State v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 28 June 2024
• Citation: 323 A.3d 928
• Docket Number: No. 23-AP-079
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Jason ROBERTS
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

323 A.3d 928

2024 VT 32

STATE of Vermont

v.Jason ROBERTS

No. 23-AP-079

Supreme Court of Vermont.

September Term, 2023

June 7, 2024

Motion for Reargument Denied

June 28, 2024

On Appeal from Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, Michael S. Kupersmith, J.(Ret.)

Evan Meenan, Deputy State’s Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and A. Alexander Donn, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1.The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of a second-degree murder charge against defendant based on the common-law year-and-a-day rule, under which "no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act."Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 453, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697(2001).The rule arose to protect defendants from a murder conviction where the lapse of time made it difficult to prove that the defendant’s actions caused the death.We conclude that justifications for the rule are no longer germane and, consequently, abrogate it.Consistent with our precedents and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rogers, we apply our abrogation to the instant case, retroactively and prospectively.Because we reverse the court’s ruling on the year-and-a-day rule, we also address defendant’s alternative arguments that the court erred in finding that the prosecution is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause or defendant’s plea agreement.We find no error and affirm those aspects of the court’s ruling.Finally, because the trial court has not yet ruled on the issue, we do not reach defendant’s contention that the State cannot make out its prima facie case.Accordingly, we reverse the court’s dismissal of the charges and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2.The undisputed facts are as follows.In 2001, defendant shook his five-week-old daughter, D.R., causing her severe neurological injuries.Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault, 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(1), and ultimately pleaded nolo contendere to the charge, serving ten years of a fifteen-year maximum sentence.¹Defendant’s plea agreement provided that the "Statewill not bring any further charges that are on file at this time."Meanwhile, D.R. was placed in foster care and later adopted, assuming the name M.S.In 2016, at age fifteen, M.S. died from complications ostensibly resulting from the injuries she received when shaken as an infant by defendant.

¶ 3.In 2022, the State charged defendant with second-degree murder, 13 V.S.A. § 2301, relating to M.S.’s death.Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the State could not make out its prima facie case and that the prosecution was barred by the common-law year-and-a-day rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and his plea agreement.The trial court withheld judgment on the prima-facie-case issue, noting that "[t]he parties agreed that the court should decide" the other issues initially "and reserve the first point for a later time."The court then rejected the double-jeopardy and plea-agreement claims, concluding that double jeopardy did not apply and that the express terms of defendant’s plea agreement did not bar the prosecution.However, the court determined that the year-and-a-day rule was still part of the common law of Vermont and that the death had occurred more than a year and a day after defendant’s act, and therefore dismissed the murder charge.This appeal by the State followed.We begin by addressing the year-and-a-day rule.

I.The Year-and-a-Day Rule

¶ 4.The State presents three related reasons why the year-and-a-day rule should not apply.First, the State disputes whether the year-and-a-day rule remains a part of Vermont common law and argues principally that the Legislature abrogated the rule when it codified murder without establishing a limitations period.Second, the State claims this Court should abrogate the rule if it still exists.Third, assuming we abrogate the rule, the State argues that we should apply that abrogation to this case, permitting the prosecution to proceed.We examine each of these issues in turn.

[1]¶ 5.The existence and application of the year-and-a-day rule under Vermont common law are legal questions that we review without deference to the trial court’s conclusions of law.SeeState v. Reynolds, 2014 VT 16, ¶ 9, 196 Vt. 113, 95 A.3d 973.

A.The Year-and-a-Day Rule Under Vermont Common Law

¶ 6.This Court has not previously addressed the year-and-a-day rule.Cf.State v. Congress, 2014 VT 129, ¶ 74, 198 Vt. 241, 114 A.3d 1128(mentioning year-and-a-day rule in single, passing reference in denying defendant’s motion for reargument), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 843, 136 S.Ct. 83, 193 L.Ed.2d 74(2015).Accordingly, we first provide a brief background on the origins of the year-and-a-day rule and its initial adoption as a part of Vermont common law.Although not in dispute, this background is helpful to contextualize the issues on appeal.We then turn to whether the Legislature has abrogated this common law rule by statute.

i. Initial Adoption of the Rule

[2]¶ 7.Vermont adopted the common law of England by statute after our independence in the 1770s.See1 V.S.A. § 271(adopting "the common law of England" in Vermont).Because our common law embraces the "unwritten law of England, as amended or altered by acts of Parliament," that existed at the time of Vermont’s founding, E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co. v. City of Burlington, 106 Vt. 446, 458, 175 A. 35, 41(1934), a law that was "part of the common law of England" is "part of our law" under § 271, State v. O’Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 107-08, 170 A. 98, 102(1934).SeeState v. Sylvester, 112 Vt. 202, 206, 22 A.2d 505, 508(1941)(describing Vermont common law’s foundation under common law of England as something " ‘courtsshall take notice thereof and govern themselves accordingly’ "(quoting1 V.S.A. § 271)(emphasis added)).²

[3]¶ 8.The year-and-a-day rule formed a part of the common law of England, both by custom and by statute, since at least 1287 with the passage of the Statute of Gloucester.SeeState v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 403 S.E.2d 495, 498(1991);State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶¶ 10-11, 261 Wis.2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381.In relevant part, the Statute mandated that appeals of murder should not be dismissed "if the party ... sue[s] within the year and the day" after the injury that caused the victim’s death occurred.Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 9(1278), reprinted in 1 0.Ruffhead, The Statutes at Large from Magna Charta to the End of the Parliament, 1761, at 67-68(London, 1762).Initially, the rule applied only in private actions.See, e.g., YB15 Edw. 2, fol.463-64, Pasch., pl. 5 (1322)(Eng.)("[T]he appellor take[s] nothing by the appeal … because the appeal was not [filed] ... [within] the year and the day.").However, the rule eventually found its way into the criminal law as part of the substantive, common-law definition of murder.People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383, 331 N.W.2d 143, 145(1982);Vance, 403 S.E.2d at 498.At common law, the death of a victim within a year and a day was requisite for the victim’s death to be deemed murder.See 3 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 52 (1627)[hereinafter Institutes]; 1 M. Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 428 (S. Emlyn et al., eds., Little-Britain, 1800)(1682)[hereinafter Pleas of the Crown]; 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *197;see, e.g., R v. Howe[1987] UKHL 8, [1987] AC 417("[M]urder being a ‘result’ crime [is] only ... complete if the victim dies within ... a year and a day.").³

[4]¶ 9.Because the year-and-a-day rule was part of the common law of England and because we statutorily adopted English common law, the rule became a part of Vermont law at the State’s inception.SeeE.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 106 Vt. at 458, 175 A. at 41;accordState v. Young, 77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556, 557(1978)(per curiam)(reaching same result under New Jersey common law);State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1107(R.I.1987)(reaching same result under Rhode Island common law).

ii.Continuation of the Rule Despite Statutory Enactments

[5–9]¶ 10.In Vermont, common-law rules can be abrogated by statute if done expressly via "clear and unambiguous language" or implicitly via language that is "clearly inconsistent" with the common law.Langle v. Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 516, 510 A.2d 1301, 1303(1986).By consequence, the common law cannot be changed by mere "doubtful implication."State v. Levine, 117 Vt. 320, 322, 91 A.2d 678, 679(1952).Rather, "the Legislature has the duty to define a different course from the common law."State v. Deyo, 2006 VT 120, ¶ 58, 181 Vt. 89, 915 A.2d 249(Dooley, J., concurring in part).Otherwise, "[i]n the absence of a statute abrogating it, the common law applies."State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 136, 513 A.2d 1164, 1166(1986), overruled on other grounds byState v. Gallagher, 150 Vt. 341, 554 A.2d 221(1988).When interpreting statutes and their impact on the common law, our primary goal is "to effectuate the intent of the Legislature."State v. Dimick, 173 Vt. 547, 549, 790 A.2d 435, 437(2001)(mem.);seeState v. Muxlow, 2023 VT 27, ¶ 3, — Vt. —, 297 A.3d 941(mem.).To determine intent, we rely principally on the statute’s plain language, but "if this is insufficient ... we consider the broad subject matter of the statute, its effects and consequences, and [its] purpose and spir- it."State v. Stearns, 2022 VT 54, ¶ 7, 217 Vt. 276, 288 A.3d 173.

[10]¶ 11.Here, neither the adoption of the murder statute, 13 V.S.A. § 2301, nor the adoption of the limitations statute, 13 V.S.A. § 4501, served to repeal of the year-and-a-day rule.

¶ 12.The plain language and context of § 2301 indicates that the Legislature did not clearly intend to abrogate the common-law year-and-a-day rule because it does not mention the rule and...