State v. Riedel

Citation242 Kan. 834,752 P.2d 115
Decision Date25 March 1988
Docket NumberNo. 60668,60668
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Lanny RIEDEL, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-4619(f)(4) provides that a conviction that has been expunged under the statute may be disclosed in a subsequent prosecution when the prior expunged conviction is a statutory element of the charge in the subsequent prosecution.

2. Ordinarily, once an issue has been determined during a pretrial hearing, a trial court should be reluctant to rehear the issue, but a decision to rehear the issue lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

3. Reconsideration of earlier pretrial rulings, when necessary to prevent prejudice and assure the parties a fair trial, cannot be said to be an abuse of the trial court's broad discretion.

Bruce W. Beye, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Dennis W. Moore, Dist. Atty., were with him on the brief, for appellant.

There was no appearance by appellee.

HOLMES, Justice:

The State of Kansas appeals from an order of the district court dismissing the complaint against the defendant Lanny Riedel. The trial court sustained defendant's motion in limine and ruled that the State was barred from introducing evidence of the facts underlying a prior conviction which had been expunged pursuant to K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-4619. The State then refused to go to trial and the complaint was dismissed. The State appeals.

As defendant has made no appearance in this appeal, the facts must be gleaned solely from the rather sparse record submitted on appeal. Defendant was originally charged with multiple counts and following a preliminary hearing was apparently bound over for trial on one count of felony theft (K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-3701) and one count of altering a vehicle identification number (K.S.A.1987 Supp. 8-116). The case was assigned to the Hon. William Gray. The State filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455 seeking to admit evidence of a prior crime. The defendant had been convicted in 1970 in Douglas County District Court of receiving stolen property while a student at the University of Kansas and that conviction was upheld on appeal in State v. Riedel, 211 Kan. 872, 508 P.2d 878 (1973). In 1981 defendant sought and received an order of the Douglas County District Court expunging the 1970 conviction. The State, at the hearing on its K.S.A. 60-455 motion, argued before Judge Gray that the facts underlying the 1970 conviction should be admissible in the present case "for the purpose of showing intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, as set out in my motion." Judge Gray took judicial notice of the facts of the prior conviction as set forth in State v. Riedel and ruled those facts would be admissible at the trial of this case. Although the defendant argued that evidence regarding an expunged conviction could not be admitted for K.S.A. 60-455 purposes, the trial court ruled it was admissible under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-4619(f)(4).

Judge Gray granted the State's motion to admit the evidence on the ground that K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-4619(f)(4) permits disclosure of the expunged prior conviction "in a subsequent prosecution for an offense which requires as an element of such offense a prior conviction of the type expunged." Judge Gray reasoned that the prior conviction was being offered to prove knowledge, intent, or absence of mistake; that these constituted "an element of this case"; and that therefore the prior conviction, despite its expunction, was admissible under the last clause of 60-455 by virtue of the exception in K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-4619(f)(4). This reasoning was clearly in error. The wording of 21-4619(f)(4) envisions prosecution for an offense such as habitually promoting prostitution (K.S.A. 21-3514), habitually giving worthless checks (K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-3708[a], or possession of a firearm by a felon (K.S.A. 21-4204[b], for which a prior conviction is a statutory element of the crime charged. The language is clear that it is the prior conviction itself that must be an element of the subsequent offense. In this case, defendant was being prosecuted for crimes which do not include a prior conviction as an element of the offenses. Judge Gray apparently confused the 60-455 exception with the 21-4619(f)(4) exception and as a result based his ruling on an erroneous interpretation of the statutes.

Thereafter, the case was reassigned to the Hon. Janice D. Russell and was given a trial date of March 9, 1987. On February 19, 1987, defendant filed a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction of the facts from the prior conviction, asserting inter alia that Judge Gray erred in his interpretation of K.S.A.1987 Supp. 21-4619. A hearing was held on March 9, 1987, and the defendant's motion was sustained. The State then declined to proceed to trial and the complaint was dismissed. The State appeals. In argument before this court the State candidly conceded its case against defendant, without evidence of the prior conviction, was too weak to justify going to trial.

The State raises two issues in this appeal:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion in limine after another district judge, to whom the case had previously been assigned, ruled on the State's motion that evidence of the expunged prior conviction would be admissible under K.S.A. 60-455; and

(2) whether the trial court, in granting the defendant's motion in limine, erred in ruling that evidence of an expunged prior conviction is inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-455.

The State initially argues that it was improper for the trial judge to even consider the defendant's motion in limine after a previous ruling by Judge Gray that the evidence was admissible. It is contended that a district judge does not have the power and authority to hear an "appeal" from a pretrial ruling made by another district judge. The State concedes that the trial court is granted broad discretion in the admissibility of evidence. However, it argues that once a trial court renders a pretrial decision on the suppression or exclusion of evidence, that decision may not be reconsidered unless new evidence or facts not considered at the pretrial hearing are adduced which could cause the trial court to change its ruling. The State asserts that defense counsel proffered no new evidence or arguments in the motion in limine.

The State cites no authority directly supporting its argument, but argues that State v. Jackson, 213 Kan. 219, 515 P.2d 1108 (1973), and State v. Boling, 5 Kan.App.2d 371, 617 P.2d 102 (1980), are analogous.

Jackson addressed whether a trial court erred in suppressing, during the trial, certain evidence alleged to have been illegally seized, after the administrative judge had denied a pretrial motion to suppress. 213 Kan. at 225, 515 P.2d 1108. The court applied K.S.A. 22-3216, which authorizes a defendant to move to suppress as evidence any property obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. That statute generally requires such a motion to be made before trial, but gives discretion to the court to entertain the motion at trial. The State argued that the motion had been ruled upon by the administrative judge prior to trial and could not be subsequently reentertained by the trial judge. The State relies upon Syllabus p 1 of Jackson, which reads:

"Under the provisions of subsection (3) of K.S.A.1972 Supp. 22-3216 the trial court may in its discretion reentertain a motion to suppress evidence made and ruled on prior to trial if at trial new or...

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12 cases
  • State v. Nunn
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 20 Gennaio 1989
    ...discretion was abused, or unless the trial judge admitted evidence that clearly had no bearing on any of the issues. State v. Riedel, 242 Kan. 834, 839, 752 P.2d 115 (1988). K.S.A. 60-455 "Subject to K.S.A. 60-447 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasi......
  • State v. Stewart
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 28 Aprile 2017
    ...court. The reconsideration of earlier pretrial rulings is a matter within the trial court's broad discretion. Cf. State v. Riedel , 242 Kan. 834, 838, 752 P.2d 115 (1988) ("Reconsideration of earlier pretrial rulings, when necessary to prevent prejudice and assure the parties a fair trial, ......
  • State v. Gibson
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 18 Aprile 2014
    ...“the decision to rehear an earlier motion is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Riedel, 242 Kan. 834, 837, 752 P.2d 115 (1988) (citing State v. Jackson, 213 Kan. 219, Syl. ¶ 1, 515 P.2d 1108 [1973] ). In State v. Miles, 233 Kan. 286, 662 P.2d 1227 ......
  • State v. Rucker
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 16 Luglio 1999
    ...the evidence is clearly irrelevant to any of the issues. State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 210-11, 768 P.2d 268 (1989); State v. Riedel, 242 Kan. 834, 839, 752 P.2d 115 (1988). As we have previously stated, discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the tr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Appellate Decisions
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 80-3, March 2011
    • Invalid date
    ...expungement order in this case did not make such disclosure a special exception under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-4619(f)(3). State v. Riedel, 242 Kan. 834 (1988), is distinguished. Relief sought by Divine flowed from expungement statute, not from a court order barred by K.S.A. 22-4908. State's ch......

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