State v. Rinaldi

Decision Date12 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 14137,14137
Citation220 Conn. 345,599 A.2d 1
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Robert RINALDI.

Walter H. Scanlon, Plainville, for appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, State's Atty., and Corinne Klatt, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and BORDEN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence offered by the defendant on the issue of the source of semen found inside the complainant on the night she was allegedly sexually assaulted. After a jury trial, the defendant, Robert Rinaldi, was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70, sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71(a)(1), and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92(a)(2)(A). 1 The trial court rendered a judgment sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years, suspended after ten years, and placing him on probation for three years. The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3). We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On June 21, 1989, the complainant, who was then fourteen years old, and two friends, Ronald and Colleen, were drinking beer and rum at the Waterbury apartment of the complainant's father. The complainant spoke by telephone to another friend, Dino, and arranged to meet him. The three friends got a ride to Dino's house and then they all walked to Fairlawn Park. The complainant and Dino soon left the other two and went to the rear of the park where they remained alone for approximately fifteen minutes to one-half hour. After their reappearance, Dino departed, leaving the complainant upset. The other three then returned to Dino's house.

While the three friends were standing in front of Dino's house, the defendant and a male passenger 2 drove by in the defendant's sports car. The defendant stopped his car and spoke with Ronald, with whom he was acquainted. At some point, the complainant's father also drove up in his car. After an argument between the complainant and her father, the complainant ran and hid behind some bushes on the side of Dino's house. Her father then drove away.

The defendant subsequently agreed to drive the three friends home. They got into the back seat of the car and the defendant drove to a nearby gas station, where the complainant's friends got out of the car. The complainant also tried to leave, but was forcibly prevented from doing so by the passenger in the defendant's car. As the car departed, the complainant screamed for help. Her friends chased the car but were unable to catch it. Two patrons at the gas station also noticed the car and heard the complainant screaming.

The defendant drove the car to a parking lot, where he and his passenger engaged in forced sexual intercourse with the complainant. They then threw the complainant into the back of the car and drove to another parking lot. The witnesses at the gas station, who had once again spotted the defendant's car, followed the car into the second parking lot and watched as the complainant was thrown from the defendant's car. The complainant's clothes had been partially removed and she told the witnesses that she had been raped. The complainant was returned to her home and, shortly thereafter, was taken by her father to Waterbury Hospital.

At the hospital, the examining physician found a cigarette burn on the complainant's cheek, a superficial laceration on her right forearm, and some grass in her pubic hair and near the entrance of her vagina. The complainant's mother, who was with her daughter at the hospital, noticed grass on her daughter's buttocks. A screening for alcohol and drugs indicated the presence of alcohol, marihuana and cocaine in the complainant's system. A technician employed by the Connecticut state police forensic laboratory analyzed the components of a sex crime kit prepared by the examining physician and determined that semen was present on the vaginal smear and in the crotch area of the complainant's underpants. Because the defendant, his passenger and the complainant all had the same blood type, the technician could not determine or identify the source of the semen.

The jury also heard the contrary testimony of the defendant, who denied having had sexual intercourse with the complainant at any time. According to the defendant, in the confrontation involving the complainant's father at Dino's house, the father threatened to shoot the defendant and his friend if they went near his daughter or his house. The defendant testified that after the complainant's friends got out of his car at the gas station, the complainant asked him to drive her home. As he drove toward her home he noticed a car following closely behind him. The driver was blinking the car's lights and honking its horn. Believing that the car belonged to the complainant's father, and recalling his previous threats, the defendant pulled into a parking lot, dropped the complainant off and drove away. The jury apparently disbelieved the defendant, because it convicted him on all counts.

In his appeal, the defendant raises three claims. He maintains that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly: (1) precluded the defendant from eliciting evidence regarding the source of the semen found in the complainant; (2) precluded the defendant from eliciting evidence regarding a comparison of a pubic hair found on the complainant's blouse; and (3) ordered defense counsel not to refer in his summation to the possibility that the complainant had had sexual intercourse with Dino at the park. We agree with the first of these claims.

I

At trial the defendant moved for permission to present evidence that the complainant had engaged in sexual intercourse with someone other than the defendant on the night of the alleged sexual assault. He offered this evidence pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86f, 3 known as the Rape Victims Shield Law. Although this statute limits the admissibility of evidence of a sexual assault victim's prior sexual conduct, such evidence is admissible under subsection (1) of the statute "on the issue of whether the defendant was, with respect to the victim, the source of semen." In compliance with § 54-86f, the defendant submitted a written motion containing an offer of proof. At the hearing on this motion conducted outside the presence of the jury, the defendant presented the proposed testimony of the complainant's friend Colleen concerning events that transpired on the evening of June 21, 1989.

A

Colleen testified at the hearing that she overheard the complainant tell Dino over the telephone that she wanted to have sexual intercourse with him. 4 She further testified that after she, the complainant, Ronald and Dino had walked to Fairlawn Park, Dino and the complainant had kissed and gone off by themselves toward a slide in the back of the park. They remained alone together for approximately twenty minutes to one-half hour. Colleen testified that she subsequently called for the complainant, who emerged from the back of the park with her pants unbuttoned. After Dino had walked away, the complainant told Colleen: "I finally got it." In response to Colleen's question to the complainant: "Are you happy now?" the complainant answered, "Yes." 5

The trial court heard the proffered oral testimony and then ruled upon each paragraph of the defendant's written offer of proof. The court excluded the testimony "that the victim told [Colleen] ... how bad she wanted to get laid or--and the language she used here today" as not constituting evidence of sexual conduct. It ruled admissible the proffered testimony that the complainant spoke with Dino on the telephone, made plans to meet him, met him, walked to the park with him and walked into the woods at the back of the park alone with Dino. The court excluded testimony of the complainant's statement, "I finally got it," ruling that it was hearsay evidence, and excluded testimony that the complainant's pants were unbuttoned as "not evidence that there was any semen transferred from Dino to the victim." The defendant took an exception to the court's rulings. Following a recess, the trial court further stated that it found the excluded evidence to be more prejudicial than probative.

The defendant claims on appeal that the exclusion of the proffered evidence violated his right to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); and by article first, § 8 of the constitution of Connecticut. We decline, however, to reach the defendant's constitutional claims because we conclude that the trial court's rulings violated § 54-86f. " 'We thus follow the recognized policy of self-restraint and the basic judicial duty to eschew unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions.' " State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 639, 431 A.2d 501, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 320, 66 L.Ed.2d 148 (1980), citing Pepin v. Danbury, 171 Conn. 74, 88, 368 A.2d 88 (1976).

The trial court's first conclusion was that the proffered statement "I want to fuck you" or "I want to fucking do you" did not meet the requirements of § 54-86f 6 because it did not provide evidence of sexual conduct. The court's ruling was, in effect, that the statement was insufficiently relevant to the issue of the complainant's alleged sexual conduct with Dino in the park. "One fact is relevant to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken...

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