State v. Ribbecke
| Decision Date | 25 May 1982 |
| Citation | 185 N.J.Super. 65,447 A.2d 215 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Kevin Roy RIBBECKE, Defendant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Gaetano T. Gregory, Asst. Prosecutor, for plaintiff (Harold J. Ruvoldt, Jr., Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney).
John J. Hughes, Bayonne, for defendant.
The question presented is whether a young adult offender who committed manslaughter by firearm may be sentenced to an indeterminate term at the Youth Correctional Institution Complex notwithstanding the minimum terms and parole ineligibility provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 c (commonly known as the Graves Act).
Defendant Kevin Roy Ribbecke, age 24, was indicted for aggravated assault ( N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 b(4)), possession of a gun for unlawful purposes ( N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4), and aggravated manslaughter ( N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a). A jury found defendant not guilty of the assault and possession charges and failed to reach agreement on the aggravated manslaughter charge after extensive deliberations. Thereafter, the State and defendant submitted a plea arrangement for the court's approval: in return for defendant's plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that no parole ineligibility term be imposed.
Kevin Ribbecke and the victim, Robert Lucas, were best friends. On September 20, 1981 they were celebrating the birth of Kevin's first child. Kevin had recently passed an examination for the Bayonne Police Department and at the beginning of the previous day had taken a test for the Bayonne Fire Department. Shortly before this incident, in full accordance with the law, he had purchased a revolver and bullets. These young men agreed that Robert should take photographs of Kevin holding the revolver with the barrel pointed towards Robert so that the tips of the bullets would show. Kevin loaded five bullets, leaving open the chamber aligned with the barrel. During the evening one of the young men cocked the gun, neither realizing that this action would bring a live round into shooting position. The friends continued eating and drinking alcoholic beverages into the early morning hours. Then, without purpose to harm or knowledge that his conduct would result in harm, Kevin, admittedly acting recklessly, but not under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, so handled the weapon that a single bullet fired, killing Robert. Kevin immediately called the police. Until this terrible event defendant Kevin Ribbecke had led a life free of crime and had enjoyed in the community an excellent reputation for being a law-abiding and honest person.
Manslaughter committed with a gun is one of the offenses included within the Graves Act. The applicable portion of this law provides that a violator "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment" with a "minimum term" which "shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or 3 years, whichever is greater ..., during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 c. Were this the only relevant provision of law, this court would be obliged to reject the plea recommended by the State. However, defendant is less than 26 years of age and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5 states that "any person" within that category who has committed a crime "may be sentenced to an indeterminate term" at the appropriate reformatory; and N.J.S.A. 30:4-148 instructs that when sentencing pursuant to § 43-5 the court "shall not fix or limit the duration of sentence." The Graves Act does not expressly provide that a court may not sentence a young adult pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5. Thus, before sentence can be imposed on this youthful offender the court must resolve the conflict between the Graves Act and the youthful offender laws.
The problem of reconciling N.J.S.A. 30:4-148 with statutes mandating minimum terms of imprisonment is hardly new to this State. State v. Hopson, 60 N.J. 1, 285 A.2d 225 (1971); State v. Lavender, 113 N.J.Super. 576, 274 A.2d 611 (App.Div.1971); State v. Brozi, 125 N.J.Super. 485, 311 A.2d 757 (App.Div.1973); State v. Prewitt, 127 N.J.Super. 560, 318 A.2d 427 (App.Div.1974); State v. Robinson, 139 N.J.Super. 58, 352 A.2d 587 (App.Div.1976).
Hopson involved a section of the narcotics laws which then required that a defendant "shall" be punished by "imprisonment with hard labor, for a term of not less than two years nor more than 15 years." The trial judge had sentenced defendant to the Youth Correctional Institution Complex for a minimum term of years. Essentially following State v. Ammirata, 104 N.J.Super. 304, 250 A.2d 24 (App.Div.1969), and State v. Pallitto, 107 N.J.Super. 96, 257 A.2d 121 (App.Div.1969), certif. den. 55 N.J. 309, 261 A.2d 354 (1970), a majority in the Appellate Division held that the trial court was required to sentence defendant to a minimum of two years, notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.A. 30:4-148. State v. Hopson, 114 N.J.Super. 146, 275 A.2d 161 (App.Div.1971). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division "for the reasons given by Judge Halpern in his dissenting opinion." State v. Hopson, supra, 60 N.J. at 2, 285 A.2d 225. Judge Halpern had made the following observations:
The Ammirata result was adopted in Pallitto, supra, and is being followed by the majority of this court. In my mind such construction is unwarranted. It is contrary to the approved and recognized philosophy that reformatory sentences are designed to correct and rehabilitate the offender, rather than to seek retribution. [Citations omitted].
The Legislature provided that only persons between the ages of 15 and 30 are eligible for confinement to a reformatory, if convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison, and if never previously confined in a State Prison. ( N.J.S.A. 30:4-147). Unquestionably, the Legislature, for about 70 years has felt that such persons had a better chance to be rehabilitated under an indeterminate sentence and returned to society as a useful member thereof, than persons not in that category. In re Marlow, 75 N.J.L. 400 (S.Ct. 1907). If the Legislature intended to break away from this long-standing philosophy of reformatory sentencing, it would have done so by specifically creating an exception in narcotic offenses. This is precisely what it did in enacting N.J.S.A. 2A:168-1, wherein it empowered courts to generally suspend prison sentences imposed except for violations of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law ( N.J.S.A. 24:18)--with the further exception that the sentences of first narcotic offenders could be suspended.
With due respect to the courts in Ammirata and Pallitto, and the majority of this court, I do not believe the Legislature intended to mandate a two year minimum when imposing a reformatory sentence under N.J.S.A. 24:18-47(c)(1). I see no objection, legal or otherwise, to the court in the instant case imposing an indeterminate reformatory term without a minimum. We must assume that the Board of Managers of the reformatory is cognizant of the Legislature's intent as expressed in N.J.S.A. 24:18-47 and would consider it in granting parole, as well as the best interests of the defendant and the public. Such construction is more compatible with the aims and purposes of the Legislature. [114 N.J.Super. at 151, 275 A.2d 161].
In State v. Brozi, supra, the court was confronted with the conflict between the kidnapping statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:118-1, which mandated a minimum of 30 years in prison, and N.J.S.A. 30:4-147, 148. Judge Carton wrote:
We see no reason why a different result should obtain when a reformatory sentence is imposed for kidnapping. We are not persuaded by the State's argument that the two statutes may be read in pari materia; that the policy of both statutes can best be expressed by recognizing the legislative mandate for minimum sentences regardless of the place where it is to be served. This argument attempts to reconcile two very different philosophies of correction. When a court sets a minimum sentence it in effect states that a person's offensive conduct necessitates confinement for a certain period. This in essence is a retributive approach. Reformatory sentences are designed to correct and rehabilitate the offender and are based upon a philosophy of rehabilitation rather than retribution. State v. Horton, 45 N.J.Super. 44 (App.Div.1957).
It strikes us as incongruous to say to this defendant, a first offender, that he is sentenced to Yardville so that he can be rehabilitated and at the same time stipulate that this process must take a minimum of 30 years.
The State seeks to distinguish Hopson solely on the basis that kidnapping is a more serious offense than possession of heroin. The flaw in this argument is that the gravity of the offense has no bearing on the issue. The issue is how to reconcile the conflicting statutes. [125 N.J.Super. at 488, 311 A.2d 757].
In State v. Prewitt, supra, the court noted that "[m]andatory minimum sentences, sometimes contained in our statutes, are inapplicable when the sentence is indeterminate." 127 N.J.Super. at 565, n.1, 318 A.2d 427; State v. Spinks, 66 N.J. 568, 575, 334 A.2d 23 (1975).
State v. Robinson, 139 N.J.Super. 58, 352 A.2d 587 (App.Div.1976), involved a young adult's conviction of murder in the first degree. The court ruled that a judge was powerless to commit the defendant to Yardville because the sentence of life...
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State v. Des Marets
...contained in our statutes, are inapplicable when the sentence is indeterminate." Recently, the Law Division in State v. Ribbecke, 185 N.J.Super. 65, 447 A.2d 215 (Law Div.1982), held that a sentencing court has the authority to impose an indeterminate term at Yardville for a twenty-four yea......
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State v. White
...subject of this litigation, where the "presumptive" term ( N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)) is below five years.2 See also State v. Ribbecke, 185 N.J.Super. 65, 447 A.2d 215 (Law Div.1982). For present purposes, given the issue before me, I note only the analysis in Ribbecke indicating that indetermina......