State v. Reynolds

Citation97 A.3d 999,152 Conn.App. 318
Decision Date19 August 2014
Docket NumberNo. 35782.,35782.
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Sheldon REYNOLDS.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alan Jay Black, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Susann E. Gill, supervisory assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEACH and BISHOP, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The defendant, Sheldon Reynolds, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a (a) and one count of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violationof General Statutes § 29–35. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior misconduct, (2) abused its discretion in admitting into evidence one victim's hearsay statements, (3) violated his sixth amendment right to confront an adverse witness by admitting recordings of two separate 911 calls into evidence, and (4) erred in failing to suppress his written statement in violation of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the appeal. A couple of years before her murder, one of the victims, Debbie Brown, developed a relationship with the defendant. Brown knew the defendant as “Mad Man,” Donald Davis,” or simply “Jimmi.” The nature of their relationship was tumultuous. For example, sometime in 2006, the defendant found a photograph of Brown and another male that was taken when Brown had lived in Jamaica. After seeing the photograph, the defendant got angry and told Brown to cut and burn the photograph. During this incident, the defendant accused Brown of being in a relationship with the man in the photograph. Then, he took the photograph from Brown and burned it. Later that same year, the defendant became physical during an argument with Brown and pushed her. The couple, however, stayed together until approximately July, 2008, when Brown and her daughter, Rejeen Morrison, moved out of the apartment they were sharing in Bridgeport with the defendant and moved in with Brown's friend, Cheryl Wilson. After she moved, Brown did not inform the defendant of her new address.

Sometime in August or September, 2008, Brown confided to Beth Landers, who was her employer at the time, about the nature of her troubles with the defendant. During that conversation, Brown sounded very upset. After the conversation, Brown filled out a form for a restraining order seeking protection from the defendant. She attempted to file the request in Stamford, the town where she worked, but the local police could not accept the filing because they lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.

Throughout these months, the defendant repeatedly called Brown's friends, associates, and employers looking for Brown. During his calls, the defendant sounded loud and vulgar, sometimes accusing Brown of cheating, and refused to hang up when told that she was not there. In reaction to these persistent telephone calls, Brown asked her friends and employers not to put her on the telephone with the defendant even if she was present when the call came in. On the rare occasions when Brown would answer the defendant's calls, she would tell him to stop calling and to stay away from her.

The defendant's attempts to locate Brown were not confined to making just telephone calls. One morning in early October, 2008, at about 5:30 a.m., the defendant climbed into a second story window of a private residence in Greenwich where Brown worked as a home caregiver to an elderly person. He was met by Brown's coworker, Lovella Cooper, who was substituting for Brown at the time. When the defendant realized that Brown was not present, he identified himself as “Jimmi” and told Cooper that he was looking for his wife. The defendant was wearing black clothes, gloves, and a “tam” hat.1 Once she found out about it, Brown asked Cooper not to report the incident to the police, promising to “handle it.” On the morning of October 23, 2008, Brown was confronted by the defendant when she was leaving her residence for work. She was able to get back inside the building and lock the door behind her. The defendant approached the front door saying, “you think I wouldn't find where you live.” He then started pounding on the door while repeating several times, “I'm gonna get you ... I gonna get you.” The defendant retreated only after Brown requested police assistance over the telephone.

On December 6, 2008, one day before the murders, the defendant called Wilson on the telephone and told her that he had seen a man, later identified as Desmond McFarland, bring food to Brown's daughter, Morrison, the night before.2 During that call, the defendant stated that Brown was “his woman,” and that if she was to “do anything he'd feel justified for it and he will go [to] prison for anything he do.”

At approximately 7:15 p.m. on December 7, 2008, Brown's housemates, Wilson, Sean Nugent, and Stacey Rhodeen, heard a series of loud bangs outside. As Nugent and Rhodeen looked outside to see what was going on, they observed a slim man, dressed in black clothes and wearing a “tam” hat, walk away from the house in a hurry, get into a car that was parked nearby, and leave the scene without turning on the headlights of his car. Responding police officers discovered a car with two victims, Brown and McFarland, inside. McFarland had been shot seven times and Brown had been shot six times; both died from the multiple gunshot wounds. On December 8, 2008, a semiautomatic handgun was found nearby and was later identified as the murder weapon.

As a result of the ensuing criminal investigation, the defendant was arrested on January 16, 2009. He was charged in a three count information with two counts of murder and one count of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges. The court sentenced him to a total effective term of 125 years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant's first claim is that the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of three instances of prior misconduct. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court erred in admitting the (1) evidence that the defendant climbed through the second story window of the Greenwich residence looking for Brown, (2) evidence that Brown had filled out a restraining order application seeking protection from the defendant, and (3) evidence of a domestic dispute witnessed by Morrison, approximately two years before the murders. The defendant further maintains that the prejudicial impact of this evidence outweighed its probative value. We disagree.

We review the admission of the disputed evidence based on an abuse of discretion standard guided by the following principles. “The admission of evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is a decision properly within the discretion of the trial court.... [E]very reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court's ruling.... [T]he trial court's decision will be reversed only where abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injusticeappears to have been done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 65 Conn.App. 470, 475–76, 783 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930, 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

Our Supreme Court has established a two part test to determine the admissibility of evidence of a criminal defendant's prior misconduct. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions outlined in § 4–5(b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, and, second, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328, 340, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007).

“Although evidence of prior unconnected crimes is inadmissible to demonstrate the defendant's bad character or to suggest that the defendant has a propensity for criminal behavior ... such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as to prove knowledge, intent, motive, and common scheme or design, if the trial court determines, in the exercise of judicial discretion, that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial tendency.... That evidence tends to prove the commission of other crimes by the accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337, 354–55, 852 A.2d 676 (2004).

“It is not essential that the state prove a motive for a crime.... But it strengthens its case when an adequate motive can be shown.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Hoyeson, 154 Conn. 302, 307, 224 A.2d 735 (1966). “Evidence of prior misconduct that tends to show that the defendant harbored hostility toward the intended victim of a violent crime is admissible to establish motive.” State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 795, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007). “When instances of a criminal defendant's prior misconduct involve the same victim as the crimes for which the defendant presently is being tried, those acts are especially illuminative of the defendant's motivation and attitude toward that victim, and, thus, of his intent as to the incident in question.” State v. Irizarry, 95 Conn.App. 224, 235, 896 A.2d 828, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 902, 901 A.2d 1224 (2006). “Because intent is almost always proved, if at all, by circumstantial evidence, prior misconduct evidence, where available, is often relied upon.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 234, 896 A.2d 828.

“The trial court's discretionary determination that the probative value of evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect will not be...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • State v. Badaracco
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • April 21, 2015
    ...(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529, 548, A.3d (2014); see also State v. Reynolds, 152 Conn. App. 318, 325-26, 97 A.3d 999, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 934, 102 A.3d 85 (2014). The state directs our attention to State v. Peeler, 267 Conn. 611, 61......
  • State v. Houghtaling, AC 35720
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • March 17, 2015
    ...his Miranda rights. Rather, he makes the narrow claim that he never waived them." [Emphasis in original.]); State v. Reynolds, 152 Conn. App. 318, 354, 97 A.3d 999 (noting that defendant did not challenge fact that he received and understood Miranda warning and that he therefore "acted with......
  • State v. Houghtaling
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • March 17, 2015
    ...his Miranda rights. Rather, he makes the narrow claim that he never waived them.” [Emphasis in original.] ); State v. Reynolds, 152 Conn.App. 318, 354, 97 A.3d 999 (noting that defendant did not challenge fact that he received and understood Miranda warning and that he therefore “acted with......
  • State v. Morales
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • March 29, 2016
    ...inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material....” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 152 Conn.App. 318, 324–25, 97 A.3d 999, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 934, 102 A.3d 85 (2014).First, the defendant contends that the evidence of prior uncharged mis......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT