State v. Rexford
| Decision Date | 18 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0470 |
| Citation | 501 P.3d 934 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tracy Alan REXFORD, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Benjamin M. Darrow, Darrow Law PLLC, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Brett D. Linneweber, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Appellant Tracy Alan Rexford (Rexford) appeals an August 5, 2020 Judgment of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which sentenced Rexford to 30 years in Montana State Prison (MSP), with fifteen years suspended, for Sexual Assault of a minor victim. We affirm.
¶3 In February 2018, then-fourteen-year-old K.N. informed the Yellowstone County Sheriff's Department that Rexford—K.N.’s grandfather—had sexually penetrated and sexually abused her on numerous occasions, beginning in late 2016 and lasting through January 2018. K.N. reported that Rexford had sexually abused her approximately "one to three times per month" during this time span, and she described several instances of this abuse with clear specificity. Forensic interviews with K.N.’s parents and with K.N.’s best friend corroborated these allegations. K.N.’s allegations concerning Rexford's conduct are not disputed by Rexford in this appeal.
¶4 On May 2, 2018, the State filed an Information charging Rexford with one count of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWC) under § 45-5-503(3)(a), MCA (SIWC of victim less than sixteen years old), along with an alternative count of Sexual Assault under § 45-5-502(3), MCA (sexual assault of a minor). In the Information, the State provided notice of its intent to pursue "penalty enhancement[s]" for both the SIWC charge and the alternative sexual assault charge which, if successful, would have permitted a sentence of up to 100 years for either offense. On December 2, 2019, Rexford entered a plea agreement with the State, whereby the State agreed to dismiss the SIWC charge and instead pursue only the lesser felony charge of sexual assault, for which the State would recommend a 40-year sentence to MSP with 20 years suspended. In return, Rexford agreed to plead guilty via an Alford plea—a unique type of plea afforded to criminal defendants by North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).1 Alford pleas are codified in Montana under § 46-12-212(2), MCA.2
¶5 On December 2, 2019, the District Court held a change of plea hearing to rule on Rexford's plea agreement. During this hearing, pursuant to the requirements for a valid Alford plea under § 46-12-212(2), MCA, Rexford expressly acknowledged that the facts offered by the State would be sufficient to prove that he was guilty of sexual assault of a minor beyond a reasonable doubt and that the plea was in his own best interests. The District Court made these same two factual findings and accepted Rexford's Alford plea.
¶6 Rexford's sentencing hearing was held on June 12, 2020. The State's witnesses at the sentencing hearing included K.N., K.N.’s stepsister, and both of K.N.’s parents. K.N. and her immediate family members testified that, in response to Rexford's sexual abuse, K.N. had regular "night terrors," had been clinically diagnosed with anxiety and depression, regularly suffered from flashbacks of the abuse, and had attempted suicide on four separate occasions. The Defense's witnesses at the hearing were Dr. Michael Sullivan (Sullivan) and Howard Lewis (Lewis)—two of Rexford's treatment providers from the Montana Sex Offender Treatment Organization. Sullivan testified that he had prepared a psychosexual evaluation of Rexford which advised that in-community treatment would prove beneficial to Rexford. Lewis's testimony regarding his treatment sessions with Rexford also supported Sullivan's conclusion about in-community treatment; however, Lewis's testimony noted that his and Sullivan's assessments were "totally disconnected from any appraisal of impact on the victim or the victim's family[.]" Lewis also testified that Rexford remained "defensive and a little combative" during treatment sessions.
¶7 During Rexford's sentencing hearing, the State also moved to dismiss Rexford's SIWC charge in favor of a charge of sexual assault of a minor under § 45-5-502(3), MCA, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of four years. At the hearing, Rexford argued that he was entitled to an exception to the four-year mandatory minimum under § 46-18-222(6), MCA (statute permitting discretionary "[e]xceptions to mandatory minimum sentences" in sexual offense cases). Citing the language of § 46-18-222(6), MCA, which requires a court to consider the "protection of the victim and society" before granting an exception to the mandatory minimum, the District Court held that this exception did not apply on the ground that "[Rexford's] treatment in the community [would] not provide the necessary protection for the victim and society." Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Rexford to MSP for 30 years with fifteen years suspended for sexual assault of a minor. On August 5, 2020, the District Court issued a ten-page Judgment in support of this sentence. On September 25, 2020, Rexford filed his notice of appeal.
¶8 Rexford's appeal raises three issues, each of which asks this Court to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it is an "illegal sentence." First, Rexford contends that, in entering his plea before the District Court, he actually intended to enter a "nolo contendere" plea under § 46-12-212(2), MCA, rather than an Alford guilty plea under this same statutory subsection. Second, Rexford alleges that, even if he did enter an Alford guilty plea, this plea was illegal pursuant to the legislative history underlying the adoption of § 46-12-204(4), MCA. Third, Rexford alleges that the District Court erred in finding him ineligible for an exception to the mandatory minimum sentence under § 46-18-222(6), MCA.
¶9 This Court "generally do[es] not address issues raised for the first time on appeal." State v. Longfellow , 2008 MT 343, ¶ 19, 346 Mont. 286, 194 P.3d 694. Nevertheless, when a criminal defendant's fundamental rights are invoked, this Court "may ... review a claim under the common law plain error doctrine where failing to review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process." State v. Taylor , 2010 MT 94, ¶ 12, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79 (citations omitted).
¶10 This Court "review[s] criminal sentences that include at least one year of actual incarceration to determine whether they are legal." State v. Garrymore , 2006 MT 245, ¶ 9, 334 Mont. 1, 145 P.3d 946 (citations omitted). "[A] sentence is not illegal when it falls within the parameters provided by statute." State v. Montoya , 1999 MT 180, ¶ 11, 295 Mont. 288, 988 P.2d 937 (citations omitted). "[T]he legality of a sentence is a question of law which we review de novo." State v. Hamilton , 2018 MT 253, ¶ 14, 393 Mont. 102, 428 P.3d 849 (citing Garrymore , ¶ 9).
¶11 It is undisputed that the District Court approved Rexford's plea as an Alford plea. Nevertheless, Rexford first argues that he did not intend to plead guilty pursuant to Alford . Instead, Rexford contends that he was actually seeking to enter a "nolo contendere" plea. Rexford does not cite any evidence from the record that would indicate his intent was to enter a nolo contendere plea. Instead, Rexford argues that his plea should be considered a "de facto" nolo contendere plea under § 46-12-212(2), MCA, because his plea involved the waiver of his right to trial without an ordinary admission of guilt, making it "essentially indistinguishable" from a nolo contendere plea. Based on this, Rexford argues that the District Court's acceptance of Rexford's plea as an Alford plea resulted in an "oppressive sentence" which constituted a plain error. Rexford asks that his plea be vacated. We conclude Rexford's argument here lacks merit.
¶12 First, while a District Court's misunderstanding of a defendant's intended plea may indeed warrant plain error review, no such analysis is required here. Instead, all evidence from the record thoroughly indicates that Rexford understood and intended for his plea to be an Alford plea. The first sentence of Rexford's own plea agreement reads that Rexford "agrees to enter an Alford plea ... as hereinafter set forth." Additionally, during Rexford's December 2019 change of plea hearing, the District Court repeatedly confirmed with Rexford that it was indeed his intent to enter an Alford plea under Montana law, as evidenced by the following exchange from the hearing:
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