State v. Ricardo Collins.
Decision Date | 05 January 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 18297.,18297. |
Citation | 10 A.3d 1005,299 Conn. 567 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Ricardo COLLINS. |
Adam E. Mattei, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, Jonathan C. Benedict, former state's attorney, and Howard S. Stein, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.**
The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly admitted, under § 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence,1 uncharged misconduct evidence concerning the defendant's involvement in a prior shooting using the same gun that was the murder weapon in the present case. The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification,2 from the judgment of the Appellate Courtreversing the judgment of conviction of the defendant, Ricardo Collins, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c and robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a)(2). State v. Collins, 111 Conn.App. 730, 961 A.2d 986 (2008). The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's involvement in the earlier nonfatal shooting of Stephen Rose, his cousin's husband (Rose shooting).
The defendant contends otherwise, and also posits, as alternative grounds for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, that the trial court improperly: (1) instructed the jury that the adequacy of the police investigation was not at issue in the case; and (2) determined that he had waived his right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history, much of which are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court.3 "The [murder] victim, Calvin Hopkins, 4 and his former girlfriend, Quiana Staton, jointly operated a 'business' in which Staton sold marijuana and Hopkins sold crack cocaine. At approximately 10:30 on the night of December 2, 2002, Hopkins went to Staton's Bridgeport apartment in a public housingproject known as the Greens. He came to the apartment carrying a large 'wad of cash' and retrieved an additional $500 to $600 from Staton's safe. Staton testified that Hopkins intended to use the money to purchase additional crack cocaine. Hopkins left Staton's apartment with the money at approximately 12 a.m. on the morning of December 3, 2002. He spoke to Staton on his cellular telephone approximately one hour later from his car in the parking lot of the apartment complex. During that conversation, Staton looked from her window to see Hopkins in his car talking to two unknown individuals. Staton later attempted to call Hopkins' cellular telephone at approximately 2 a.m. and again at 3 a.m. but received no answer to either of those calls.
(Citation omitted.) Id., at 735, 961 A.2d 986.
The jury reasonably could have found the following additional facts demonstrating, however, that the defendant did not actually dispose of the chrome and blacknine millimeter handgun that he had used in the Rose shooting and, indeed, used it to kill Hopkins in the course of robbing him. Specifically, Ryshon Penix, the defendant's cousin, also lived in the Greens housing project. When the defendant visited him there on November 28, 2002, several days before Hopkins' death, both Penix and Ivan Ramos, his roommate, noticedthat the defendant had with him a chrome and black handgun. Further, Kimberly Finney, who had been incarcerated with the defendant at the Bridgeport correctional center, testified that the defendant had confessed to him in a conversation in the dayroom there that he had murdered Hopkins while robbing him. Finney testified specifically that the defendant, while evading the police investigation of the Rose shooting, had unsuccessfully attempted to support himself by selling drugs in the Greens housing project, turned to robbery instead, and elected to rob Hopkins because the defendant, who had purchased drugs from Hopkins before, had seen him with a lot of money. After arranging to meet with Hopkins, ostensibly to purchase drugs, the defendant then attempted to rob Hopkins in his car, and shot him when Hopkins resisted. The defendant told Finney that he had turned himself in for the Rose shooting in an attempt to avoid being considered a suspect in the Hopkins case, figuring that "he [would] never become a suspect in the [Hopkins] case because he had been in jail already."
9 State v. Collins, supra, 111 Conn.App. at 735-36, 961 A.2d 986.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia,10 that the introduction of evidence concerning his involvement in the Rose shooting deprived him of a fair trial because its prejudice to the defense exceeded its probative value. Id., at 737, 961 A.2d 986. The Appellate Court agreed, concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the uncharged misconduct evidence. Id., at 743-44, 961 A.2d 986. The Appellate Court further concluded that the defendant had proven that the improper admission of this evidence was harmful, given the lack of direct evidence linking him to Hopkins' death and multiple reports of jury deadlock in this case. Id., at 744, 961 A.2d 986. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial. Id. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
On appeal, the state contends that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the Rose shooting,...
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