State v. Renhard, 39128
Decision Date | 20 July 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 39128,39128 |
Citation | 430 P.2d 557,71 Wn.2d 670 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Marcus H. RENHARD, Appellant. |
Marcus Renhard, pro se.
Marion Garland, Bremerton, for appellant.
Nathan G. Richardson, Pros. Atty., Paul E. Froude, Deputy Pros. Atty., Port Angeles, for respondent.
The appellant was charged with the crime of larceny by means of fraudulent or false representations and was found guilty by a jury. On appeal, he raises three contentions, only one of which needs to be considered, inasmuch as it requires a reversal of the judgment.
The evidence showed that the appellant, who was president and organizer of a plywood corporation which obtained permission of the Securities Division of the Department of Licenses to sell its preferred stock to the public, obtained two checks of the corporation and appropriated the proceeds to his own use. One of these checks was in the amount of $1,400 and the other was in the amount of $650. The only income of the corporation at that time was from the sale of stock and borrowing, inasmuch as it was still in its formative stages.
Checks of the corporation were required to be signed by the appellant and by the assistant secretary, who was a woman employed in the office of the corporation. She testified that she had no authority to refuse to sign a check and signed checks when she was told to do so by the appellant or by other directors. In other words, her signature appeared on the checks simply as a precaution against forgery.
When the appellant asked the assistant secretary for the two checks in question, he told her that they were to pay for equipment for the corporation. He used them, however, to pay for property which he was purchasing for his own use.
The state did not attempt to show that the appellant was not entitled to the money, but rested after showing that he had obtained the checks and misrepresented to the assistant secretary the use which he intended to make of them. The trial court ruled that the burden had shifted to the appellant to show that he was entitled to the money. This he attempted to do by testifying that it represented earned salary which had been agreed upon by the directors and which was shown in the prospectus of the corporation.
In rebuttal to this testimony, the state offered evidence that the corporation was authorized to spend no more than two per cent of the proceeds of the sale of preferred stock on commissions and other expenses. There was, however, no showing that this two per cent was exceeded when the checks were drawn.
The court instructed the jury that it should find the appellant guilty if it found that he obtained the money by means of fraudulent representations, defining the crime of larceny according to the language of RCW 9.54.010(2), which provides that every person who, with intent to defraud or deprive the owner thereof,
Shall obtain from the owner or another the possession of or title to any property, real or personal, by color or aid of any order for the payment or delivery of property or money or any check or draft, knowing that the maker or drawer of such order, check or draft was not authorized or entitled to make or draw the same, or by color or aid of any fraudulent or false representation, personation or pretense or by any false token or writing or by any trick, device, bunco game or fortune-telling; * * *
shall be guilty of larceny.
Instruction No. 9 defining 'false or fraudulent representation' was as follows:
A false or fraudulent representation as used in these instructions is an untrue statement of an existing or past fact by one who knows it is not (to be) true, which is designed to induce the person to whom it is made to commit some act or to do something which the person would not have done had the false or fraudulent representation not have been made. As used in these instructions, 'intent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof' means a purpose to obtain (a) property of another by wrongful means or acts. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that false and...
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State v. Mehrabian
...P.2d 587. If the victim would have parted with the property even if the true facts were known, there is no theft. State v. Renhard, 71 Wash.2d 670, 672–74, 430 P.2d 557 (1967). On the other hand, it is unnecessary that the deception be the sole reason that induced the victim to give up the ......
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State v. Mehrabian
...at 529. If the victim would have parted with the property even if the true facts were known, there is no theft. State v. Renhard, 71 Wn.2d 670, 672-74, 430 P.2d 557 (1967). On the other hand, it is unnecessary that the deception be the sole reason that induced the victim to give up the prop......
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State v. Fullen
...a reasonable doubt. The requisite is that each and every element of the crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Renhard, 71 Wash.2d 670, 430 P.2d 557 (1967); RCW 10.58.020. There was substantial evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom to support a finding that the defendan......
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State v. Allen
...truth. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence supports such a determination. Allen's reliance on Renhard is mistaken. In Renhard, the defendant was the president of a corporation who asked the assistant secretary for two checks from the corporation.9......