State v. Riley
| Decision Date | 01 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 36576.,36576. |
| Citation | 159 Conn.App. 462,123 A.3d 123 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Winston Anthony RILEY. |
159 Conn.App. 462
123 A.3d 123
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Winston Anthony RILEY.
No. 36576.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued May 21, 2015.
Decided Sept. 1, 2015.
Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Auden Grogins, for the appellant (defendant).
Deborah Violet Abrams, certified legal intern, with whom were Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and Stephen M. Carney, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
GRUENDEL, SHELDON and BORDEN, Js.
Opinion
SHELDON, J.
The defendant, Winston Anthony Riley, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 and 53a–134(a)(3), and attempt to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 and 53a–123(a)(3). Following the jury's guilty verdict on these and two other related charges,1 the defendant was sentenced by the court to a total effective term
of six years incarceration.2 The defendant appeals on two grounds: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's rejection of his defense of renunciation3
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that the court's
jury instruction on the defense of renunciation was constitutionally inadequate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, are relevant to this appeal. On March 18, 2012, the defendant drove to the Mohegan Sun Casino in Montville in order to make up an $800 gambling loss from the prior day. Upon his arrival at the casino, the defendant attempted to withdraw money from an automated teller machine, but could not do so because his wife had transferred money out of their account. After returning to his car and falling asleep for a period of time, the defendant woke up and decided to commit a robbery. The defendant thus slipped a knife up the sleeve of his sweatshirt and began to walk around the parking garage.
Louise Carty, an eighty-three year old woman, was at the casino on March 18, 2012, to play the penny slots. As she was entering the elevator in the Winter Parking Garage, Carty noticed that a man, later identified as the defendant, was following her inside. After the elevator door closed, the man, whom Carty was never able to identify, “all of a sudden pull[ed] a knife out of his pocket and head[ed] toward me.” In response, Carty screamed, “No, no, no,” and shoved the man, causing him to jump away from her. Carty then grabbed the man's sweatshirt by the sleeve and pursued him off the elevator. The man never took or demanded money or property from Carty or verbally threatened her.
At trial, the defendant sought to defend himself by raising the defense of renunciation under General Statutes § 53a–49(c).4 In support of that defense, he testified
as follows. First, he admitted that he was the man who had accosted Carty in the elevator. Having initially intended to rob her, he admittedly followed her into the elevator, pulled a knife out of his sleeve to confront her and took two or three steps toward her after the elevator doors closed. The defendant described as follows what happened in the elevator as he began to approach Carty:
“[Defense Counsel]: What was your intention at that moment?
“[The Defendant]: My intentions as I approached her, as I took, like, the second or third step to her, I'm, like, oh, my God, this could by my grandmother; what am I doing?
“[Defense Counsel]: So, when you thought that, what were you going to do
about that; were you going to do anything about your thought?
“[The Defendant]: I immediately said I'm sorry. I basically curled the knife toward myself, and I was, like, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. She then grabbed me.”
Carty, by contrast, testified that, although she heard the man mumble something after she shoved him, she could not make out what he said and did not hear him say that he was sorry. After she and the man exited the elevator, the man hustled away from Carty while she told others in the vicinity that the man had tried to knife her. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the state failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that he renounced his criminal purpose under § 53a–49(c). According to the defendant, the state did not successfully rebut his testimony that he changed his mind as he took his second or third step toward Carty, then curled his knife
back toward himself and apologized, because both Carty's testimony and a casino surveillance video of the incident supported his version of events. Although the defendant did not preserve this issue at trial, claims of evidentiary insufficiency are invariably reviewable on appeal because they are based on the alleged violation of a fundamental constitutional right. See State v. Lewis, 303 Conn. 760, 767 n. 4, 36 A.3d 670 (2012). We disagree with the defendant's claim on the merits, concluding that the evidence in this case was sufficient to disprove his defense of renunciation beyond a reasonable doubt.
“The standard of review employed in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.... [W]e do not sit as the seventh juror when we review the sufficiency of the evidence ... rather, we must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miles, 97 Conn.App. 236, 240, 903 A.2d 675 (2006).
“[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt ... nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor, 306 Conn. 426, 432, 50 A.3d 862 (2012).
In evaluating sufficiency of the evidence claims, “we must defer to the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 461, 886 A.2d 777 (2005). “It is axiomatic that evidentiary inconsistencies are for the jury to resolve, and it is within the province of the jury to believe all or only part of a witness' testimony.” State v. Meehan, 260 Conn. 372, 381, 796 A.2d 1191 (2002).
Before evaluating the defendant's claim, it is first necessary to examine the defense of renunciation. At common law, renunciation was not universally recognized as a defense to the crime of attempt. P. Hoeber, “The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other Problems of Temporal Individuation,” 74 Cal. L.Rev. 377, 381–82 (1986) ; Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1985) § 5.01, comment 8, p. 356 (“[i]t was uncertain under the law prior to the drafting of the Model Code whether abandonment of a criminal effort, after the bounds of preparation had been surpassed, constituted a defense to a charge of attempt”). The Model Penal Code, however, included the defense of renunciation in its 1962 proposed official draft. P. Hoeber, supra, p. at 382 and n. 14.
Two main reasons have been advanced for allowing the defense of renunciation to the crime of attempt. First, an actor's renunciation of his criminal purpose prior to the completion of a substantive crime suggests that he did not have a firm purpose to commit the crime, and thus tends to negate his dangerousness. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01, comment 8, p. 359. Second, the availability of the defense can provide the actor with the motivation to desist from
his criminal effort, “thereby diminishing the risk that the...
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...such a defense, a charge on the defense is obligatory.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Riley, 159 Conn.App. 462, 477–78, 123 A.3d 123, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 949, 125 A.3d 528 (2015).Our review of the jury charge, read as a whole, leads us to conclude that i......
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State v. Daniel B.
...such a defense, a charge on the defense is obligatory." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Riley, 159 Conn. App. 462, 477-78, 123 A.3d 123, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 949, 125 A.3d 528 (2015). Our review of the jury charge, read as a whole, leads us to conclude that......
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