State v. Richards
| Decision Date | 02 March 1926 |
| Docket Number | (No. 5588) |
| Citation | 101 W.Va. 136 |
| Parties | State v. Ralph Richards, Roscoe Cross and Samuel Elliott |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Jury //, In Homicide Case, Jnror on Voir Dire Satisfies Court That, Notwithstanding Previously Expressed Opinion As to Accused's Guilt, His Mind is Free From Bias and Prejudice, and That He Can Give Accused Free and Impartial Trial, He is Competent, and Shoidd Not Be Rejected From Panel of 20 Called (Const. V. S. Amend. 6; Code, c. 159, § 3).
If, in a homicide case, a juror on his voir dire shows to the satisfaction of the court that notwithstanding a previously expressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused his mind is free from bias and prejudice and that he can give the defendant a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence, he is a competent juror and should not be rejected from the panel of twenty called. (p. 139.)
(Juries, 35 C. J. § 3 85.)
2. Same1Although Juror Answers on Voir Dire That it Will Take Evidence to Change Previously Expressed Opinion As to Guilt of Accused, if Opinion Was Based Solely on Newspaper Reports and Reports Current in Community, and Merely Tentative, and He Satisfies Court That He Can Give Accused Fair Trial, Accepting Him Is Not Reversible Error.
Although a juror so called answers on his voir dire that it will take evidence to change a previously expressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, yet if it appears that such opinion is based solely on newspaper reports and reports current in the community, and the opinion merely tentative, and he satisfies the court by unequivocal and satisfactory answers to questions that regardless thereof he can give the prisoner a fair trial according to the law and the evidence adduced, on the trial, it is not reversible error to accept such juror, and if selected to try the case, the judgment upon a verdict of guilty will not be reversed on that ground. (p. 140.)
(Juries, 35 C. J. §§ 377, 385.)
3. Same Previously Formed and Expressed Opinion As to Guilt of Accused in Homicide Case, to Disqualify Juror, Must Have Been Deliberately and Decidedly Formed, and Juror Thereby Rendered Uncertain As to Ability to Try Case Without Bias or Prejudice on Law and Evidence.
To disqualify a juror in a homicide case on account of a previously formed and expressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the opinion must have been deliberately and decidedly formed, and the juror thereby rendered uncertain as to his ability to try the case without bias or prejudice on the law and the evidence adduced at the bar of the court. (p. 140.)
4. Criminal Law Court Has Duty Before Admitting Confes-sion to Determine Whether it Was Free and Voluntary or Given Under Duress and Threats, or by Inducement Held Out by Someone in Authority; Burden is on State to Show to Satisfaction of Court Facts Justifying Admission of Confession; On Admission of Confession, Jury Are Final Judge's of Its Weight and Effect in Connection With All Other Evidence.
It devolves upon the trial court in the first instance, before admitting it, to determine from evidence whether a confession of guilt has been freely and voluntarily made and not under duress or threats or by some inducement made or held out to the accused by someone in authority, of benefit or reward of a worldly or temporal character, or in mitigation of punishment; and the burden is upon the state to show to the satisfaction of the court facts justifying the admission of such confession; and upon its admission the jury are then the final judges of the weight and effect that should be given such confession in connection with all the other evidence in the case as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (p. 141.)
(Criminal Law, 16 C. J. §§ 1509, 1513, 1518, 2287.)
5. Same That Confession Was Made to Public Officer, Such As Sheriff or Public Prosecutor, Does Not Render it Inadmissible, Though Made in Response to Questions, if Made Without Threats or Intimidations, or Promises of Reward or Immunity From Punishment.
The fact that a confession has been made to a public officer, as a sheriff or public prosecutor, will not render it inadmissible, provided it has been freely and voluntarily made, though in response to questions, if made without any threats or intimidations or promises of reward or immunity from punishment for the crime, (p. 145.)
(Criminal Law, 16 C. J. §§ 1474, 1477.)
Error to Circuit Court, Doddridge County.
Ralph Richards, Roscoe Cross and Samuel Elliott were convicted of murder, and they bring error.
Affirmed.
M. K. Duty, for plaintiffs in error.
Howard B. Lee, Attorney General, and R. A. Blessing, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Defendants were indicted, tried and convicted of the murder of James Powell, on the night of December 23, 1924, at his home in Doddridge County, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the period of their natural lives.
To reverse the judgment of imprisonment pronounced on April 25, 1925, counsels' first proposition is, that the jury trying the case was unlawfully impaneled, in that the panel of twenty jurors from which the trial jury was selected were not qualified jurors. On their voir dire seven of the panel had stated that they had made up and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants, and four of these said that it would take evidence to change their opinions; and these four were among those selected and sworn to try the case; and a fifth said, that from reading the newspapers that defendants had confessed, he thought they were the guilty parties, but that he didn't know. But the attorney general would affirm the judgment on the ground that each of these jurors qualified themselves by their answers to certain other questions propounded to them by the court, to the effect that, regardless of what they had read and heard about the case, and the opinions any of them had expressed, they would take the evidence of the witnesses, and the law as it might be propounded by the court, and give the defendants a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence; and to the further question by the trial judge, "Will you and each of you do that?'' they answered that they would. The fact most strongly urged, is the admission of four of these jurors that it would take evidence to change their opinions previously formed. In impaneling jurors courts should not too lightly consider the provision of the Constitution and statutes granting to those accused of crime trial by an "impartial" jury, and a jury free from exception. Article VI, Const. U. S., and sec. 3, chapter 159 Code W. Va. Neither of the jurors impaneled was specifically asked whether he was conscious of any bias or prejudice against the accused, as he should have been, perhaps; but his answers to the questions which were addressed to him, in connection with the other evidence on the subject, we think imply that each was free from all bias and prejudice, and was prepared to try the case as presented to him. In State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767, it was held that if a proposed juror shows to the satisfaction of the court on his voir dire that notwithstanding a previously expressed opinion of the guilt or innocence of the accused, his mind is free from bias and prejudice, and the contrary is not shown, he is a competent juror and ought not to be rejected.
The close question presented here is, did the jurors who said it would take evidence to change their opinions thereby disqualify themselves to sit as jurors in the ease? Having answered that they could and would give the prisoners a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence, what did they mean by saying it would take evidence to change their previously formed opinions? They could not have meant that they would start upon the trial with any preconceived and decided opinion on the question of guilt or innocence of the defendants: they could have meant simply that if on the trial the evidence did not warrant conviction, their opinions based necessarily on newspaper reports or gossip in the county, tentative opinions, would be surrendered, and their verdict given according to the law and the evidence. We have perhaps written enough on this subject to render it a work of supererogation to write more. State v. Schnelle, supra; State v. Baker, 33 W. Va. 319; State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561; State v. Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684; State v. Moneypenny, 81 W. Va. 362; State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330; State v. Toney, 98 W. Va. 236; State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241. The rule as most recently stated is that if the answers of the jurors are so unequivocal and satisfactory as to convince the trial court of the juror's fairness and impartiality, the reviewing court will not disturb the judgment below accepting the juror. State v. Toney, supra. To disqualify one proposed as a juror in a case like this, on account of a previously formed or expressed opinion, his opinion must have been deliberate and decided. But if he hesitates or is in doubt as to his ability to disregard such opinion and with an unbiased and unprejudiced mind to give the accused a fair and impartial trial, it would be error to accept him as qualified to try the case. In State v. Messer, we decided that a juror whose opinion was of such a decided character that he could not give due weight to the presumption of innocence of the accused and would not acquit unless the defendant should prove himself innocent, was incompetent. While some of the questions proposed to the jurors chosen in the present case were not as searching as might be desired, yet we can not say, after a careful consideration of their examination, that the court below committed any error in accepting them.
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