State v. Rice, No. W1/96-0257A (R.I. Super 4/10/2007), W1/96-0257A
| Decision Date | 10 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. W1/96-0257A,W1/96-0257A |
| Parties | STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. KENNETH S. RICE |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Before this Court is the defendant's, Kenneth S. Rice (defendant), motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Having considered the record, the memoranda filed by the defendant and the oral arguments, this Court holds that the defendant's claims are denied in part and granted in part.
I
On March 9, 1998, the defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault (counts 1, 2, and 3), one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (count 4), and two counts of solicitation with the intent to commit a felony (counts 5 and 6). As a result, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for count 1 (first-degree child molestation sexual assault), to run consecutively to a twelve-year sentence defendant already was serving as a result of his probation violation after a previous conviction for second-degree child molestation sexual assault. The defendant further received concurrent fifty-year sentences for his convictions on counts 2 and 3 (both first-degree child molestation sexual assault charges). On count 4 (second-degree child molestation sexual assault), the defendant was sentenced to ten years to run consecutively to count 1's life sentence, and defendant received concurrent sentences of five years on counts 5 and 6. Finally, the Court, upon declaring defendant a habitual offender pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21, sentenced him to an additional ten years to run consecutively to the sentences already imposed. Due to his habitual offender status, the trial justice ruled that defendant would be ineligible for parole for thirty years. The facts underlying defendant's convictions are detailed in State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137 (R.I. 2000), in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld defendant's convictions.
Subsequent to sentencing, defendant moved this Court to reduce his sentence, which motion was denied. The Supreme Court, however, reversed this Court's ruling, holding that G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21(b), the habitual offender statute, does not authorize the trial justice to impose a restriction on a defendant's eligibility for parole greater than the habitual offender portion of his or her sentence. That decision is reported at State v. Rice, 811 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I. 2002).
On February 22, 2007, defendant moved this Court to correct his sentence, arguing that (1) discrepancies between his judgment of conviction form and the sentencing transcript warrant a decrease from fifty years imprisonment to five years imprisonment on counts 2 and 3 and (2) in light of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Rice, 811 A.2d 1144, his ineligibility for parole must be reduced from thirty years to no more than ten years.
The defendant argues that his judgment of conviction and commitment erroneously reflects that he was sentenced to concurrent fifty-year sentences for his convictions on counts 2 and 3, both first-degree child molestation sexual assault charges. According to defendant, the sentencing transcript indicates that the trial justice announced his actual sentence as five years on each of these counts. Although defendant vehemently disputes his sentence, he never before filed a motion specifically requesting that this portion of his sentence concerning counts 2 and 3 be reduced or corrected.
After reviewing the sentencing transcript and defendant's judgment of conviction, all reasonable inferences support that there is a mistake in defendant's sentencing transcript, not in his judgment of conviction. Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, such "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative * * *." (Emphasis added.) In this case, it is clear that the transcript mistakenly reflects that defendant was sentenced to five, not fifty years for first-degree child molestation sexual assault. At the time of defendant's conviction, such a charge carried a minimum sentence of not less than twenty (20) years. G.L. 1956 §...
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