State v. Reyes, No. 29097.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: PERRY.
• Citation: 139 Idaho 502,80 P.3d 1103
• Decision Date: 26 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 29097.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Heraclio REYES, Jr., Defendant-Respondent.

80 P.3d 1103
139 Idaho 502

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Heraclio REYES, Jr., Defendant-Respondent

No. 29097.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

November 26, 2003.

80 P.3d 1104

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued

Clark Feeney, Lewiston, for respondent. Paul Thomas Clark argued.

PERRY, Judge.

The state appeals from the decision of the district court affirming the magistrate's order reducing a charge of felony domestic

80 P.3d 1105

violence to misdemeanor domestic battery. We reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

During a dispute between Heraclio Reyes, Jr. and his wife, Reyes picked his wife up and threw her to the floor, causing injury to her arm. The state charged Reyes with felony domestic battery. I.C. § 18-918(3). At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel asked the victim whether she had reason to believe that her husband intended to inflict injury upon her. She answered "no." When defense counsel asked if the injury could be described as a "freak accident," the victim responded, "I guess you could say that." Based partly on this testimony, defense counsel argued that the felony domestic battery statute requires a willful and unlawful infliction of a traumatic injury and that the traumatic injury inflicted by Reyes was not willful.

The magistrate found that the offense of felony domestic battery requires a battery and a willful and intentional act of inflicting a traumatic injury and that the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that Reyes willfully inflicted a traumatic injury. The magistrate reduced the charge against Reyes to misdemeanor domestic battery. I.C. § 18-918(5). The state appealed, and the district court affirmed.

The state again appeals, presenting two arguments. The state asserts that the magistrate erred in determining that the felony domestic battery statute requires intent to inflict the specific injury actually suffered by the victim. The state contends that, because the evidence demonstrated that Reyes threw his wife down causing her arm to break, the magistrate should have found probable cause to bind Reyes over to the district court on felony domestic battery. The state also argues that the magistrate exceeded its jurisdiction when it reduced the charge to misdemeanor domestic battery rather than dismissing the charge so that the state could elect to refile another felony offense.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we examine the record of the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 939, 866 P.2d 193, 196 (Ct.App.1993). A magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed an offense should be overturned only upon a showing that the magistrate abused its discretion. State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983); State v. Phelps, 131 Idaho 249, 251, 953 P.2d 999, 1001 (Ct.App.1998). The finding of probable cause must be based upon substantial evidence on every material element of the offense charged, and this test may be satisfied through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct.App.1990). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

III.

DISCUSSION

The state argues that the magistrate erred when it determined that the felony domestic battery offense requires a willful infliction of the actual injury suffered by the victim. Based on this determination, the state asserts that the magistrate abused its discretion when it refused to bind Reyes over on the charge of felony domestic violence. The correct interpretation of the statute, the state contends, is that a person must commit a battery and willfully inflict a traumatic

80 P.3d 1106

injury rather than willfully inflict the specific injury suffered by the victim. In his briefing, Reyes agrees with the state's interpretation of the statute, arguing however that the magistrate analyzed the charge under that interpretation and still found a lack of probable cause to bind Reyes over for felony domestic...