State v. Rivera
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-196-C.A.,16-2067A,P1,2019-196-C.A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. Carlos RIVERA. |
Owen Murphy, Department of Attorney General, for State
Megan F. Jackson, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court.
The defendant, Carlos Rivera, appeals from an October 15, 2018 judgment of conviction and commitment entered against him in the Providence County Superior Court on one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. The defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial justice erred by unfairly limiting the testimony of a defense witness, thereby violating defendant's constitutional right to present a full and fair defense. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
This case was initiated by the allegations of the complaining witness, Allison,1 that defendant, her step-grandfather, had sexually molested her on multiple occasions between July 18, 2013, and July 17, 2015. On July 8, 2016, defendant was indicted by a grand jury on the following counts, all relating to Allison, who was fourteen years of age or younger when the alleged incidents occurred: sexual penetration, to wit, penile/vaginal penetration (count one); sexual contact, to wit, hand to breast (count two); sexual contact, to wit, hand to buttocks (count three); and sexual contact, to wit, hand to vaginal area (count four).
In June 2018, a jury trial was held in the Superior Court. Prior to trial, the state moved in limine to preclude any reference at trial to the immigration status of any of the witnesses (including defendant) or concerning immigration proceedings relative to any of the witnesses.2 At the hearing, the state argued that such references would be irrelevant to the instant case. The state further explained that, if such references were permitted, the trial would "turn into a mini immigration proceeding regarding the status of [defendant]" and would potentially "play[ ] upon any sympathies of the jury." The state also contended that, based on the minimal documentation as to defendant's immigration proceedings provided to the state, any purported proceedings were "far attenuat[ed] from this case[.]"
Defense counsel responded that the "immigration status and proceedings * * * form the genesis of the[ ] allegations against [defendant]." He asserted that he should be allowed to question Allison about whether she was aware of the immigration proceedings that involved both defendant and her grandmother, Amanda DeLeone, which proceedings had taken place just three weeks before Allison made her accusation of sexual molestation against defendant. Defense counsel added that the purpose of such questioning would not be to introduce the contents of those proceedings, but rather simply to use the existence of those proceedings and the events that occurred thereafter to demonstrate Allison's knowledge of "how Ms. DeLeone perceived those events * * * [and] her state of mind after those events"—particularly with respect to Ms. DeLeone's feelings toward defendant. Defense counsel added that to deny defendant the opportunity to question Allison as to her knowledge about the immigration proceedings "would be to deny a fundamental right of cross-examination."
The trial justice ruled that he would permit defense counsel to cross-examine Allison on "foundational question[s]"—namely, whether she was aware of the immigration proceedings in which Ms. DeLeone and defendant had participated. Defense counsel replied to the trial justice that, if Allison "is not aware of any of these proceedings, and does say no, that would be the end of it." The trial justice added that he would postpone ruling on the motion in limine as it pertained to the testimony of a particular defense witness—Allison's aunt, Jackelyn Rivera3 —until the conclusion of the state's case. Allison then began her testimony.
On direct examination, Allison testified that, at the time of the incidents at issue, she was eleven or twelve years old and she lived in Central Falls, Rhode Island. She stated that she lived there with her mother, her younger sister, her grandmother (Ms. DeLeone), and defendant, who was at that time married to Ms. DeLeone.4
Allison testified that, on a typical afternoon when she was eleven or twelve years old, she would return home from school, eat a snack in the kitchen, and then would make her way to the bedroom "because there [were] toys there." Allison stated that, on one occasion, defendant, who had also been in the kitchen, followed her into the bedroom. She testified that, once inside the bedroom, defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her. She added: "He told me * * * what he was going to do is normal and * * * to not say anything." She stated that, although she told him to stop, she did not yell for anyone because she was scared.
Allison testified that defendant had sexually assaulted her "[s]ix times, seven[,]" and she testified as to what had taken place during some of those incidents. She added that, on at least one other occasion, defendant told her not to tell anyone. Allison stated that, despite defendant's admonitions, when she was thirteen years old, she told her younger sister and her pediatrician about what defendant had done to her.5 Allison testified that, after speaking to her pediatrician, she spoke to "[a] lot of people[,]" including representatives of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families; officers from the police department; and several medical professionals.
During cross-examination, Allison testified about her relationship with her grandmother, Ms. DeLeone. She stated that she was "not really close to her" and that, even though her grandmother "took care of" her, they "never really talked." Her testimony consisted of the following:
At the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief, the trial justice, adhering to his previously stated intention, revisited the state's original motion in limine , which had sought to preclude any references to the immigration status of any of the witnesses, now focusing on the motion solely as it pertained to the proposed testimony of Jackelyn, a defense witness, who was the daughter of defendant and Ms. DeLeone.
In arguing against the state's motion, defense counsel made an offer of proof as to the testimony he expected to elicit from Jackelyn. He stated that Jackelyn would testify that she had lived with Ms. DeLeone, Allison's mother, and Allison for a number of years, during which time Ms. DeLeone freely discussed her immigration status. Defense counsel further stated that Jackelyn would testify that, on January 26, 2016, she and Ms. DeLeone had gone to Boston and, on that date, Ms. DeLeone received updated information as to the status of certain immigration proceedings that involved her.6
During defense counsel's argument, the trial justice inquired as follows:
Defense counsel contended that Jackelyn would testify as to Ms. DeLeone's state of mind that she "was upset about the outcome of those proceedings" and that, during the car ride home from Boston, she "blamed [defendant] for the handling of those [immigration] proceedings." Defense counsel indicated that Jackelyn would testify that Ms. DeLeone spoke freely in her home about her immigration status. He argued that, if allowed to hear this testimony, the jury could consider it to be circumstantial evidence of "a motive for [Allison] to fabricate these allegations * * * merely three weeks after" the immigration proceedings had taken place. Defense counsel added that, because the proposed testimony "goes to the basis of why [Allison] would fabricate the allegations against [defendant,]" said testimony was "key and central" to the defense's theory of the case. Defense counsel further argued that "a motive to fabricate is always relevant as discrediting the witness or affecting the weight of his or her testimony."
The state argued that, because none of the information concerning the immigration proceedings was relevant to the case at hand, Jackelyn should be precluded from making any references to the immigration status of any of the witnesses or to the immigration proceedings in general. The state further paraphrased the language of Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence when he stated: "[A] witness cannot testify to any matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness had personal knowledge of the matter." The state argued that, because there was no evidence that Jackelyn had any personal knowledge as to whether Allison knew about "any immigration proceedings or anything that was going on at that time for her grandmother * * * or the [d]efendant," she should not be permitted to testify about what Allison might have known about such proceedings.
In partially granting the state's motion in limine with respect to Jackelyn's testimony, the trial justice stated:
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