State v. Rigby

• Citation: 369 P.3d 127
• Decision Date: 03 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140553–CA.,20140553–CA.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Zachary RIGBY, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Utah

369 P.3d 127

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Zachary RIGBY, Appellant.

No. 20140553–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 3, 2016.

Brandon J. Smith, for Appellant.

James Swink and Aaron M. Jossie, for Appellee.

Judge STEPHEN L. ROTHauthored this Opinion, in which Judge GREGORY K. ORMEand Senior Judge JAMES Z. DAVISconcurred.¹

ROTH, Judge:

¶ 1 Zachary Rigby appeals his conviction for driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors. Rigby challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence that the police found during a warrantless search of his vehicle. Rigby contends that the Utah Constitution provides its citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches than the United States Constitution because Utah courts have required police officers to have both probable cause and exigent circumstances when performing a warrantless search under the automobile exception. He concedes the officers had probable cause to search his automobile following the traffic stop but asserts that they violated his constitutional rights by conducting the search without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances. Because we are reluctant to diverge from our supreme court's historical pattern of paralleling federal search and seizure law, we conclude that law enforcement officers were only required to have probable cause to justify the search of Rigby's vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Ordinarily, "[w]e recite the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings from the suppression hearing." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct.App.1997)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 656 (Utah Ct.App.1996). But for purposes of Rigby's motion to suppress and, by extension, this appeal, both parties have stipulated to the facts as presented in the original police report. "A stipulation of fact filed with and accepted by a court ... is conclusive of all matters necessarily included in the stipulation." Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 287(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ¶ 14, 296 P.3d 709("[W]hen a court adopts a stipulation of the parties, the issues to which the parties have stipulated become settled...." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, we recite the facts in accordance with the parties' stipulation.

¶ 3 On March 28, 2013, a police officer pulled Rigby's automobile over for a stop sign violation. Upon approaching the vehicle, the police officer could "[i]immediately ... detect[ ] the odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the vehicle." Rigby and the two other occupants were "exhibiting physical indicators of recent marijuana use, including bloodshot eyes, droopy eyelidsand a stoned look," along with acting "extremely nervous" during the traffic stop. Additional officers, including a K9 officer, were called to the location. The officer who initiated the traffic stop then "explained [to Rigby] that [he] was going to be searching the vehicle, not only based on the fact that [he] could smell the marijuana in the vehicle but because the drug dog had given a positive indication as well." Two officers then searched Rigby's vehicle; they recovered a small metal pipe with marijuana residue and plastic bags containing fresh marijuana. Rigby was arrested and charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors; and failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor.

¶ 4 Rigby filed a motion to suppress "[a]ll evidence seized and any statement obtained" "as a result of the unlawful searches" conducted "in violation of the Utah Constitution." At the evidentiary hearing on Rigby's motion, he conceded that the "odor of marijuana was sufficient" to establish probable cause but argued that exigent circumstances were also "required in order to justify a warrantless search" under the automobile exception. The trial court denied Rigby's motion to suppress, finding that "the search was reasonable under the circumstances and such evidence was lawfully obtained under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement."

¶ 5 Rigby subsequently pled guilty to one count of driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, see Utah Code Ann. § 41–6a–517(2)(LexisNexis 2014), and one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, see id. § 58–37–8(2)(a)(i).² In entering his pleas, Rigby reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct.App.1988)(describing how a conditional plea "specifically preserves the suppression issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate court") (citations omitted).

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 On appeal, Rigby argues that although the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain nearly identically phrased protections against unreasonable searches, the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens by requiring law enforcement officers to have both probable cause and exigent circumstances before conducting a warrantless search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, even though the United States Supreme Court has held that under the federal constitution the automobile exception requires only probable cause. "Matters of constitutional interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness, and we provide no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." State v. Gonzalez–Camargo, 2012 UT App 366, ¶ 15, 293 P.3d 1121(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 27, 344 P.3d 581("Constitutional issues ... are questions of law that we review for correctness...." (first omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 7 Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain nearly identical provisions safeguarding an individual's right against unreasonable searches and seizures.³ Both protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Some time ago, the Utah Supreme Court observed that "Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitutionreads nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment, and thus [the] Court has never drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the respective constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has always considered the protections afforded to be one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). The question presented here is whether Utah courts should continue to follow this principle and track the relatively recent evolution of the automobile exception under federal law or chart its own path under the Utah Constitution. To address this question, we first trace the history of the automobile exception under both federal and state case law. Next we examine the status of the automobile exception under federal law in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996)(per curiam). Finally, we consider whether Utah is likely to continue to track federal law after Labron with regard to the automobile exception or chart a new path under the Utah Constitution.

I. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement

¶ 8 Because warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), "[p]olice officers generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy," State v. Boyles, 2015 UT App 185, ¶ 10, 356 P.3d 687(citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)); see also id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674) (noting that "[b]efore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search"). "There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule ... one [of which] is the so-called 'automobile exception'...." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). Historically, under the automobile exception, police were permitted to search an automobile without a warrant so long as both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48–51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).

A. The Automobile Exception Under Federal Case Law

¶ 9 In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the seminal case addressing the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. In Carroll, the Court determined that while an individual has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in an automobile, the degree of protection is lessened "because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id. at 153, 45 S.Ct. 280. This mobility principle has continued to be a factor in the Supreme Court's approach to automobile search cases since Carroll. See, e.g., Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485; New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–13, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986); Carney, 471 U.S. at 392–93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588–89, 94...