State v. Ricks
| Decision Date | 02 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 49743 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSHUA T. RICKS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Cynthia Yee-Wallace District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Ben P. McGreevy argued.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Joshua T. Ricks appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). Ricks argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
In July 2021, an officer stopped a vehicle driven by Ricks for having an expired registration. During the stop, Ricks disclosed that his driver's license was also expired. The officer cited Ricks for driving without privileges and had him exit the vehicle for an explanation of the citation. While the officer was explaining the citation, Deputy Orcutt and his drug dog arrived at the scene and began an exterior drug-detection sniff of Ricks' vehicle. During the sniff, the dog jumped on the rear-passenger door, jumped on the front-passenger door, and then inserted his nose into the open front-passenger window. After entering the vehicle, the dog gave a final alert when he "sat and began to stare at the window and then back at [Deputy Orcutt]." A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed narcotics and drug paraphernalia.
The State charged Ricks with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, and he filed a motion to suppress. Relying on two recent Idaho Supreme Court cases, State v. Randall, 169 Idaho 358, 496 P.3d 844 (2021), and State v. Howard, 169 Idaho 379, 496 P.3d 865 (2021), cert. denied (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-975), Ricks argued the drug dog's entry into Ricks' vehicle was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State opposed the motion, arguing probable cause existed before the dog stuck his nose in the window and justified the search under the automobile exception. At an evidentiary hearing, Deputy Orcutt testified, and the video from his body camera showing the sniff was admitted into evidence.
In addressing Ricks' suppression motion, the district court considered whether the drug dog's "change in behavior that signals he is pursuing an odor he is trained to detect" is "sufficient to find probable cause, even though no final alert" was made. The court concluded the dog's change in behavior was sufficient to establish probable cause. In support, the court made numerous factual findings, including that:
[I]t was undisputed that Deputy Orcutt and Django [the dog] are certified as a narcotics team, and that Django is certified to detect marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. It was similarly undisputed that Django detects odors accurately. Django is trained to sniff where the Deputy points, unless [the dog] detects the odor of narcotics, in which case he is trained to follow the odor to its source. Deputy Orcutt looks for distinct changes in behavior when Django is working, including: head snaps, whining, breathing, tail and excitement to signal that Django is in odor. Deputy Orcutt testified that when Django jerked past his hand and went to the passenger side of the car, this change in behavior signaled that Django had detected the odor of narcotics.
The court further found that Deputy Orcutt's testimony was credible and that his body camera video corroborated his testimony.
Subsequently, Ricks pled guilty conditionally to possession of a controlled substance and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Ricks timely appeals.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
On appeal, Ricks challenges the district court's conclusion that probable cause justified the search. Ricks does not challenge any particular factual finding as erroneous, however. Rather, he argues that "the district court erroneously considered Deputy Orcutt's subjective belief that the drug dog had detected the odor of narcotics" before entering the vehicle and that "this case is on all fours" with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Howard, 169 Idaho at 384, 496 P.3d at 870 (concluding State failed to meet burden to show probable cause).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). A reliable drug dog's sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a search under the Fourth Amendment and does not require either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). The Idaho Supreme Court has held, however, that a dog's trespass into the interior of a vehicle during an exterior sniff converts a nonsearch into a warrantless search requiring probable cause. Randall, 169 Idaho at 367, 496 P.3d at 853. Further, the Court has concluded that no de minimis exception exists to the rule that a dog's trespass is a search. Howard, 169 Idaho at 382, 496 P.3d at 868. Rather, a dog's entry into a vehicle constitutes a warrantless search regardless of "the degree of the dog's intrusion" and even if that intrusion is only "momentary." Id. Accordingly, to avoid a Fourth Amendment violation, any entry by a dog into the interior of a vehicle during a sniff requires either consent, a warrant, or probable cause. Randall, 169 Idaho at 370, 496 P.3d at 856.
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982). "Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise--in the mind of a reasonable person--to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). "Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard," requiring only "a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present." Id. In the context of a drug dog's entry into the interior of a vehicle, the proper inquiry is whether the officer had probable cause to believe illegal drugs were in the vehicle before the dog's entry. Randall, 169 Idaho at 369, 496 P.3d at 855.
In this case, the district court framed the issue for resolving Ricks' suppression motion as:
whether a drug detection dog's change of behavior that signals he is pursuing an odor he is trained to detect (also referenced herein as a "general alert") is sufficient to find probable cause, even though no final alert (also referenced herein as "pinpoint indication" or "final indication") is made, prior to the search.[1]
In resolving this issue, the court relied on nonbinding case law from other jurisdictions and found that this case is "similar" to cases "in which courts have found probable cause to exist when a drug dog makes a general alert that the dog had detected the odor of narcotics, even where a final alert is not made." See United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2014) (); United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (); United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2009) (); see also State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431-32, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130-31 (Ct. App. 1996) ().
On appeal, Ricks does not challenge the district court's reliance on a rule that probable cause may exist even if the drug dog has not given its final indication pinpointing the odor's strongest source. Indeed, Ricks notes this rule "agrees with Howard," in which the Idaho Supreme Court stated that it was not "suggest[ing] that the absence of a trained alert is ipso facto an absence of probable cause." Howard, 169 Idaho at 384, 496 P.3d at 870; see also Randall, 169 Idaho at 368, 496 P.3d at 854 (). We agree that language in Randall and Howard indicates the Idaho...
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