State v. Rheams
Citation | 352 So.2d 615 |
Decision Date | 14 November 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 59638,59638 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Marvin R. RHEAMS. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Doran, Jr., Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Douglas Moreau, Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
In an eleven count bill of information defendant Marvin R. Rheams was charged with nine counts of armed robbery, one count of attempted armed robbery and one count of attempted first degree murder. He was tried by a jury and convicted of four counts of armed robbery, the charge of attempted armed robbery and the attempted first degree murder charge. Defendant was acquitted of the five remaining armed robbery counts. After sentence he lodged this appeal relying upon three assignments of error.
Evidence of an oral confession was improperly admitted for several reasons the defendant contends. He did not sign any statement or form indicating that he understood the Miranda warnings read to him by the police officer until some time after the warnings were given. Nor did he make a statement at that time. However, later he did make an oral statement but refused to reduce it to writing.
These delays, defendant argues, indicate that he was not sure of his rights or of the effect of unwritten statements by him, the implication being that he may have felt a statement could not be used against him unless written. He asserts that his indecision and his refusal to reduce the statement to writing illustrate his failure to appreciate his legal rights. Thus, the argument concludes, it was error to admit the oral confession.
Police officers testified that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and that he originally refused to make a statement. However, later when they were assembled for a lineup, defendant confessed voluntarily and without coercion at a time when no effort was being made to elicit such an admission. No testimony was offered to rebut the free and voluntary character of the confession, only the argument is made that the delays involved indicated his lack of appreciation for the consequences of his action.
Based upon the testimony of two officers that defendant's confession was free and voluntary, and the lack of evidence to the contrary, the trial judge found the confession admissible.
It is noted at the outset that there is no requirement in law that a person sign a statement to the effect that he has been advised of his rights before making a statement. While such a practice may be considered advisable to support proof that the Miranda warning was given, failure to obtain such a written statement does not deny the accused any legal right.
Undoubtedly, as the defense contends, the State is obliged to demonstrate affirmatively the free and voluntary character of the confession it seeks to introduce in evidence. La.Rev.Stat. 15:451. The burden is a heavy one which must be fully discharged. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 703(C); State v. Taylor, 336 So.2d 855 (La.1976).
In factual determinations where the evidence in support of admissibility is positive, and only inferences to be drawn from delays by the confessor are urged by the defense to support its position that the accused did not understand his rights, the ruling of the trial judge finding the confession admissible will not be disturbed on review. State v. McSpaddin, 341 So.2d 868 (La.1977) and cases cited there.
The case of State v. Bray, 292 So.2d 697 (La.1974) is somewhat analogous to the situation here. There defendant first availed himself of the right to remain silent after receiving his Miranda warnings, but later changed his mind and gave a statement to the police. The Court drew an opposite conclusion then saying defendant's decision to remain silent immediately after arrest indicated an understanding of his rights.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case the decision to remain silent was not irreversible, and a later change of mind induced by a voluntary decision to confess does not require a conclusion that the delayed confession was involuntary or made without understanding of the confessor's legal rights in the matter.
After the State had presented the bulk of its case, defense counsel verbally moved in open court to quash the indictment on the ground that Article 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional. In brief it is asserted that after listening to the State's evidence, the defense observed that the prosecutor had failed to show that the offenses occurred in the same transaction, or that the offenses were so connected together as to constitute part of a common scheme or plan.
Article 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically covers this situation; it states that "(t)he objections of duplicity, misjoinder of defendants, or misjoinder of offenses may be urged only by a motion to quash the indictment." And Article 535 of the Code states that a motion to quash may be filed "at any time before commencement of the trial." The "motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the defendant or his attorney, and filed in open court or in the office of the clerk of court." La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 536. The statutory formalities were not complied with in this case.
These legislative requirements for the orderly conduct of trials are not meaningless. They are reasonable, based upon experience, and designed to promote the efficient administration of justice. Compliance imposes no undue burden on the defense. Failure to satisfy these formalities results in a waiver of the rights sought...
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...State v. Trudell, 350 So.2d 658 (1977). Furthermore, the State's burden is a heavy one which must be fully discharged. State v. Rheams, 352 So.2d 615 (1977); State v. Taylor, 336 So.2d 855 Our statutes make clear that when an accused takes the witness stand he is subject to all the rules ap......
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