State v. Reynolds, 1643.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1938
• Docket Number: No. 1643.,1643.
• Citation: 1 A.2d 730
• Parties: STATE v. REYNOLDS.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

1 A.2d 730

STATE

v. REYNOLDS.

No. 1643.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Washington.

Jan. 4, 1938.

Exceptions from Washington County Court; Walter H. Cleary, Judge.

Edward A. Reynolds was convicted of perjury, and from an order overruling motion made before trial to dismiss the information, defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Argued before POWERS, C. J., and SLACK, MOULTON, SHERBURNE, and BUTTLES, JJ.

Webster E. Miller; State's Atty., of Montpelier, for the State.

H. C. Shurtleff, of Montpelier, for respondent.

BUTTLES, Justice.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of perjury in Washington County Court and comes here on exception to the overruling by the trial court of his motion, made before trial, to dismiss the information. All other exceptions taken during the trial were waived and the only contention now urged by the defendant is that the prosecution of the criminal charge in this case violates the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14, § 1, in that he was denied equal protection of the laws. He bases this contention on Section 6648 of the Public Laws which reads thus: "The commissioner shall not be liable in any civil action or criminal prosecution for any act or omission in his official capacity, under the provisions of chapters 271 to 276, made in good faith and upon reasonable grounds or for any act or omission in accord with the advice of the advisory banking board." The commissioner referred to is the state commissioner of banking and insurance.

If the last clause of this section is to be given the broad construction for which the defendant contends the logical result would be that said commissioner would be immune from prosecution for any statutory or common law crime that he might commit, provided he could show that he acted on advice of the board. Should he be guilty of burglary, arson or murder, proof that the advisory banking board advised commission of the crime would be a perfect defense. Such a result would obviously be unreasonable and absurd. It is always presumed in regard to a statute that no unjust or unreasonable result was intended by the legislature. Matter of Meyer, 209 N.Y. 386, 103 N.E. 713, Ann. Cas.1915A, 263; Brackett v. Chamberlain, 115 Me. 335, 98 A. 933.

It has been said that ambiguity exists within the meaning of the rule authorizing resort to extrinsic facts when the literal meaning of the statute is absurd or unreasonable. 59 C.J. 1016, and cases there cited; Matter of Meyer, supra. This court has held repeatedly that a construction of a statute leading to an absurd consequence must always be avoided if possible. Brammall v. Larose, 105 Vt 345, 350, 165 A. 916; Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128, 131, 163 A. 628; In re Fulham's Estate, 96 Vt. 308, 317, 119 A. 433; Morse v. Tracy, 91 Vt. 476, 478, 479, 100 A. 923; In re Howard's Estate, 80 Vt. 489, 495, 68 A. 513. However, some authorities seem to require that a statute shall be something more than unreasonable or absurd before resort is had to judicial construction, and certainly great care should be used by the court not to expand proper construction into judicial legislation. The United States Supreme Court has recently said: "but a consideration of what is there said will disclose that the principle"—avoiding absurd results—"is to be applied to override the literal terms of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances. The illustrative cases cited in the opinion demonstrate that, to justify a departure from the letter of the law upon that ground, the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense. * * And there must be something to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail." Crooks v. Harrelson et al, 282 U.S. 55, 51 S.Ct. 49, 50, 75 L.Ed. 156.

We think that the section of the Public Laws under consideration here meets both of these requirements. The absurdity of a general license to the commissioner of banking and insurance to commit crime is so gross as to shock the general moral and common sense, and a consideration of the history of the enactment of this section, the other sections which were portions of the same act, the unusual business and economic conditions which then existed and the obvious purpose of the legislation make plain the intent of the legislature that the broad literal meaning of the words, "in accord with the advice of the advisory banking board" in P.L. 6648 was not to prevail without limitation. Section 6648 was enacted as section 3 of No. 124 of the Acts of 1933. P.L. 6646 was section 1 of the same Act, and P.L. 6647 was section 2 thereof. There were twenty-three other sections of the same act, all pertaining to banks and banking, and eighteen of these sections were amendatory of previously existing banking laws. The first three sections above referred to were new matter, there being no previous legislative provision for an advisory banking board. The House and Senate journals disclose that H. 179, which became Act No. 124...