State v. Ricker
| Citation | 252 A.3d 721 |
| Decision Date | 10 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2018-293-C.A.,16-488A,K3,2018-293-C.A. |
| Parties | STATE v. Lisa RICKER. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for State.
Megan F. Jackson, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court.
This case came before the Supreme Court on March 31, 2021, on appeal by the defendant, Lisa Ricker, from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of driving under the influence, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2. This prosecution arose from a motor vehicle stop that occurred on May 31, 2016.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of a witness and abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial. The defendant also raises two purported errors of law related to a jury instruction and the verdict form. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
The testimony at trial revealed that defendant visited the Coventry Police Department on the afternoon of May 31, 2016, in order to seek assistance from the police regarding several matters. Officer Jadine Ferri was called in from patrol to speak with her.1 The two conferred in the "counsel chambers" for ten to fifteen minutes, during which defendant stood and paced, eventually becoming upset. Then, abruptly, defendant left.
Afterwards, Officer Ferri, who was nearing the end of her shift, proceeded to her car. At trial, she testified that it was her practice to refill her police cruiser's gas tank before a shift change. Another car, driven by defendant, was also pulling out of the parking lot in front of Officer Ferri. The officer drove behind defendant's vehicle for less than a mile, later testifying that she observed defendant driving between five and ten miles an hour below the speed limit and swerving across both the inner and outer lines of the lane in which she was traveling. At that point, Officer Ferri turned on her emergency lights and pulled defendant's vehicle over.
At defendant's car, Officer Ferri did not ask her for identification or registration but noted that defendant had been crying. When asked why she was traveling west on Flat River Road, defendant told Officer Ferri that it was "none of [her] business." The defendant claimed to the officer that she had not been drinking although, Officer Ferri testified, defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery, she spoke loudly and slurred her words, and the officer detected a faint odor of alcohol.
After backup arrived, Officer Ferri asked defendant to step out of her car, observing that, as she did so, defendant was leaning on the car to maintain her balance. Officer Ferri then asked defendant to perform three standard field sobriety tests—the horizontal gaze nystagmus test
, the walk and turn test, and the one leg stand test. At trial, Officer Ferri testified that defendant, in her performance of these tests, exhibited multiple indicators that she was under the influence of an intoxicant. Then-Sergeant Kenneth Gebo, also present, asked defendant to perform two additional tests, the lack of convergence test and the Romberg balance test, later testifying that defendant's performance on these tests also indicated likely intoxication. At this point, Officer Ferri placed defendant under arrest and returned to the Coventry police station.
After making a phone call, defendant consented to a breath test. Officer Ferri, who was certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 9000,2 observed defendant for the requisite fifteen-minute period to ensure an accurate test, and then took two breath samples. The first sample showed a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .083 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and the second sample showed a BAC of .080. The defendant denied having had anything to drink that day but stated she had consumed a "big Bloody Mary" the prior evening and had taken some prescription medications.
On June 10, 2016, the Coventry Police Department charged defendant in the Third Division District Court with driving under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor, under § 31-27-2.3 After she was found guilty at her District Court bench trial in August 2016, defendant exercised her right to a de novo trial in the Superior Court, which took place in January 2018.
During trial, on January 10, 2018, at the end of defendant's cross-examination of Officer Ferri, the state objected to a line of questioning regarding a refusal affidavit included in Officer Ferri's police report, which had been offered by the state for identification only. The record shows that, despite her testimony that defendant had submitted willingly to the breathalyzer test, Officer Ferri also completed a notarized affidavit which stated that defendant had refused to comply. The state argued that cross-examination should be limited with regard to this affidavit, because it would confuse the jury. The state also explained to the trial justice and defense counsel at sidebar that it was the regular practice of the Coventry Police Department to complete such affidavits in every case, regardless of whether or not defendants had actually refused the test. The trial justice asked defense counsel where she was going with this line of questioning, and counsel replied that it was being offered "[j]ust to point out on that sheet it says, they can take it for whatever it is worth." Defense counsel also stated that it was her last question. The trial justice then sustained the state's objection, citing his "concern for misleading and confusing the jury[,]" and cross-examination of Officer Ferri continued as to other matters.
Both the state and defendant rested on January 10, 2018. The following morning, before the trial justice gave the jury its instructions, defendant objected to the verdict form "with respect to the fact that on the verdict sheet we have the two options for a guilty verdict." The verdict sheet allowed the jury to "check one or both" of the following three options: "GUILTY because she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle"; "GUILTY because she was operating a motor vehicle in the state of Rhode Island with a blood alcohol level of 0.08%"; or "NOT GUILTY[.]" The defendant's objection was based on the fact that the criminal complaint stated only one charge: driving under the influence as evidenced by her BAC.4 The trial justice disagreed, finding that the complaint could reasonably be read to include both theories. Consequently, the trial justice found the verdict sheet to be appropriate and left it intact.
When the jury entered the courtroom, the trial justice proceeded to instruct them on the law. Included was an instruction that, "if you find that the breathalyzer test was administered within a reasonable time after the accident you may draw the inference that the blood alcohol level of the defendant at the time she was driving was as reported by the breathalyzer test." After the trial justice completed his instructions, defendant and the state pointed out an error in the instruction to the trial justice, i.e. , the use of the word "accident" in a case where there had been no accident, and the trial justice corrected the charge to the jury, asking that they substitute "motor vehicle stop" for the term "accident." The defendant made no other objections to the jury instructions.
Initially, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. However, after receiving an Allen charge5 and submitting several questions to the trial justice, the jury returned a verdict. The jury foreperson first reported the verdict as not guilty, but after the trial justice looked at the completed verdict form, he noted that it was not in conformity with that statement. In fact, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty under the "second theory of intoxication," based on the blood-alcohol reading from the breathalyzer.6
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice heard and denied. The trial justice then sentenced defendant to one year at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with three months to serve in the home-confinement program and the remaining nine months suspended, with probation. The trial justice also suspended defendant's license for six months and ordered her to pay a $100 fine, perform ten hours of community service, undergo a substance-abuse evaluation, and abide by any treatment or counseling recommendations made by her probation officer. Thereafter, defendant timely appealed her conviction to this Court.
Before this Court, defendant argues that the trial justice erred in limiting her cross-examination of Officer Ferri. Additionally, defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. Finally, defendant argues that there were errors of law regarding a jury instruction and the verdict form that merit a new trial.
The defendant argues that the trial justice erroneously limited her cross-examination of the arresting officer by refusing to allow questioning about the officer's sworn affidavit, which contained a false statement.
"Inherent in a criminal defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him or her—found in both article 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution—‘is the fundamental right of the criminal defendant to cross-examine his or her accusers.’ " State v. Drew , 919 A.2d 397, 411 (R.I. 2007) (quoting State v. Stansell , 909 A.2d 505, 509 (R.I. 2006) ). However, "[w]hile criminal defendants possess the constitutional right ‘to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,’ such a right ‘is far from absolute.’ " State v. Danis , 182 A.3d 36, 40 (R.I. 2018) (quoting State v. Manning , 973...
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