State v. Rhodes, 45963
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Citation | 600 P.2d 1264,92 Wn.2d 755 |
| Docket Number | No. 45963,45963 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kim Wade RHODES, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 11 October 1979 |
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v.
Kim Wade RHODES, Appellant.
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[600 P.2d 1265] Institutional Legal Services, Stan Taylor, Seattle, for appellant.
Henry R. Dunn, Cowlitz County Pros. Atty., Kelso, Robin M. Force, Longview, for respondent.
DOLLIVER, Justice.
Defendant Kim Rhodes, a juvenile, was arrested on August 4, 1978, on suspicion of theft of a motorcycle. He asked to see an attorney but was told by a police officer he was not entitled to appointed counsel unless his parents sold their car. When defendant appeared before the court commissioner for hearing, he was not represented by counsel but was then informed by the court that the police officer was wrong and counsel would be appointed if he or his parents could not afford to hire an attorney. The court further informed defendant of the services an attorney would provide. Defendant was asked twice if he wished to be represented by counsel; he said he did not. Defendant pled guilty, the court accepted the plea and proceeded to disposition.
After testimony from a probation officer, a juvenile parole counselor, and defendant's mother, the court announced its judgment. The court invoked the "manifest injustice" exception to the sentencing standards of RCW 13.40 (the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977), and ordered the defendant committed to the Department of Social and Health Services for 24-36 weeks. Defendant appealed. The case was transferred here from the Court of Appeals because defendant has challenged the constitutionality of the "manifest injustice" exception to the sentencing standards of the new juvenile code.
Three questions are before us: (1) Was the waiver of counsel knowing, intelligent, expressed and voluntary as required by statute? (2) Is the "manifest injustice" exception to the sentencing standards of the juvenile justice act
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void for vagueness? (3) Was there "clear and convincing" evidence to support the sentence imposed?RCW 13.40.140(9) sets the criteria for waiver of counsel:
Waiver of any right which a child has under this chapter must be an express waiver intelligently made by the child after the child has been fully informed of the right being waived.
RCW 13.40.140(2) provides that "The youth shall be fully advised of his or her right to an attorney and of the relevant services an attorney can provide."
A fair reading of the record convinces us the court commissioner complied with the spirit and content of the statute. The defendant and his mother were fully advised of his rights to have an attorney and the services which an attorney could provide. Twice Kim Rhodes was asked if he wanted an attorney; twice he said, "No". There was no violation of RCW 13.40.140(2), (9).
The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 directs the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services to develop disposition standards for juvenile offenders. These standards provide ranges of confinement, partial confinement, and community supervision based on the offender's age, criminal history and seriousness of the offense.
Defendant was found to be a "middle offender" under the terms of the act. RCW 13.40.160(4) provides for the following disposition in such cases:
Where the respondent is found to have committed an offense and is neither a [600 P.2d 1266] serious offender nor a minor or first offender, consistent with the purposes of this chapter the court shall: (a)(i) Where the appropriate standard range includes a period of confinement exceeding thirty days, sentence the offender to the department for a term consisting of the appropriate standard range, or (ii) where the appropriate standard range does not include a period of confinement exceeding thirty days, sentence the offender to a determinate term within the appropriate standard range in which case the court shall consider only those aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in RCW 13.40.150 and shall state its reasons for selecting the particular punishment imposed, or (b) shall impose a
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term of community supervision. If the court sentencing pursuant to subsection (a)(i) or (ii) of this section finds that a disposition within the standard range would effectuate a manifest injustice, it may impose a disposition other than community supervision outside the range but only after it enters reasons upon which it bases its...To continue reading
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State v. S.D.H., 53841-5-II
...in order to "prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application of the manifest exception." State v. Rhodes , 92 Wash.2d 755, 759, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds , State v. Baldwin , 150 Wash.2d 448, 78 P.3d 1005 (2003). The juvenile court is not, however, limited to conside......
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State v. M.S., 96894-2
...courts may consider nonstatutory aggravating factors in imposing a manifest injustice disposition. State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 759, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979) ("[T]he court is not limited to consideration of these [statutorily enumerated] factors."), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ba......
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Stastny v. Board of Trustees of Central Washington University, 4759-III-8
...enforcement. Seattle v. Rice, 93 Wash.2d 728, 731, 612 P.2d 792 (1980); State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 758-59, [647 P.2d 506] 600 P.2d 1264 (1979). When First Amendment rights are involved, a greater degree of specificity is required. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77, 96 S.Ct. 612, 662, 4......
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State v. T.J.S.-M., 96434-3
...he presents a clear danger to society for a manifest injustice disposition to be upheld. Id. (citing State v. Rhodes , 92 Wash.2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979) ). He also cites to a long line of cases that also hold similar propositions.2 ¶ 21 The State argues the line of cases that T.J.S.-M. r......
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Stastny v. Board of Trustees of Central Washington University, 4759-III-8
...enforcement. Seattle v. Rice, 93 Wash.2d 728, 731, 612 P.2d 792 (1980); State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 758-59, [647 P.2d 506] 600 P.2d 1264 (1979). When First Amendment rights are involved, a greater degree of specificity is required. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77, 96 S.Ct. 612, 662, 4......
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State v. T.J.S.-M., 96434-3
...he presents a clear danger to society for a manifest injustice disposition to be upheld. Id. (citing State v. Rhodes , 92 Wash.2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979) ). He also cites to a long line of cases that also hold similar propositions.2 ¶ 21 The State argues the line of cases that T.J.S.-M. r......
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State v. Olivas, 59436-8
...Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash.2d 259, 676 P.2d 996 (1984); State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 64 Spokane v. Douglass, supra, 115 Wash.2d at 182, 795 P.2d 693. 65 100 Wash.2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983). 66 Brief of Appellants, at 17-20......
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State v. S.D.H., 53841-5-II
...in order to "prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application of the manifest exception." State v. Rhodes , 92 Wash.2d 755, 759, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds , State v. Baldwin , 150 Wash.2d 448, 78 P.3d 1005 (2003). The juvenile court is not, however, limited to conside......