State v. Rhodes

• Decision Date: 27 March 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20070
• Citation: 249 A.3d 683,335 Conn. 226
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Amelia RHODES

335 Conn. 226

249 A.3d 683

STATE of Connecticut

v.Amelia RHODES

SC 20070

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 12, 2018

Officially released March 27, 2020^*

Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Michael A. DeJoseph, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Vertefeuille and Prescott, Js.^**

D'AURIA, J.

The defendant, Amelia Rhodes, challenges her conviction of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-217 (a)¹ and having a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 29-38 (a).² The evidence presented to the jury at her trial showed that she drove an armed passenger, Lamar Spann, around Bridgeport for ninety minutes, including to and from the place where Spann discharged a weapon. The defendant appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she constructively possessed a firearm under § 53a-217 (a) or that she knowingly had a firearm under § 29-38 (a). We disagree with the defendant and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As both of the defendant's claims on appeal challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we first must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and then determine whether, on the basis of those facts and the inferences reasonably drawn from them, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. James E. , 327 Conn. 212, 218, 173 A.3d 380 (2017). "On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury's] verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier , 330 Conn. 149, 187, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019).

With these principles in mind, our review of the record discloses the following relevant facts that the jury could have reasonably found. At the time of the shooting at issue, the defendant and Spann had a relationship going back as many as seven years. Spann had been a drug dealer for much of this time, and, because of the risks involved in that enterprise and the need to coerce payments from customers, he commonly carried a firearm. According to Spann's testimony, the defendant "[m]aybe" knew he was a drug dealer. Between July 29 and August 17, 2013, the two had once or twice gone together to a rental car agency where Spann had rented a black Chevrolet Impala.

On the afternoon of August 17, 2013, Spann left his home, driving the Impala and carrying a nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun that was not equipped with a silencer. At about 4 p.m., he picked up the defendant at her home. At the defendant's request, she drove the Impala while Spann sat in the front passenger seat.

The defendant and Spann were together in the car for nearly all of the next ninety minutes. For the first forty-five minutes, the defendant drove "around" with no apparent destination. At about 4:45 p.m., they stopped at a gas station-convenience store, and Spann went inside. Surveillance images of him in the store are inconclusive as to whether the gun was on his person or whether it remained with the defendant in the Impala. After Spann reentered the car, the defendant drove for another forty-five minutes. Spann testified that he kept the gun "under [his] lap" or sat on it during this portion of their drive.

At about 5:30 p.m., they approached a large outdoor social gathering near a housing complex on Trumbull Avenue in Bridgeport. The defendant stopped the car in the lane of travel rather than driving toward the sidewalk and stopping there. Spann then exited the car, fired multiple gunshots from the weapon, and reentered the car.

After reentering the car, Spann told the defendant to drive. Unbeknownst to them, however, police officers had been stationed nearby and witnessed the shooting. When the officers attempted to block the Impala with their patrol car, the defendant maneuvered around them and continued along Trumbull Avenue with the officers in pursuit. She proceeded to weave between pedestrians, drive past multiple stop signs without stopping and drive at high rates of speed. After a 1.2 mile car chase, the defendant crashed the car as she approached a highway entrance ramp. Spann testified that, during the car chase, the gun was "on the side of [him] ... in between the seat and the door."

After the crash, the defendant and Spann fled on foot. The police found the defendant hiding in an unlit sewer in waist-deep water and arrested her. Spann, who initially evaded the police, testified that he disposed of the gun while the police chased him but was arrested after appearing at the Bridgeport police station and falsely reporting that the Impala had been stolen. The police never recovered the gun. Spann pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine³ to various charges related to this incident and was sentenced. He did not face additional criminal exposure as a result of his testimony at the defendant's trial. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The record also reveals the following procedural history. The state charged the defendant in a two part substitute information with seven offenses stemming from the incident: (1) attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (1) and 53a-49 (a) (2) ; (2) carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a) ; (3) having a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of § 29-38 (a); (4) interfering with a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a) ; (5) using a motor vehicle without the owner's permission in violation of General Statutes § 53a-119b (a) (1) ; (6) reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222 (a) ; and (7) criminal possession of a firearm in violation of § 53a-217 (a).

After two days of evidence, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit, stating that "the court certainly heard evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the defendant] constructively possessed the gun" but not that she had "carried [the firearm] on ... her person," as required by § 29-35 (a).⁴ The jury found the defendant not guilty of attempted assault and interfering with an officer but found her guilty of having a weapon in a motor vehicle, using a motor vehicle without the owner's permission, and reckless driving. The jury then separately heard evidence of the defendant's prior convictions for the sale of hallucinogens or narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a) and stealing a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-212, and found her guilty of criminal possession of a firearm.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and the appeal was transferred to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c) ; Practice Book § 65-1. On appeal, the defendant challenges her conviction of criminal possession of a firearm and having a weapon in a motor vehicle.⁵ We reject both of these claims.

I

The defendant claims first on appeal that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she "possessed" a firearm and, therefore, that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of criminal possession of a firearm under § 53a-217 (a). She argues that the evidence established only that she and the firearm were in the same car at the same time and that, on the basis of this alone, the jury could not reasonably infer that she possessed the firearm. We disagree and conclude that the record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence, beyond mere proximity, that the defendant knew the firearm was in the car, was in a position to control it, and intended to control it. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm.

"A party challenging the validity of the jury's verdict on grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support such a result carries a difficult burden." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagliano v. Advanced Specialty Care, P.C. , 329 Conn. 745, 754, 189 A.3d 587 (2018). In particular, before this court may overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, it must conclude that "no reasonable jury" could arrive at the conclusion the jury did. State v. Terwilliger , 314 Conn. 618, 660, 104 A.3d 638 (2014). Although "the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense ... each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 187, 193 A.3d 1.

A

A defendant is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm if (1) the defendant "possesses" a firearm, (2) the defendant is a convicted felon, and (3) the firearm is operable.⁶ The defendant disputes only whether she "possessed" the firearm for purposes of § 53a-217 (a).

" ‘Possess’ means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property ...." General Statutes § 53a-3 (2). Therefore, possession may be actual or constructive. See, e.g., State v. Butler , 296 Conn. 62, 77, 993 A.2d 970 (2010). This court consistently has held that constructive possession is "possession without direct physical contact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson , 316 Conn. 45, 58, 111 A.3d 436 (2015). It can mean "an appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the [contraband]"; (internal quotation...