State v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 03 June 2016
• Docket Number: 113,565
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals
• Parties: State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Louis Reynolds, III, Appellant.

State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Louis Reynolds, III, Appellant.

No. 113, 565

Court of Appeals of Kansas

June 3, 2016

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Benjamin L. Burgess, judge.

Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Gardner, P.J., Leben, J., and Hebert, S.J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Louis Reynolds, III, appeals from the district court's denial of his postsentence motion to withdraw his plea. Reynolds claims his plea was not voluntarily and knowingly made because he was not told that the charge to which he pled should have been barred since it should have been included as an additional count in an earlier prosecution against him in another county. Reynolds also claimed that his attorney was ineffective for not informing him of that compulsory joinder argument. We find the trial court properly denied Reynolds' motion to withdraw his plea, although we base our holding on grounds a little different than those stated by the district court.

Procedural background

The facts are not disputed. In December 2012, Louis Reynolds III, and two associates entered the home of Travis Maes near Dodge City, Kansas, in Ford County. The men confronted Maes with a weapon, forced him into his home, and struck him with the weapon. They took weapons, drugs, a cellular phone, a computer, and money from Maes and then left in a car headed toward Wichita, Kansas.

Approximately 2 hours later, they were stopped by a law enforcement officer in Sedgwick County. The officer had seen the car's rear passenger door open as the car was traveling nearly 50 miles per hour and had seen an unknown item come out of the car, so he stopped the car due to a possible littering violation. Defendant does not challenge the legality of this stop, his detention, or the ensuing search of the car or its contents.

When the officer searched the car, he found weapons, cellular phones, a laptop, money, five bags of marijuana, and three bags of cocaine. After Reynolds admitted that those items belonged to him, he was arrested.

While the officer was completing paperwork, one of the stolen phones received a text message. An officer contacted the number displayed on the phone. Following a conversation with that individual, the officer believed the owner of the phone lived in Dodge City and was either a victim of or a witness to a crime. The officer then contacted the Dodge City Police Department and was told the police were working a case of battery and theft involving individuals who matched the description of Reynolds and the two other men.

In January 2013, following an investigation, Reynolds was charged in Ford County with the following: one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated battery, one count of theft, and one count of felony cruelty to animals. Reynolds waived his preliminary hearing and entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted kidnapping and one count of robbery. The State dismissed the remaining counts.

During Reynolds' plea hearing, the State presented the following factual basis for the plea:

"Your Honor, were the matter to have proceeded to trial the State would put on evidence that between the dates of December 12^th and December 13^th of last year, Mr. Reynolds and two of his associates entered into a dwelling which would've been the residence of a Travis Maes here in Dodge City within Ford County, Kansas. This is 11258 110 Spring Road. They confronted Mr. Maes, they confronted him with a weapon, told him they wanted his-they wanted his money and also drugs that he had. They forced him into his house, they struck him with a weapon and then took weapons from Mr. Maes along with drugs, a phone, computer and some money and then left that residence and hit the road for Wichita, at which point they were pulled over by Goddard police with those weapons. Mr.-Blood we believe would be identified to be Mr. Maes' blood on them along with the weapons and the computer and the cell phone that would've been in their vehicle."

No other facts were proffered or admitted during the plea hearing about the events near Dodge City.

The Ford County district court sentenced Reynolds, who had no prior criminal history, to 63 months' imprisonment and then suspended the sentence and granted him 36 months' probation under the supervision of community corrections.

Reynolds was subsequently charged in Sedgwick County with drug offenses, including possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on the drugs found in the car stop. Reynolds admits and the State does not contest that those drugs were taken during the Ford County robbery approximately 2 hours before Reynolds' Sedgwick County arrest. Reynolds pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the prosecution dismissed the other charges, and the district court sentenced him to 73 months' imprisonment. That sentence was to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in the Ford County case. Reynolds' sentence was calculated on a criminal history score of B, which was based on his Ford County convictions.

Reynolds later filed a postsentence motion to withdraw his plea in the Sedgwick County case, claiming it "was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made because he was never informed that he had a meritorious [compulsory joinder] claim against the Sedgwick County charges." He also alleged his counsel was ineffective for having failed to inform him he had a compulsory joinder claim.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on that motion. After hearing the evidence and argument from both sides, the district court found that no "evidence" had been presented in the Ford County case because the factual basis for the guilty pleas was not evidence, thus the compulsory joinder rule did not apply. The district court also found Reynolds' trial counsel was not ineffective because the compulsory joinder claim was not meritorious. Accordingly, the district court denied Reynolds' postsentence motion to withdraw his plea. Reynolds timely appeals.

I. Did Reynolds waive his right to assert his compulsory joinder claim by pleading guilty?

We first address the State's contention that Reynolds waived his right to raise a compulsory joinder defense by entering a guilty plea in this Sedgwick County case.

The State relies on the general rule that a guilty plea waives a double jeopardy claim. Thompson v. State, 23 Kan.App.2d 305, 307, 929 P.2d 803 (1996) (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-75, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 [1989]). The State correctly argues that when a defendant pleads guilty, the defendant "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including a claim of double jeopardy." See State v. Edwards, 281 Kan. 1334, 1341, 135 P.3d 1251 (2006). Furthermore, a defendant waives the right to assert a double-jeopardy based collateral attack on convictions and sentences. See Thompson, 23 Kan.App.2d at 307.

But Reynolds does not make a double jeopardy claim here. We do not construe his statutory compulsory joinder claim as making a constitutional claim. See In re Berkowitz, 3 Kan.App.2d 726, 734, 602 P.2d 99 (1979); see also 22A C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 655 (statutory compulsory joinder provisions expand proscription of double jeopardy beyond constitutional protections). Our compulsory joinder statute, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5110(b)(1), provides different protection than double jeopardy-its object is to prevent the prosecution from substantially proving a crime in a trial in which the crime is not charged, and then in effect retrying the defendant for the same offense in a later trial where it is charged. See State v. Mahlandt, 231 Kan. 665, 668, 647 P.2d 1307 (1982). Double jeopardy, however, prohibits multiple punishments for the same crime. U.S. Const. amend. V; State v. Van Lehman, No. 112, 500, 2015 WL 7162178, at *4 (Kan. App. 2015)(unpublished opinion).

Additionally, Reynolds asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which is intertwined with his compulsory joinder claim-the crux of Reynolds' argument is that he did not enter his plea knowingly due to his counsel's ineffectiveness. And the State does not contend that Reynolds waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by pleading guilty. We do not agree that Reynolds has waived either of his claims, so we address the issues on the merits. See Thompson, 23 Kan.App.2d at 307-08 (finding "[a]bsent a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, Thompson's argument that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his double jeopardy rights fails").

II. Did the district court err in finding compulsory joinder did not apply?

A. Standard of review

K.S.A 2015 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) provides that the district court, after sentencing, may set aside a conviction and permit a defendant to withdraw a plea upon a showing of manifest injustice. Factors the district court generally considers in determining whether a defendant has shown the manifest injustice necessary to withdraw a plea after sentencing mirror those considered when reviewing for good cause to support a presentence motion. See State v. Morris, 298 Kan. 1091, 1100-01, 319 P.3d 539 (2014). "In evaluating a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea, the district court should consider: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made." State v. Green, 283 Kan. 531, 546, 153 P.3d 1216 (2007); see...