State v. Rice

• Decision Date: 02 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 27385.,27385.
• Citation: 877 N.W.2d 75
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kevin James RICE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

877 N.W.2d 75

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Kevin James RICE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 27385.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Jan. 11, 2016.

Decided March 2, 2016.

Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Jared Tidemann, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, SD, for plaintiff and appellee.

Nicole J. Laughlin, Sioux Falls, SD, for defendant and appellant.

GILBERTSON

, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Kevin James Rice appeals the circuit court's imposition of an 80–year sentence for one count of first-degree manslaughter. Rice asserts his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶ 2.] On December 2, 2013, Sioux Falls resident Jason LaBeau returned home after work to discover two intruders in his home attacking his 20–year–old son, Jordan. After Jason rushed to Jordan's aid, one of the intruders produced a pistol and shot both Jason and Jordan. After the shooting, the intruders fled the scene, leaving behind the pistol and one of their cell phones. Jason summoned help, but Jordan died before emergency assistance arrived. Jason survived his injuries.

[¶ 3.] Law enforcement's investigation revealed a plot conceived by Jordan's girlfriend, Faith Rasmussen, and orchestrated by Rice to steal $100,000 in cash from Jordan. Rasmussen ran a drug-distribution operation in Sioux Falls. She and Rice became acquainted with one another in the course of Rice's work for her as a distributor. In the fall of 2013, Rasmussen told Rice that Jordan kept $100,000 in a shoebox under his bed.¹ She showed Rice a picture as proof and gave him Jason's work schedule. Rasmussen's ex-boyfriend, Austin Hogan, drove Rice to, and identified, Jordan's home.

[¶ 4.] Rice began recruiting help. He first contacted his long-time friend, Doug Scholten. Rice then contacted Brian Anderson, an 18–year–old senior from Watertown High School who had been selling marijuana for Rice. Rice told Anderson that Jordan had previously been robbed without putting up a fight, that Jordan would likely be under the influence when they entered the house, and that Jason would not be home until after 5:00 p.m. Anderson agreed to the plan and in turn, recruited his friend, Trevor Kruthoff, a 17–year–old high school student from Watertown.

[¶ 5.] Shortly before December 2, Anderson and Kruthoff drove to Sioux Falls from Watertown. After meeting Rice, the three of them drove to the LaBeau residence. The three agreed that Anderson and Kruthoff would carry out the plan. The two would-be intruders plotted their point of entry and then returned to Watertown. On December 2, Anderson and Kruthoff called Rice to tell him they intended to carry out the plan that day. The two skipped school; packed duct tape, gloves, and handcuffs; left Watertown; and joined Rice and Scholten at Rice's residence. While there, Rice handed a pistol to Scholten, who loaded the weapon with ammunition. Rice then handed the weapon to Anderson.

[¶ 6.] Armed with a loaded firearm and a hammer, the four left Rice's residence in two different vehicles. Rice and Scholten drove one car; Anderson and Kruthoff, the other. Upon arriving at Jordan's house, the four noticed that his vehicle was there. Although Rice noted that the presence of Jordan's vehicle indicated Jordan was likely home, Anderson and Kruthoff decided to proceed as planned. Rice and Scholten drove to a nearby convenience store and waited for Anderson and Kruthoff to return.

[¶ 7.] Anderson and Kruthoff entered the home through a basement window and were almost immediately confronted by Jordan. Anderson and Kruthoff attempted to restrain Jordan. Despite the information Rice had received from Rasmussen, Jason returned home from work at 2:15 p.m. Jason struck Anderson, and Kruthoff drew the pistol. Anderson commanded Kruthoff to fire the weapon, and Kruthoff complied, firing multiple shots at—and striking—Jason. Kruthoff then turned the weapon on Jordan, shooting him as well.

[¶ 8.] Anderson and Kruthoff fled the scene, leaving behind the pistol and Kruthoff's cell phone. The pair did not locate the $100,000.² Rice and Scholten saw Anderson and Kruthoff's vehicle speed past the convenience store. Anderson sent a text message to Rice indicating there was a problem, and the four met back at Rice's residence. Rice and Scholten provided clean clothing to Anderson and Kruthoff. Rice and Scholten then destroyed Anderson's phone, disposed of as much evidence as they could, and fled to Madison for the night. Anderson and Kruthoff returned to Watertown.

[¶ 9.] Rice, Scholten, Anderson, and Kruthoff were all arrested and charged with homicide. All four subsequently pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter. Anderson and Kruthoff also pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Rice was sentenced to 80 years imprisonment with 20 years suspended. Scholten was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment with all 30 years suspended. Anderson was sentenced to 80 years imprisonment with 30 years suspended for manslaughter. He also received a suspended, concurrent, 15–year sentence for aggravated assault. Kruthoff was sentenced to 80 years imprisonment with 40 years suspended for manslaughter. He also received a suspended, concurrent, 15–year sentence for aggravated assault.

[¶ 10.] Rice raises one issue on appeal: Whether his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Standard of Review

[¶ 11.] "We generally review a circuit court's decision regarding sentencing for abuse of discretion." State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 31, 874 N.W.2d 475, 486

(quoting State v. Garreau, 2015 S.D. 36, ¶ 7, 864 N.W.2d 771, 774 ). "However, when the question presented is whether a challenged sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment, we conduct a de novo review ... to determine whether the sentence[ ] imposed ... [is] grossly disproportionate to [the] offense[ ]." Id.

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 12.] Rice asserts that a sentence of 80 years is grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Specifically, Rice argues that the sentence he received is cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to the sentence Scholten received. Rice also argues that the sentencing court did not properly weigh his background, criminal history, age, or prospects for rehabilitation in determining his sentence. Rice presents all of these arguments as supporting the conclusion that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Rice conflates the questions whether his sentence is constitutional and whether it is an abuse of discretion. These questions are not synonymous, and the analysis for each is different.

[¶ 13.] We recently surveyed United States Supreme Court decisions on the Eighth Amendment and explained the proper analysis of cruel-and-unusual-punishment cases in Chipps. The question whether a noncapital sentence violates the Eighth Amendment requires us to determine de novo whether the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to its corresponding offense. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 38, 874 N.W.2d at 489. To do so, we first compare the gravity of the offense—i.e., "the offense's relative position on the spectrum of all criminality"—to the harshness of the penalty—i.e., "the penalty's relative position on the spectrum of all permitted punishments." Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶¶ 35–38, 874 N.W.2d at 489. "If the penalty imposed appears to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, then we will compare the sentence to those ‘imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction’ as well as those ‘imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.’ " Id. ¶ 38, 874 N.W.2d at 489 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ). The challenged sentence is cruel and unusual only if these comparisons "validate [the] initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate to [the] crime." Id. ¶ 34, 874 N.W.2d at 487 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ).

[¶ 14.] We begin by examining the gravity of Rice's offense. Rice pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter. Among other instances, this offense occurs when one human being kills another "[w]ithout any design to effect death ... but by means of a dangerous weapon[.]" SDCL 22–16–1

, –15(3). Historically, homicide has long been considered "the highest crime against the law of nature, that man is capable of committing." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *177–78. Although the gravity of the offense of manslaughter is less than that of murder, first-degree manslaughter is still an unjustified and unexcused killing. This crime is among those deemed inherently violent by the South Dakota Legislature, SDCL 22–1–2(9), which contributes to the gravity of this offense, Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 35, 874 N.W.2d at 487 ("Nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence." (quoting Helm, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011 )). Therefore, as a lesser form of the highest crime, the gravity of first-degree manslaughter is relatively great on the spectrum of criminality.

[¶ 15.] Next, we examine the harshness of Rice's sentence. The circuit court sentenced Rice to 80 years imprisonment with 20 years suspended. First-degree manslaughter is a Class C felony, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a fine of $50,000. SDCL 22–6–1

, –16–15. More severe punishments authorized by the Legislature include death (Class A felonies) and mandatory life imprisonment (Class A and Class B felonies). Notably, the fact that the court imposed a term of years instead of a life sentence means that Rice could be eligible for parole in the future. See SDCL 24–15–4 ("No inmate sentenced to life...