State v. Riker
| Decision Date | 03 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 58970-4,58970-4 |
| Citation | 123 Wn.2d 351,869 P.2d 43 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 62 USLW 2595 The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Deborah Ann RIKER, aka: Deborah A. Pothier, Appellant. |
Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Jeffrey E. Ellis, Seattle, for appellant.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Brenda Louise Bannon, Carol D. Spoor, Deputies, Seattle, for respondent.
James E. Lobsenz, Seattle, amicus curiae for appellant on behalf of Northwest Women's Law Center.
Deborah Riker raised the defense of duress to charges of delivery and possession of cocaine. She claimed that a police informant, Rupert Burke, coerced her into the crime with verbal threats. She also contended that her history as a battered woman in other relationships should have been made known to the jury, and she offered the testimony of an expert on the subject. The trial court instructed the jury on duress and allowed Riker to make a brief statement to the jury about her earlier batterings. However, the trial court disallowed the testimony of the expert witness. Riker claims that ruling was erroneous and also questions the trial court's instructions on the burden of proof. We affirm.
When raising a duress defense, the defendant admits the truth of the State's allegations, but contends that her actions should be excused. We will begin by relating the State's version of these events. In 1987, police officer John Pritchard and Rupert Burke, a paid police informant, were posing as marijuana growers looking to buy illegal guns. During the course of that investigation, Burke met the defendant's sister, Suzanna Rohrer. On June 16, 1987, Rohrer set up a cocaine deal with Riker.
Burke and Rohrer drove to Riker's house where Burke observed the two women measuring out approximately an eighth of an ounce of cocaine (an "eightball") on a triple beam scale. The defendant commented that the cocaine was from the bottom of a kilogram bag. Burke paid Riker $250 for the cocaine, and told Burke that he could call her directly if he wanted more cocaine. She gave him her phone number.
On June 18, 1987, Burke, with three officers present, called Riker from a pay phone to purchase more cocaine. They met at a truckstop, where Riker delivered another eightball of cocaine in exchange for $250. According to Burke, Riker also offered to deliver larger quantities of cocaine in the future.
A few days later, Burke met with Riker again at her house to discuss the sale price of a pound of cocaine. They agreed on $18,000. Riker said that her cocaine supplier was named "Bill". On June 25, 1987, Riker invited Burke and Pritchard to her house. When they arrived, Burke went inside the house while Pritchard remained in the car. Riker delivered a sixteenth of an ounce of cocaine to Burke in exchange for $125. The defendant then went outside and was introduced to Pritchard, who posed as a marijuana runner. Pritchard testified that Riker told him that she had done pound deals before, and that she wanted to go back to dealing pounds.
The final agreement was that Burke would meet the defendant at the SeaTac Mall parking lot and exchange a pound of cocaine for $18,000. On July 16, 1987, Burke went to the mall with the money. At about 1:15 p.m., Riker arrived at the mall. They entered the mall through a door near where Burke was parked, and then exited after a few minutes.
About 5 minutes later, a pickup truck pulled up to Burke's car. The man introduced himself as "Bill". Burke left with Bill in the truck. A third man entered the truck and showed Burke the pound of cocaine, and they then drove back to Burke's car in order to count the money. At this point, Burke signaled to the police and both men were arrested.
Riker was arrested that evening. A subsequent search of her home disclosed an O'Haus Triple Beam scale in the bedroom closet, a .22-caliber pistol, $1,400 in cash and some food stamps. Also recovered was a "bullet", a device used to inhale cocaine, and a small amount of marijuana. No cocaine was found in the residence.
While Riker agrees with most of the facts as stated above, she claims that the tale is not so simple. Rather, she denies any previous involvement with cocaine, and states that she participated in these events only because of the pressure exerted on her by the informant, Rupert Burke. Although she was unable to testify to any explicit threats by Burke, she claims that her previous history of abuse has left her a "battered woman" and affected her ability to resist the alleged coercion. Briefly, her testimony is as follows.
Riker first met Burke in the spring of 1987 at her sister's house. At the time, she thought that Burke was involved with a marijuana growing organization and that he was emotionally involved with her sister.
Riker's testimony was vague as to the threats employed by Burke. She testified that once, Burke forced her sister to give Riker some rings in exchange for $20 to buy cocaine. Riker also testified that, according to her sister, Burke had "pushed [Rohrer] against the wall once ... and then verbally he [Burke] was abusing her". Report of Proceedings (RP), at 591. Riker stated that Burke threatened that Rohrer would "more or less ... suffer[ ] the consequences" if Riker did not obtain cocaine for him. RP, at 591.
Riker contends that she participated in the first cocaine sale only because Burke threatened to harm her sister unless she got cocaine. Riker stated that, although she has never used or dealt drugs, she was able to obtain an eighth of an ounce of cocaine on credit quickly from her ex-husband's former prison cellmate, Bill Smith.
Riker testified that Burke later called her to demand more cocaine. She said that she tried to resist, but that he told her, "Well, you will know the consequences." RP, at 599. She believed that the consequences would be physical harm to her or her sister. However, she also testified that she had never seen any bruises on her sister, that Burke had never hit Riker, and that Burke had never made his threat more specific.
Riker also testified that Burke coerced her into selling larger amounts of cocaine with the statement, "You will know the consequences." RP, at 607. Riker denied that she had sold pounds before but admitted making arrangements for the pound deal. She claimed that she was only at the mall on July 16 to go shopping.
Finally, Riker testified regarding her history of abusive relationships to support her duress defense. The trial court ruled that she could present this testimony, but not in undue detail. Riker claimed that she had been physically and sexually abused in numerous relationships since she was young, most recently a little over a year before she met Burke. She stated that her abusive relationships played a part in her fear of Burke, and that she believed that Burke would hurt her or her sister if she did not comply with his requests.
As an additional part of her defense, Riker attempted to introduce the testimony of Karil Klingbeil, an expert on the battered woman syndrome. In her offer of proof, Klingbeil testified that battered woman syndrome is generally considered a subset of post-traumatic stress syndrome. Klingbeil considered the relationship and the continuum of violence to be a very important aspect in arriving at a diagnosis that a person suffers from the battered woman syndrome.
Klingbeil also described some of the behavioral characteristics that normally accompany the battered woman syndrome. For instance, she testified that such women usually exhibit "learned helplessness". She explained that such a condition occurs when the woman is subjected to "repeated threats, fears, coercion, physical battering episodes, most of which are predictable" such that she comes to feel she has no options. RP, at 536-37.
Klingbeil also testified that, in her opinion, Riker was a battered woman in June and July of 1987. She based her opinion on Riker's history of abusive relationships with the significant men in her life and stated that Riker's association with Burke could not be separated out from her prior relationships. However, Klingbeil admitted that use of the battered woman syndrome in a case where there was not an intimate relationship between the batterer and the victim was novel, and that she could not cite any studies applicable to this situation. Following this offer of proof, the trial court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible.
At the close of the trial, the court took exceptions from counsel as to the jury instructions. The prosecutor had no objections to an instruction on duress. Both the State and the defendant agreed with the court's proposal not to instruct the jury regarding the applicable burden of proof on the duress defense. However, during deliberations, in response to a question from the jury, the court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving duress by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury found Riker guilty on all four counts. Riker received a sentence at the lowest end of the standard range--46 months--on each count, to be served concurrently. Riker appealed to the Court of Appeals and the case was transferred to this court.
Riker relied on the theory of duress to excuse her actions. The elements of duress are:
(a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and
(b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and
(c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved.
RCW 9A.16.060(1). Riker offered Dr. Klingbeil's expert testimony on the battered woman...
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