State v. Riggs

• Decision Date: 17 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-143.,03-143.
• Citation: 2005 MT 124,327 Mont. 196,113 P.3d 281
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Daron RIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

113 P.3d 281

2005 MT 124

327 Mont. 196

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Daron RIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 03-143.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs December 4, 2003.

Decided May 17, 2005.

Rehearing Denied June 14, 2005.

For Appellant: William F. Hooks, Helena, Montana.

For Respondent: Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Ashley Harrington, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana.

Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Robert Riggs (Riggs) appeals the judgment and sentence entered in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, following his conviction by a jury. We affirm.

¶ 2 We address the following issue on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by limiting the testimony of Riggs' expert witness and by excluding the expert from the courtroom during the victims' testimony?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by allowing the State's expert to testify and by limiting the defense's ability to cross-examine her?

¶ 5 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Riggs' motion for severance?

¶ 6 4. Did the District Court fail to ensure Riggs' presence at all critical stages of the trial?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 7 On May 21, 2001, the Gallatin County Attorney filed an Information charging Riggs with four counts of sexual abuse involving four young girls. Count 1 alleged that Riggs had committed sexual assault, in violation of § 45-5-502, MCA, on or about September 25, 1999, by subjecting D.M. to sexual contact by rubbing her genital area with his hand. Count 2 alleged that Riggs committed incest, in violation of § 45-5-507, MCA, from September 1999 to April 2001, by having sexual contact with D.C., his step-daughter, by touching her breasts and genital area. Count 3 alleged that Riggs committed sexual intercourse without consent, in violation of § 45-5-503, MCA, from September 2000 through March 2001, by subjecting S.M. to non-consensual sexual intercourse by digitally penetrating S.M.'s genitals. Count 4 alleged that Riggs committed sexual assault, in violation of § 45-5-502, MCA, in March 2001, by subjecting M.J. to sexual contact by touching M.J.'s breasts. Count 4 was later amended to allege that the offense occurred in November 2000.

¶ 8 On October 11, 2001, Riggs filed a motion to dismiss several of the charges for lack of probable cause and to sever the charges. The State filed a response, Riggs replied thereto, and on November 9, 2001, the District Court conducted a hearing on the motion. Following the hearing, the District Court denied the motion.

¶ 9 On February 25, 2002, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent Riggs from offering the expert testimony of Dr. Sarah Baxter for the purpose of questioning the credibility of the complaining witnesses. The District Court heard and granted the State's motion on March 4, 2002.

¶ 10 The trial concluded on March 8, 2002, when the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all four charges. On November 15, 2002, the District Court sentenced Riggs to a term of twenty-four years at the state prison, followed by a suspended term of twenty-five years.

¶ 11 The jury heard testimony which tended to substantiate the following findings. On September 25, 1999, D.M. went to the Riggs' home to play with Riggs' step-daughters and to sleep over until the next morning. D.M. was ten years old at the time and best friends with the step-daughters, who are triplets, the same age as D.M. During the evening, D.M. fell asleep on the living-room floor while watching a video and Riggs carried her into a bedroom. Later than night, D.M. awoke when she felt someone touching her. She found Riggs sitting on her bed with his hand inside her underwear, trying to insert his finger into her vagina.

¶ 12 Riggs left a few moments later, and D.M. began crying. Riggs' wife put D.M. into one of the other bedrooms to sleep with one of the triplets.

¶ 13 D.C. is Riggs' step-daughter. When D.C. was in the third or fourth grade, Riggs began molesting her by putting his hand into her panties and touching and rubbing her vaginal area. Riggs also put his hand under her clothing and touched her breasts. D.C. testified that the abuse happened four to six times and ended about the time she finished fifth grade.

¶ 14 In early November 2000, M.J., another young girlfriend of the triplets, spent the night at Riggs' home watching movies on television. During the movies, Riggs was sitting on the couch next to M.J., who was in her pajamas. Riggs began touching M.J. by putting his hand up her pajama shirt and onto her breast. The touching continued until the end of the movie. M.J. was frightened and remained quiet while Riggs was touching her.

¶ 15 S.M., another girlfriend of the triplets, also spent the night at Riggs' home in November 2000. While Riggs and S.M. were sitting on the couch watching movies, Riggs put his hand up S.M.'s shirt and underneath her brassiere. S.M. asked Riggs to stop, but he would not. Riggs then unzipped S.M.'s pants, stuck his hand into her pants, and put his finger inside her. Riggs continued the touching throughout the movie and then warned S.M. not to tell anyone. S.M. testified that Riggs continued the sexual abuse the next weekend and described three more instances of molestation, including digital penetration and forcing S.M. to touch Riggs' penis with her hand, the last incident occurring in March 2001.

¶ 16 Additional facts will be discussed where relevant.

DISCUSSION

¶ 17 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by limiting the testimony of Riggs' expert witness and by excluding the expert from the courtroom during the victims' testimony?

¶ 18 This Court has often observed that a district court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony, and without a showing of abuse of discretion, the district court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Crawford, 2003 MT 118, ¶ 30, 315 Mont. 480, ¶ 30, 68 P.3d 848, ¶ 30; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 54, 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 54, 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 54. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Weldele, 2003 MT 117, ¶ 72, 315 Mont. 452, ¶ 72, 69 P.3d 1162, ¶ 72.

¶ 19 Riggs argues that the District Court ruled in such a way that the State was able to bolster the credibility of its complaining witnesses with expert testimony, while the defense was barred from attacking their credibility with expert testimony, and that this violated Riggs' rights to the effective assistance of counsel, to due process, and to present his defense.

¶ 20 As a factual matter, this claim is erroneous. The record clearly reflects that the District Court prohibited the defense from offering expert testimony on the subject of the complaining witnesses' credibility on the specific grounds that the State would not be offering such testimony, either. The record further reflects that the State in fact did not offer expert testimony on the credibility of its witnesses, but only as rebuttal to the defense's expert testimony which criticized the interview techniques employed during the investigation. The defense was put at no disadvantage in this regard.

¶ 21 In State v. Geyman (1986), 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475, we held that expert testimony is admissible for the purpose of helping the jury to assess the credibility of a child sexual assault complainant, Geyman, 224 Mont. at 200, 729 P.2d at 479, a narrow exception to the general rule that judgment as to the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury in criminal trials, Geyman, 224 Mont. at 196-97, 729 P.2d at 477. In carving out this exception, we reasoned that an adult's reaction to being sexually assaulted is likely to be within reach of the jury's empathic imagination, so as to enable the jury to assess the complainant's truthfulness. A child's emotional reactions to such abuse, on the other hand, especially given the circumstances in which the child may find herself, and the familial relation that she may have to the alleged abuser, are likely to be outside the ken of the jury, which may find those reactions mystifying without the guidance of expert testimony. Geyman, 224 Mont. at 196-201, 729 P.2d at 477-80.

¶ 22 Having affirmed Geyman in State v. French (1988), 233 Mont. 364, 760 P.2d 86, in State v. Harris (1991), 247 Mont. 405, 808 P.2d 453, we restated the rule as follows:

In cases involving sexual abuse of a minor child, we will allow expert testimony on the credibility of the alleged victim. This exception applies, however, only when the victim testifies at trial, and credibility is brought into question.

Harris, 247 Mont. at 410, 808 P.2d at 455 (citations omitted).

¶ 23 Riggs has entirely failed to show how the District Court's rulings in this regard, which resulted in neither party's being able to offer expert testimony on the subject of the complaining witnesses' credibility, unfairly prejudiced him in the presentation of his defense.

¶ 24 On the other hand, the District Court permitted Riggs to present extensive expert testimony critical of the interviewing techniques employed in the investigation. As part of her preparation for giving this testimony, Dr. Sarah Baxter, the defense's expert, was provided with the entire police file on the investigation, and prepared a full report thereon. The District Court did not, however, permit Dr. Baxter to listen to the testimony of the complaining witnesses, reasoning that to do so would only be useful preparation for credibility testimony — testimony which had been prohibited by the court in limine. Given the general preference, expressed in Rule 615, M.R.Evid., for excluding witnesses,...