State v. Rivera

Decision Date06 June 1980
Docket NumberNo. 7025,7025
Citation612 P.2d 526,62 Haw. 120
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Isidro RIVERA, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Amendment of former rape statute to reflect a gender-neutral classification was to forestall the possibility of a constitutional challenge, which, if successful, would leave a void in the criminal laws.

In determining the constitutionality of a sex-based classification under the equal protection guarantees, the test is whether the classification serves an important governmental objective and whether it is substantially related to achievement of that object.

Protecting women from nonconsensual intercourse is an important legislative objective and the legislative decision to deal with the act of forced intercourse by men upon women as a more significant social problem is substantially related to achievement of that objective.

A statutory classification based upon unique physical characteristics of men or women does not violate the equal rights amendment.

An accused has the right to present evidence of character traits associated with the basic nature of the offense with which he is charged and evidence supporting his credibility as a witness.

Relevant time for accused's reputation for peacefulness and nonviolence is a time at or prior to the commission of the alleged offense.

Where defendant testifies, his reputation for truth and veracity is in issue at time of trial.

Even if trial court commits error in excluding reputation evidence, where the evidence establishing defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is overwhelming, error is harmless.

Standard of review for a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the prosecution's case is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Right to counsel in criminal prosecution does not mean errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering, reasonably effective counsel.

Record disclosed no facts from which it would appear that the defense of mental impairment should have suggested itself to a reasonably diligent counsel.

Where defense in rape trial was consent, trial counsel's decision not to call doctor who examined the complaining witness was based on adequate reason and is not grounds for alleging ineffective counsel.

More is required than mere allegation that trial counsel ineffectively cross-examined witnesses.

Pat McManaman, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu (Marie N. Milks, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, on briefs), for defendant-appellant.

Calvin K. Murashige, Deputy Pros. Atty., County of Kauai, Lihue, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., retired Justice MARUMOTO and Circuit Judge LUM Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

OGATA, Justice.

Defendant-appellant, Isidro Rivera (hereinafter "appellant"), was convicted on February 15, 1978, of two counts of kidnapping in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-720 (1976), and one count of rape in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-730 (1976). On appeal, he raises the following questions:

I. Whether the rape statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional?

II. Whether the trial court erroneously excluded character evidence?

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal?

IV. Whether trial counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance in his defense?

We answer all questions in the negative and affirm his conviction. We discuss below the issues seriatim.

I.

Constitutionality of HRS § 707-730 (1976).

Appellant was convicted of first degree rape under HRS § 707-730 (1976). 1 The applicable statute was amended as of June 26, 1979 2 and as we understand appellant he would have no equal protection challenge to the new statute. The purpose of the amendment was to restate the statutory provisions in gender-neutral terms. Appellant contends that this amendment supports his claim that the statute, as it stood prior to the amendment, was unconstitutional. The legislature, by substituting the word "person" wherever words making a gender distinction appeared in the statute, did not intend to "invalidate, influence, or in any way affect any case currently before the Supreme Court on appeal from a criminal prosecution arising under these statutes." House Stand.Com.Rep.No. 620 (1979), 1979 House Journal 1434. Rather, the intent was to eliminate the possibility of a successful constitutional challenge, which would create a void in our criminal laws.

Appellant challenges the constitutionality of HRS § 707-730 prior to its amendment, and claims that, by its terms, it denied him the equal protection of the law by punishing only men and no women, and protecting only women and no men, thus violating the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 4 of the Hawaii State Constitution 3 and the equal rights amendment, Article I, Section 21, of the Hawaii State Constitution (ERA). 4

To withstand judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause, a sex-based distinction " ' must serve governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' " Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1766, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1111, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 456, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Holdman v. Olim, 59 Haw. 346, 350, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (1978). Under this principle, the question is whether the sex-based classification in the former rape law served an important governmental objective and was substantially related to achievement of that objective. We find that it plainly met the test.

Although the statute sets up a gender-based classification by defining rape as an offense which can be committed only by a male, it reflects a legislative judgment as to the degree of harm posed to potential victims of nonconsensual intercourse. "While we recognize that it is possible for females to commit a sex offense which might be deemed rape, the fact remains that historically and generally rape is a crime committed by males against females." Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1303 (6th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929, 98 S.Ct. 1500, 55 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 218-219, 245 N.W.2d 612, 616-617 (1976); State v. Craig, 169 Mont. 150, 157, 545 P.2d 649, 653 (1976). The legislature chose to selectively deal with the act of forced intercourse by men upon women as a more significant societal problem where the need for proscription was clearest. Protecting women from nonconsensual intercourse is an important legislative objective. And a law which punishes males for nonconsensual intercourse with women against their will is substantially related to that objective. Appellant's contentions might be more persuasive if he had provided us with empirical data tending to show that female rapes of males presented a social problem. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400, 57 S.Ct. 578, 585, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937), the United States Supreme Court restated the principle that "(i)f 'the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied.' " We are dealing with a criminal sex offense statute. We are not dealing with an overbroad generalization based on sex which is entirely irrelevant to any difference between men and women or which demeans the ability or status of the affected class. The courts have been reluctant in striking down criminal sex laws and all have upheld rape statutes against constitutional challenges. 5 Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d. at 1303; State v. Fletcher, 341 So.2d 340 (La.1976); State v. Witt, 310 Minn. at 219, 245 N.W.2d at 618; State v. Craig, 169 Mont. at 156, 545 P.2d at 653; People v. Reilly, 85 Misc.2d 702, 381 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1976); People v. Gould, 188 Colo. 113, 532 P.2d 953 (1975); Brooks v. State, 24 Md.App. 334, 330 A.2d 670 (1975); Stewart v. State, 534 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn.Cr.App.1975); Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935, 95 S.Ct. 1143, 43 L.Ed.2d 411 (1975); People v. Medrano, 24 Ill.App.3d 429, 321 N.E.2d 97 (1974); State v. Price, 215 Kan. 718, 529 P.2d 85 (1974); State v. Ewald, 63 Wis.2d 165, 216 N.W.2d 213 (1974).

Appellant claims that because Article I, Section 4, now Article I, Section 5, of the Hawaii State Constitution specifically enumerates sex along with race, religion and ancestry, this specific enumeration requires a more stringent test than that required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the ERA, which, by its terms forbids classifications based on sex, is said to necessitate a judicial standard of review at least as high as the "strict scrutiny" standard under equal protection analysis.

Not even the ERA, however, forbids all classifications. "The fundamental legal principle underlying the ERA . . . is that the law must deal with particular attributes of individuals. . . ." Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Brown). A classification based on a physical characteristic unique to one sex is not an impermissive under- or over-inclusive classification because the differentiation is based on the unique presence of a physical characteristic in one sex and not based on an averaging of a trait or characteristic which exists in both sexes. Two frequently-cited examples are laws relating to wet nurses, which would apply to all or some women but no men; or laws regulating sperm donation which would apply to all or some men,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • Baehr v. Lewin, 15689
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • May 5, 1993
    ...equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Tookes, 67 Haw. 608, 614, 699 P.2d 983, 988 (1985); State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 123, 612 P.2d 526, 529 (1980). 32 See, e.g., State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527,......
  • Israel by Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Com'n, 18904
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • December 20, 1989
    ...977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988); Long v. Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 428 So.2d 688 (Fla.1983); State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 612 P.2d 526 (1980); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982); Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418 (La.1979); Callahan v. Department of......
  • 80 Hawai'i 126, State v. Malufau
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • October 18, 1995
    ...guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are deemed harmless." State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 127-28, 612 P.2d 526, 532 (1980) (citations omitted). The case of State v. Yamashiro, 8 Haw.App. 595, 817 P.2d 123 (1991), is a case in which there was such......
  • State v. Sua, 21480.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Hawai'i
    • August 30, 1999
    ...the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lee, 75 Haw. 80, 110, 856 P.2d 1246, 1262 (1993); State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 128, 612 P.2d 526, 532 (1980). We conclude, based on the following discussion on Defendant's nonsubstantial evidence point, that a reasonable mind might......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT