State v. Ricci

• Decision Date: 19 August 1970
• Docket Number: Nos. 900-M,s. 900-M
• Citation: 268 A.2d 692,107 R.I. 582
• Parties: STATE v. Albert L. RICCI, Jr. Lawrence M. LeCLAIR v. Honorable Stephen A. FANNING et al. P., 922-M.P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 692

268 A.2d 692

107 R.I. 582

STATE v. Albert L. RICCI, Jr.

Lawrence M. LeCLAIR v. Honorable Stephen A. FANNING et al.

Nos. 900-M.P., 922-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 19, 1970.

Herbert F. DeSimone, Atty. Gen., Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State

Raymond Daniels, Charles Rogers, Providence, for LeClair and others.

Notte & Notte, John Notte, III, Providence, for Ricci, Jr.

Herbert F. DeSimone, Providence, Atty. Gen., for Stephen A. Fanning.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

These petitions for certiorari were brought in two criminal cases, each seeking a review of a ruling of the respective courts, one denying and one granting a motion for pretrial criminal discovery pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 12-17-16. In one of these cases a justice of the Superior Court rested his denial of disclosure on statutory grounds, contending that the scope of disclosure contemplated in § 12-17-16 was limited by the provisions of the criminal bill of particulars act, § 12-12-9. In the other, the Attorney General as petitioner seeks a review of a ruling of a justice of the District Court granting a motion for pretrial disclosure under the tangible evidence statute, so called. Therein the court ordered the Attorney General to produce for the purpose of the defendant's examination, inspection, and copying statements of witnesses, including the complaining witness, and all communications received by the complaining witness attributable to the defendant, and any and all weapons used by the defendant. The Attorney General contends that the order of the District Court was made in excess of the authority conferred upon that court by the provisions of the pertinent statute.

Upon becoming aware of this divergence of opinion among the justices of the trial courts of this state as to the scope of § 12-17-16, the tangible evidence statute, so called, we concluded that the orderly administration of criminal justice requires that this court establish some broad guidelines for the application of the provisions of that statute by the trial courts which will delineate its scope and establish its limitations. We, therefore, granted certiorari in each of these cases and ordered them consolidated for hearing. State v. Ricci, R.I., 260 A.2d 723; LeClair v. Fanning, R.I., 260 A.2d 723.

We note at the threshold defendants' contention that their petition for disclosure here is not limited to that provided for by the statute, but invokes also the inherent authority of the court to require the prosecution to make disclosures of evidence in particular circumstances. With this we do not agree. Certiorari issued in these cases solely to enable this court to consider the extent to which the prosecution is required to disclose tangible evidence under § 12-17-16. In both LeClair and Ricci the motion for pretrial disclosure was made expressly pursuant to and in reliance upon the provisions of § 12-17-16.

We so conclude fully aware that in State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 195 A. 497, this court held that circumstances could exist which might require a modification of the common-law rule as to the disclosure of evidence by the prosecution. In that case we held that while this state follows the common-law rule that no disclosure of a prosecution's evidence ordinarily can be compelled, we went on to say at 357, 195 A. at 501: 'It is conceivable that, under special and unusual circumstances, an occasion may arise when a strict adherence to the rule would amount almost to a denial of a defendant's constitutional rights. On such an occasion, it would, in our opinion, be within the sound discretion of the trial justice to relax the rigor of the rule to a sufficient extent to assure the defendant a reasonably fair opportunity to prepare his defense. The test in such a case would be whether or not there was a real necessity for the defendant to inspect the articles in the custody of the state, in order to be able to make such preparation.' However, as we have already noted, we issued certiorari in these cases not to review the inherent power of the court to order disclosures in criminal proceedings but to discuss only the extent to which the tangible evidence statute confers upon defendants disclosure in such circumstances as of right.

During the Superior Court hearing on the motion in LeClair, the Attorney General argued that the language of § 12-17-16 must be read together with that of § 12-12-9 and that the latter statute is one that limits the scope of § 12-17-16. The Superior Court agreed with this contention, saying, in its decision: 'The right of a defendant to examine tangible evidence must be limited by the provisions of 12-12-9. By 12-12-9 the Court is forbidden to require the Attorney General to disclose its witnesses or evidence. The defendants clearly cannot have disclosed to them under 12-17-16 either evidence or the identity of witnesses.'

The petitioners contend, however, that these statutes are not in conflict with or controlling over each other, since each has a different specific purpose. We are of the opinion that while these statutes relate to a common subject matter, that is, criminal procedure, they do not have a common purpose. It seems rather obvious that § 12-12-9 relates to the bill of particulars as it has been known in the criminal practice in this state for many years. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that § 12-17-16 is a recent legislative declaration concerning the extent to which a defendant may as of right have disclosure of evidence in the possession of the prosecution. This statute was not enacted until 1969.

Section 12-12-9 contemplates situations wherein a defendant, by reason of the state's resort to the statutory provisions for charging offenses in a simplified form, that is, pursuant to §§ 12-12-3 to 12-12-8, in complaints or indictments, requires further factual information to inform himself of the precise offense with which he is charged and against which he must defend. The defendant under that statute is entitled to such a bill of particulars as a matter of right. As we said in State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 115, 121, 196 A.2d 133, 137: 'In other words, where the complaint is constitutional even though set out in the simplified form provided in § 12-12-6, this statute provides for the defendant a bill of particulars as a matter of right when the complaint is so lacking in particularity as to make difficult the preparation of an efficient defense.'

Section 12-12-9 first became part of the statutory law of this state in chap. 1954 of P.L.1932 as clause 7 of sec. 3 of chap. 407 of G.L.1923. In addition to providing basically for a bill of particulars in an appropriate case, the legislature at that time apparently deemed it appropriate to limit the area to which such motions for bills of particulars would apply by expressly excluding therefrom any requirement on the part of the prosecution '* * * to disclose its witnesses or evidence nor to do any more than to require the prosecution to furnish the defendant with such facts as fairly disclose the actual charge with which the defendant is accused.' This cautionary language of limitation remained in the legislation until the January session of 1970 when it was amended to read as follows: 'When an indictment or complaint charges the offense in accordance with the provisions of 12-12-3 to 12-12-8, inclusive, the court shall, upon motion, order the prosecution to furnish him with such particulars.' The clear intent of the legislature, in our opinion, in so amending § 12-12-9 was to indicate that its intention was was that the language of § 12-12-9 would in no manner limit the operative effect of § 12-17-16 but that § 12-17-16 was to be limited only by the restrictions inherent therein.

We agree with petitioners' contention that the Superior Court erred in holding that the right of defendant LeClair for disclosure of tangible evidence in the possession of the prosecution pursuant to the provisions of § 12-17-16 was limited in any manner by the provisions of § 12-12-9. In enacting § 12-17-16 the legislature deemed it prudent to have set forth in express terms the right of the defendant to a disclosure of tangible evidence in the possession of the prosecution for two reasons: (1) to enable a defendant to intelligently rebut or otherwise explain away any evidence that might be introduced at trial for the purpose of establishing his guilt; and (2) to permit a defendant to determine the existence of any exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution.

We turn, then, to a consideration of the issue that moved us to grant certiorari in these cases, namely, the extent to which § 12-17-16 requires the prosecution to make a disclosure of evidence in its possession. Section 12-17-16, enacted in 1969, P.L.1969, chap. 203, sec. 1, is entitled 'Tangible evidence in criminal trial' and reads as follows: 'In any criminal procedure where the prosecution is in possession of tangible evidence which may be used at trial of any defendant, said defendant shall have the right upon demand given in writing to the prosecuting authorities to inspect, examine and/or copy said evidence at a time and place to be fixed by a justice of a court of proper jurisdiction.'

An exhaustive examination of the statute persuades us that the legislature, in an exercise of considerable care, enacted this legislation intending to afford a defendant in a criminal prosecution a limited right to examine or copy tangible evidence that may be used at a trial thereof at a time and place to be fixed by a justice of the court having jurisdiction over the offense and the...