State v. Ritchie

• Decision Date: 22 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-K-0478,90-K-0478
• Citation: 590 So.2d 1139
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald RITCHIE.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 1139

590 So.2d 1139

STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald RITCHIE.

No. 90-K-0478.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 22, 1991.

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Watson

Feb. 28, 1991.

On Rehearing Dec. 12, 1991.

Richard C. Goorley, Shreveport, for Ronald L. Ritchie defendant-applicant.

William Guste, Atty. Gen., Henry N. Brown, Dist. Atty., James M. Bullers, Asst. Dist. Atty., for State of La. plaintiff-respondent.

John S. Baker, Jr., for John S. Baker, Jr. amicus curiae.

PHILIP C. CIACCIO, Judge Pro Temp. ^*

Relator Ronald Ritchie was found guilty as charged of three counts of negligent homicide, violations of LSA-R.S. 34:851.6. He was sentenced to serve the maximum term of one year in jail and to pay a fine of $1,000 on each of the three counts with the sentences to run consecutively. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. State v. Ritchie, 556 So.2d 651 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990). This Court granted the relator's application for certiorari for consideration of Assignment of Error Number Three: Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jurors that "ordinary negligence" was the standard of proof under LSA-R.S. 34:851.6. State v. Ritchie, 563 So.2d 888 (La.1990).

On May 17, 1989, Ronald Ritchie was operating his boat in an area known as Bossier Slough in Lake Bistineau. The Bossier Slough intersects with a body of water known as Miller's Cut. The relator was travelling approximately 45 m.p.h. as he entered the intersection of the two bodies of water. Relator, who was alone in his boat, had just passed on his port side a pleasure boat in which four people were riding. Testimony at trial indicated that the defendant was travelling "excessively fast" and, rather than watching in front of his boat, he continued to stare back at the pleasure boat for "an inordinate period of time."

A boat carrying three passengers was being driven by Albert Dupree on the right, tree-lined bank of Bossier Slough. The relator's boat headed into the path of Dupree's boat and struck Dupree's boat on the port side, causing it to run into a grove of trees. The three passengers in Dupree's boat were killed.

Testimony at trial revealed that the relator's blood alcohol concentration was approximately .06 to .08 percent at the time of the accident. Urinanalysis also indicated that the relator had a substance in his system indicating significant use of marijuana over a long period of time and possibly recent use. A quantity of marijuana was seized from the relator's boat following the accident.

Certiorari was granted in this case to consider whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury that negligence under LSA-R.S. 34:851.6 is defined as "the omission on the part of a person to do some act which an ordinary, careful and prudent man would do under like circumstances or the doing of some act which an ordinary, careful and prudent man under like circumstances wouldn't do by reason of which another person is endangered in life or bodily safely." (Tr. 401). The relator argues that the level of negligence necessary to convict under LSA-R.S. 34:851.6 ¹ is "criminal negligence" as defined by LSA-R.S. 14:12 ².

The relator contends that the term "negligent", used in R.S. 34:851.6, must be interpreted in conjunction with Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. LSA-R.S. 14:7 describes a crime as "that conduct which is defined in this Code, or in other Acts of the Legislature, or in the Constitution of this State." LSA-R.S. 14:8 defines criminal conduct as "criminal negligence that produces criminal consequences." Criminal negligence is defined in LSA-R.S. 14:12 as set forth in footnote 2, below. The defendant argues that "criminal negligence" is a necessary element of criminal conduct and, therefore, the proper standard to be applied in this case. The relator alternatively argues that "gross negligence" as provided in 46 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2302 ³ is the correct standard of proof.

Finding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the level of negligence required by R.S. 34:851.6, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

Although this is the first occasion for this Court to define the term "negligent" as it is used in a statute which provides for criminal penalties, several courts from other states have interpreted similar language. In State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410 (Vt.1988), the Supreme Court of Vermont construed the following statute: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public highway in a careless or negligent manner ... or in any manner to endanger or jeopardize the safety, life or property of a person." 23 V.S.A. Sec. 1091(a). The court held "the requisite level of culpability under the section is 'ordinary negligence such as would impose civil liability and ... to support a conviction ... there is no necessity for the State to produce evidence tending to show criminal negligence ...'. State v. LaBonte, 120 Vt. 465, 468-69, 144 A.2d 792, 794-95 (1958)." Stevens, 552 A.2d at 411. The court in LaBonte, disapproved some courts' interpretation of the term "negligence" as implying criminal negligence. The court held "it is now well settled that it is within the power of the legislature to declare an act criminal irrespective of the intent of knowledge of the doer of the act [citations omitted]. Furthermore, the power of a legislature to define a crime based upon ordinary negligence has been recognized in numerous jurisdictions." [citations omitted]. LaBonte, 144 A.2d at 794.

The negligent homicide statute in Michigan contained language very similar to the negligent homicide statute at issue in the present case. The negligent homicide statute in Michigan provided:

Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway or upon any other property, public or private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not willfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than two years or by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. M.C.L. Sec. 750.324; M.S.A. Sec. 28.556.

The court in People v. Abramczyk, 163 Mich.App. 473, 415 N.W.2d 249 (Mich.App.1987) interpreted this statute to require only proof of ordinary negligence. "Because the offense is a statutory crime, the legislature has the power to define it without regard to the presence or absence of criminal intent or culpability in its commission." Abramczyk, 415 N.W.2d at 251. The court referred to an earlier Michigan Supreme Court opinion which noted "the number of deaths resulting from automobile accidents" and concluded that the legislature was "prompted to pass a law to curb reckless, careless, and negligent driving which caused death, in cases where the negligence was less than gross." People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723 (Mich.1930). The court in McMurchy held:

The law is well settled that the legislature, in the exercise of its police power in order to preserve the health, morals, and safety, may constitute something to be a crime that theretofore was not criminal. It may impose a criminal responsibility to a tort that theretofore carried with it only civil liability. 249 Mich. at 162, 228 N.W. at 723.

In People v. Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 96 P.2d 788 (1939), the defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide. The negligent homicide statute in California provided that any person operating a vehicle in a negligent manner or in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony which resulted in the death of another person would be found guilty of negligent homicide. The trial court instructed the jury that a finding of guilty as charged may be returned if the jury found that the defendant was guilty of "negligence resulting from a failure to exercise ordinary care under all the facts and circumstances." The defendant in that case argued, as the relator in the present case does, that the term "negligent" must be read in conjunction with the penal code to mean "criminal negligence." The court in Pociask, responded:

But, in answering the question of what constitutes criminal negligence, the court is bound to apply an appropriate definition enacted by the legislature. Only when the legislature has not properly defined a term is it necessary for the courts to look to the meaning thereof as understood in the common law ... It is within the function of the legislature to make laws defining what breaches of the public peace shall be made punishable. Accordingly it may specify various degrees of the same crime and require a different measure of punishment for each. It is apparent that by the enactment of Section 500 of the Vehicle Code [the negligent homicide statute] the legislature has specified a lesser degree of punishment when the homicide is committed in the doing of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony while operating any vehicle, or while driving in a negligent manner, than is meted out in the cases of homicides otherwise committed in the doing of an unlawful act not amounting to felony or without due caution and circumspection ... When the legislature has so spoken and the court has stated the law to the jury in the language of the applicable statutes, it is not required to do more. Pociask, at 791-792.

The Court concluded that the trial court did not err by refusing the requested instruction which contained a definition of "criminal negligence."

In Commonwealth v. Berggren, 398 Mass. 338, 496 N.E.2d 660 (Mass.1986), the defendant was convicted of motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle so as to endanger public safety. The court found that a finding of ordinary negligence sufficed to establish the violation of the statute. The court stated "a showing of ordinary negligence has generally been held or recognized as sufficient to convict an accused under a...