State v. Richards

Decision Date10 November 1969
Docket NumberNo. 10545,10545
Citation84 S.D. 376,171 N.W.2d 808
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John E. RICHARDS, also known as Gary Richards, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Charles E. Carrell, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

Gordon Mydland, Atty. Gen., C. J. Kelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent.

ROBERTS, Judge.

The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and from the judgment thereon he has appealed.

Defendant was arrested on October 16, 1967. He had a preliminary hearing on November 6 and 7, 1967, at which defendant was represented by court appointed counsel who continued to represent him at the trial and on appeal. Defendant was arraigned on an information charging that he 'wilfully and unlawfully, and feloniously did kill a human being, to-wit: Pedro Maestas, said killing being perpetrated without a design to effect death and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, said killing constituting neither excusable nor justifiable homicide, in violation of SDC 13.2013'. The trial commenced on January 22, 1968, and the case was submitted to the jury on January 30, 1968.

The evidence discloses that the deceased Pedro Maestas, an itinerant laborer, age 48, resided with his brother in a motel in New Underwood. On the morning of October 14, 1967, at about seven o'clock deceased was found by a motorist lying on old Highway 14--16 about one mile east of New Underwood. The motor patrolman who was dispatched to the scene found Pedro Maestas lying on the tarvia-surfaced highway bleeding and unconscious. He called an ambulance which arrived within fifteen or twenty minutes. The victim died on the way to a hospital. The patrolman testified that he picked up about twenty pieces of glass within a few feet of the body which were introduced in evidence.

Dr. Harold Frost, who performed an autopsy, testified that there were cuts, bruises and abrasions about the head and face of the deceased, a severe cut on the forehead, a broken nose and skull fracture. The witness also testified:

'Q And the injuries, the cuts and the bruises and contusions, Doctor, what in your opinion could have caused these injuries that you found? A I believe that the head injury was caused by one or more blows by a heavy hard blunt object.

'Q And how about on the scalp and cuts on the scalp, and bruises you found there? A These could have been caused either from the fall as a result of the main injury, or they could have been caused by other blows.

'Q Such as blows from the fists or kicks, or something of that nature? A Yes, the cuts over the top of the head and the two bruises on the top of the head were not as severe as the one over the forehead, the one over the forehead was enough to crush the skull, those on top of the head were mere cuts or bumps. * * *

'Q From your examination, Doctor, would you have an opinion as to whether or not the injury that you found in the forehead could be caused by being struck by an automobile? A Yes.

'Q And what is that opinion? A I believe that if this head injury had been caused by a moving vehicle it would be enough to throw him to the ground violently, and that he would have sustained other injuries to other parts of the body than just the head because of this I believe that his injuries were not sustained from a moving vehicle. * * *

'Q Is there anything about the size or dimensions of the fracture that you found that in your opinion would lend support to a statement that the blow had been received by a bottle, say of a quart or a fifth size? * * * A I think a bottle of that size could do it.'

About an hour before midnight on October 13th, deceased accompanied by Richard Hunter went to a house in New Underwood occupied by Annie DuBray, a middle-aged Indian woman, and Steve Hopkins. Deceased and Hunter brought with them a fifth of whiskey and a six-pack of beer and were joined in a drinking party by Mrs. DuBray, Steve Hopkins and the defendant, a twenty-two year old Indian youth who was in the house at the time of the arrival of deceased and his companion. Within an hour Maestas, Hunter and Hopkins left and returned with more whiskey and beer and the party continued. There was testimony that deceased asked Hopkins and defendant to return with him to his motel for a drink of wine. Other facts and circumstances as disclosed in the record are that Maestas suggested that he and his two companions drive some place in the country. They drove a mile and a half south of New Underwood, parked and drank more wine. They then returned to New Underwood and drove east on old Highway 14--16 and parked near the place where the unconscious Pedro Maestas was later found. Defendant and Hopkins returned to town in the Maestas car and parked it at the motel. They arrived at the DuBray dwelling at about 5:30 in the morning.

Defendant seeks reversal on the grounds: (1) That an extended examination of the state's witness, Steve Hopkins, by the court and the asking of leading questions of this witness during the course of the trial deprived defendant of a fair trial and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

The state's witness, Steve Hopkins, was questioned by the state's attorney as to events after he left deceased's apartment and he answered that he 'was drunk' and 'didn't remember'. Then the following questions and answers appear in the record: 'Q (By Mr. Lehnert) Are you telling me, Steve, at this point you don't remember anything else, is that what you are saying? A Yes. Q When does your memory return to you, what's the next thing you remember? A I was home. Q Next thing you remember is being home? A Yes. Mr. Lehnert: Your Honor, the State at this time would request on the basis of surprise, and the basis that this witness has become a hostile witness, the right to cross-examine.'

At this point in the trial, the jury was excused and the court in chambers conducted an examination of the witness. In the course of the examination the court read the questions and answers of the witness at the preliminary hearing and then asked him if he actually remembered what happened the night in question and if he testified to the truth at the preliminary hearing. To this inquiry the witness replied in the affirmative. In State v. Rief, 53 S.D. 438, 221 N.W. 53, where the trial judge called and examined in the presence of the jury an unwilling witness for the state, it was stated that the examination appeared to have had for its object only the eliciting of the truth without any display of bias or unfairness and that it could not be said that the conduct of the judge was improper.

A trial judge is not a mere moderator, but has the duty to control the conduct of a trial and within proper limits may examine witnesses for the purpose of eliciting facts material to the case and in the interest of justice. 53 Am.Jur., Trial, §§ 74, 75. The examination was out of the presence of the jury and...

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3 cases
  • Shamburger v. Behrens
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 20, 1986
    ...manner of cross-examination are matters for the trial court's discretion. State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812 (S.D.1983); State v. Richards, 84 S.D. 376, 378, 171 N.W.2d 808 (1969). The Supreme Court of Iowa has addressed the question of the scope of Rule 43(b). Matter of Estate of Herm, 284 N.W.......
  • State v. Wolford, 13540
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1982
    ...should not have asked Sanderson about the license number of the car depicted in exhibit # 1. We disagree. In State v. Richards, 84 S.D. 376, 381, 171 N.W.2d 808, 810 (1969), this Court observed that "[a] trial judge is not a mere moderator, but has the duty to control the conduct of a trial......
  • State v. Grooms, 10825
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1971
    ...second degree, as a public offense, depends exclusively on culpable negligence.' There the death was caused, as it was in State v. Richards, 84 S.D. 376, 171 N.W.2d 808, by beatings and blows to the head. That these statutes of long standing have been applied to many differing facts indicat......

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