State v. Richards
| Decision Date | 22 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-429,93-429 |
| Citation | 274 Mont. 180,906 P.2d 222 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Becky L. RICHARDS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
William Boggs, Missoula, for appellant.
Robert L. Deschamps, III, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Patricia Jordan, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, for respondent.
Defendant Becky Richards (Richards) was convicted by a jury in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, of one count of deliberate homicide and forty-nine counts of related economic crimes involving theft, forgery and deceptive practices. Richards was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Women's Correctional Facility on the deliberate homicide count. She received suspended sentences on the economic counts and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $68,968.60. Richards was designated a dangerous offender for purposes of parole eligibility. She appeals those convictions. We affirm.
We address the following issues on appeal:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Richards' conviction on Counts 1, 3, 4, 48 and 55?
2. Did the District Court err in denying Richards' motion to sever the economic counts from the deliberate homicide count?
On October 22, 1992, Richards was charged by information with one count of deliberate homicide, fifty-one counts of felony theft, seven counts of felony forgery and one count of felony deceptive practices. The information charged that on March 5, 1992, Richards caused the death of her husband by shooting him in the head with a pistol. The majority of the other fifty-nine counts alleged that Richards had obtained or exerted unauthorized control over funds from her husband's business, Richards Logging, while she was acting as bookkeeper for the company. Six of the counts alleged various economic crimes by Richards against other parties.
On January 19, 1993, defense counsel filed a motion to sever all of the fifty-nine economic counts from the deliberate homicide count. The District Court denied the motion and Richards went to trial on all sixty counts. During the trial, one count of felony theft was dismissed by the court and one count of felony forgery was reduced by the State to misdemeanor forgery. After deliberating for four days, the jury found Richards guilty on the deliberate homicide count and forty-nine of the economic counts including the count that had been reduced to misdemeanor forgery.
Richards was sentenced to six months in the Missoula County Jail on the misdemeanor forgery charge and ten years in the Women's Correctional Facility on each of the remaining economic counts. Richards' sentence on each of these counts was suspended and she was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $68,968.60. Richards was sentenced to life imprisonment on the deliberate homicide charge and she was designated a dangerous offender for the purpose of parole eligibility. Richards appeals these convictions.
Was the evidence sufficient to support Richards' conviction on Counts 1, 3, 4, 48 and 55?
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Arlington (1994), 265 Mont. 127, 146, 875 P.2d 307, 318 (quoting State v. Cyr (1987), 229 Mont. 337, 339, 746 P.2d 120, 122).
In Counts 1, 3 and 4, Richards was charged with forgery pursuant to § 45-6-325, MCA (1991). This statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the offense of forgery when with purpose to defraud he knowingly:
(a) without authority makes or alters any document or other object apparently capable of being used to defraud another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time or with different provisions or of different composition;
(b) issues or delivers such document or other object knowing it to have been thus made or altered;
....
(2) A purpose to defraud means the purpose of causing another to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate any right, obligation, or power with reference to any person or property.
With respect to Count 1, the evidence showed that four checks made payable to Missoula Plans Exchange, were endorsed and cashed by Richards and that she pocketed the cash. The evidence further showed that as receptionist for Missoula Plans Exchange, Richards had authority to endorse the company's name on checks for deposit into the company's bank account, but she did not have the authority to endorse the company's name in order to cash checks for her own use. When an agent exceeds his authority with respect to an instrument in writing, with intent to defraud, the offense of forgery is committed. State v. Daems (1934), 97 Mont. 486, 496, 37 P.2d 322, 327.
The evidence on Count 3 showed that two postal money orders made out to Blackfoot Parish were purportedly purchased by Richard McNeely, former Pastor of the parish, to reimburse the parish for personal expenses it paid on behalf of McNeely. However, McNeely testified that he knew nothing about these money orders. The testimony further showed that the money orders were intended to cover up Richards' diversion of parish funds to her own use while she was bookkeeper for the parish. Inserting McNeely's name on the money orders, with the knowledge that he had not given authority for the use of his name and with an intent to defraud the parish, constitutes forgery. Section 45-6-325, MCA (1991).
With respect to Count 4, the evidence showed that a money order made payable to "Jim & Becky Richards" as payment for rental property owned by Jim Richards was altered by Richards after her husband's death to read "Jim or Becky Richards" and cashed by Richards. Jim Richards' estate was thereby defrauded of its interest in these funds.
In Count 48, Richards was charged with deceptive practices pursuant to § 45-6-317, MCA (1991). The evidence showed that, in applying for a loan, Richards represented to Norwest Financial that two snowmobiles owned by Richards Logging were free of liens and available as collateral for the loan. Richards failed to disclose to Norwest Financial that these snowmobiles were encumbered by a prior lien to First Interstate Bank.
Section 45-6-317, MCA (1991), provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the offense of deceptive practices when he purposely or knowingly:
....
(c) makes or directs another to make a false or deceptive statement to any person respecting his financial condition for the purpose of procuring a loan or credit....
The offense of deceptive practices is complete upon the knowing or purposeful making of a false financial statement. See State v. Cassill (1924), 70 Mont. 433, 438-39, 227 P. 49, 52.
In Count 55, Richards was charged with theft pursuant to § 45-6-301, MCA (1991). The evidence showed that Richards Logging purchased a 1989 Indy Trail Polaris snowmobile on December 30, 1991, and sold it on January 10, 1992. The payee line on the check received from the purchaser of this snowmobile was filled in by Richards with her name and the check was deposited into her account. Testimony at trial showed that Richards Logging never received payment for the sale of this company asset.
Section 45-6-301, MCA (1991), provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely or knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner and:
(a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property....
We conclude that after viewing the evidence on Counts 1, 3, 4, 48 and 55 in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crimes charged in each of these counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm Richards' conviction on Counts 1, 3, 4, 48 and 55.
Did the District Court err in denying Richards' motion to sever the economic counts from the deliberate homicide count?
Our inquiry into issues regarding joinder and severance is twofold. First, we must determine whether joinder of the offenses in the information is proper. Second, we must determine whether severance of the offenses is necessary to prevent prejudice to the defendant.
The District Court determined that joinder was proper in this case under § 46-11-404, MCA, since the economic crimes establish the motive for the homicide and overlapping proof must be offered. Section 46-11-404, MCA, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Two or more offenses ... may be charged in the same charging document in a separate count, or alternatively, if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Allegations made in one count may be incorporated by reference in another count.
The State argues that the embezzlement from Richards Logging provided the motive for Richards to kill her husband. On the day he was killed, Jim Richards was reviewing the books for Richards Logging and was about to discover a $10,000 overdraft at the bank and numerous unauthorized checks written by Richards. The State maintains that Richards killed her husband to prevent him from discovering her embezzlement of funds from the company.
Joinder is proper where the offenses are logically linked by motive and where overlapping proof must be offered. State v. Baker (1989), 237 Mont. 140, 144, 773 P.2d 1194, 1197 (citing United States v. Hoelker (9th Cir.1985), 765 F.2d 1422, 1425). Additionally, the State argues that the six economic crimes that were not part of the embezzlement from Richards Logging were "of the same or similar character" or "based on the...
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