State v. Rivera
| Decision Date | 05 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-04-0170-PR.,CR-04-0170-PR. |
| Citation | 210 Ariz. 188,109 P.3d 83 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Anthony RIVERA, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General by Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorney for Appellee.
James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender by Garrett W. Simpson, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorney for Appellant.
Andrew P. Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney, Richard M. Romley, Former Maricopa County Attorney by Diane Gunnels Rowley, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council.
¶ 1 We granted review to determine whether a plea agreement containing terms that require truthful testimony and an avowal that prior statements by the pleading defendant were true constitutes a "consistency agreement," prohibited by our decision in State v. Fisher, 176 Ariz. 69, 859 P.2d 179 (1993) (Fisher III). We hold that it does not. We have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-120.24 (2003).
¶ 2 In 1998, Michael Rivera, Marcario Vela, Victoria Valenzuela, and Katherine Saiz were charged with murdering Megan Ramirez. In separate plea agreements with the State, Victoria Valenzuela and Katherine Saiz independently agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder. In the agreements, each woman avowed that the information she had provided in a "free talk" with the State on August 10, 1998, was a complete, accurate, and truthful account of the events surrounding the murder. The witnesses understood that the State had entered into the plea agreements based on that avowal, and each witness promised that she would testify truthfully at Rivera's trial. The plea agreements each provided, in relevant part, as follows:
¶ 3 Rivera sought to preclude Valenzuela and Saiz from testifying at his trial, arguing that their plea agreements contained consistency provisions, which are prohibited by this court's decision in Fisher III, 176 Ariz. at 74, 859 P.2d at 184. Rivera claimed that because the witnesses had committed to testify to a settled version of the facts, allowing them to testify would violate his right to a fair trial. The trial court denied the motion.
¶ 4 At trial, Valenzuela and Saiz testified that the victim, Megan Ramirez, was dating Rivera, who was a member of the West Side Chicanos gang. The night of the murder, Megan was seen dancing with a former member of a rival gang that was thought to be responsible for killing a member of Rivera's gang. After the victim went home, Rivera, Vela, and Valenzuela broke in and forced her into their car. They picked up Saiz and then drove to a field. Valenzuela and Saiz testified that Rivera shot the victim twice, and then ordered each of them to shoot her as well. Megan's body was found the next day.
¶ 5 At trial, Valenzuela and Saiz admitted to having given several differing versions of the events surrounding the murder before making their August 10th videotaped statements. Each witness also testified that she understood that any significant variation from the statements in the August 10th "free talk" might cause her to lose the benefit of her plea agreement. Each also testified, however, that she understood that the plea agreement required her to testify truthfully, and that she had done so.
¶ 6 Both the prosecutor and defense counsel addressed the plea agreements several times during the trial — during voir dire, testimony of the witnesses, and closing arguments. The judge also instructed the jurors on the significance of plea agreements before they retired to deliberate.
¶ 7 The jury convicted Rivera of first degree murder, first degree burglary, and kidnapping. He was sentenced to natural life for the murder and to consecutive sentences for the burglary and kidnapping. Rivera appealed, contending that the accomplice witnesses' plea agreements contained illegal consistency clauses that deprived him of a fair trial.
¶ 8 The court of appeals, in a split decision, agreed with Rivera. State v. Rivera, 207 Ariz. 383, 391, ¶ 35, 86 P.3d 963, 971 (App.2004). The majority found that in this case, as in Fisher III, the plea agreements required the witnesses to testify at trial consistently with an earlier recitation of events. Id. at 387, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d at 967. The majority also found that, because the accomplice witnesses' testimony was important to the State's case, the plea agreement terms may have affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 390, ¶ 30, 86 P.3d at 970. The court therefore remanded for a new trial. Id. at 391, ¶ 35, 86 P.3d at 971. The court ordered that at Rivera's retrial the State could not introduce Valenzuela's and Saiz's testimony from the previous trial or any other statements they made after they had entered their plea agreements. Id. at ¶ 33. The majority concluded, however, that Valenzuela and Saiz could testify at the retrial if the trial court removed the taint caused by the improper plea agreement provisions by informing the witnesses, before they testified, that the consistency provisions were unenforceable. Id. at ¶ 34.
¶ 9 Judge Thompson dissented. Id. at 391-92, ¶ 36, 86 P.3d at 971-72 (Thompson, J., dissenting). He believed that the majority erred in applying Fisher III, which he read as requiring a showing that the testimony of the accomplice witnesses would have exculpated Rivera had they not been constrained by their plea agreements. Id. at 392, ¶ 37, 86 P.3d at 972. Because Rivera had not established that the accomplice witnesses' testimony would have exculpated him, Judge Thompson reasoned, there was no due process violation. Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.
¶ 10 We granted review to decide whether the court of appeals misapplied Fisher III in holding that the accomplice witnesses' plea agreements were impermissible consistency agreements.
¶ 12 Although we allow accomplices to testify pursuant to plea agreements, we have held that provisions that require a pleading defendant to give testimony consistent with a previously given statement of the facts are unenforceable in Arizona. Fisher III, 176 Ariz. at 73, 859 P.2d at 183.
¶ 13 The issue first came before us in Fisher III, 176 Ariz. 69,859 P.2d 179. In that case, Defendant James Fisher's wife, Ann Fisher, signed an agreement allowing her to plead guilty to a lesser felony if her testimony at James's murder trial did "not vary substantially in relevant areas [from] statements previously given [to] investigative officers." Id. at 71, 859 P.2d at 181. The agreement did not require her to testify truthfully. Despite the agreement, Ann asserted her Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify at James's trial. Id. The defense then submitted her plea agreement into evidence and James was convicted of the murder. Id.
¶ 14 At a later hearing on a motion for a new trial, Ann testified about conflicting statements she had made to various people, saying at times that James had committed the murder and at other times that she had done it. Id. at 72, 859 P.2d at 182. She stated that she had invoked the Fifth Amendment both on the advice of her lawyer and because she did not want to violate, and possibly lose, her plea deal with the State. Id.
¶ 15 We ruled that a witness must be allowed to testify truthfully and therefore cannot be compelled to testify consistently with a previously given statement regardless of the truth of that statement. Id. at 73, 859 P.2d at 183. Such agreements may "undermine the reliability and fairness of the trial and plea bargaining processes and taint the truth-seeking function of the courts." Id. at 74, 859 P.2d at 184. We observed, however, that "[p]lea agreements may, of course, properly be conditioned upon truthful and complete testimony." Id.
¶ 16 The plea terms in this case differ in one significant respect from the ones at issue in Fisher III. Unlike the agreement in Fisher III, these plea agreements required Valenzuela and Saiz to testify "fully, accurately, and truthfully."1 While the agreements contain an avowal by the witnesses that their prior statements were truthful,...
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