State v. Roberts
| Citation | 52 P.3d 1123,183 Or.App. 520 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Diana Roberts, Alleged to be a Mentally Ill Person. STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Diana ROBERTS, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 28 August 2002 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Oregon |
Laurie Bender, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Kyle J. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and BREWER and SCHUMAN, Judges.
The trial court found appellant to be a danger to herself because of mental illness and committed her to the Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days. She appeals. We review de novo, State v. O'Neill, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976),
and reverse.
Appellant, 56 years old at the time of her hearing, lives with her husband in Portland. He adequately supports her, and she apparently functions successfully as a homemaker. As she concedes, however, she suffers from a bipolar schizoaffective disorder that leads her, when she is not on her medication, to wander the streets in a confused state of mind. Before the incident that led to her commitment, she had been detained on a "mental health hold," ORS 426.070(5), four times, most recently two weeks earlier.
On the occasion of the detention in this case, the record does not disclose, and no witness could recall or determine, any details of how or why she had come to the attention of authorities. The record reveals only that on May 15, 2001, she was involuntarily hospitalized because, according to the "notification of mental illness,"
ORS 426.070(2), she was "wandering—confused—disorganized." When Robert Skall, a mental health investigator, tried to interview her, she acted "paranoid and delusional," "loud and hypo-manic." His report noted a long history of mental illness and hospitalizations, as well as a pattern of not taking her medications and "putting herself in harm's way." He concluded that "she is unable to care for her basic personal [sic ] and is dangerous to herself and others." Except to repeat that she was "found wandering, confused and disorganized in her thinking," the report, submitted to the court pursuant to ORS 426.074, did not describe any incidents in which she had, in fact, put herself in harm's way or acted so as to be dangerous to anybody.
In preparation for a hearing on May 29, 2001, two mental health professionals examined appellant and submitted reports to the court. One wrote that appellant's "manic behavior places her at risk of initiating a dangerous situation through wandering," that she was "at risk of angering others," and that she was "at high risk of dangerous behavior wandering in the streets." The other wrote that she was "likely to place herself in harm's way," without details. Both examiners relied heavily on the report from Skall, the investigator.
At the May 29 hearing, appellant and Skall were questioned by both examiners, the court, and appellant's counsel. The following dialogue between Skall and appellant's counsel includes the only information in the record referring with any specificity to actual incidents that might be considered dangerous:
Based on the reports, the testimony and its own observations, the trial court concluded that appellant was a danger to herself. Acknowledging that "the Court does not have good evidence regarding incidents which have resulted in danger to herself," the court found that appellant's "condition remains at such a level that if she were released today, she would be so confused that she would be unable to navigate the streets—although she does do that—that her confusion has reached a level that it would be dangerous to herself and that there would be immediate danger to herself if released on the streets." A person may be committed to involuntary confinement in a mental institution if the person is found to be "mentally ill." ORS 426.130(1)(b)(C). As relevant to this case, a mentally ill person is one "who, because of a mental disorder, is * * * [d]angerous to self or others." ORS 426.005(1)(d)(A). Confinement requires proof by clear and convincing evidence, ORS 426.130(1)(b)(C), which, in the context of an involuntary commitment hearing, is "evidence that is of extraordinary persuasiveness." State v. Simon, 180 Or.App. 255, 263, 42 P.3d 374 (2002); State v. Johnson, 131 Or.App. 561, 564, 886 P.2d 42 (1994). Put another way, "[c]lear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes the fact in issue highly probable." State v. King, 177 Or.App. 373, 377, 34 P.3d 739 (2001).
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Dep't of Human Servs. v. T. M. D. (In re R. D. D.-G.)
...P.3d 320 (2007) (acknowledging that fact-matching is "especially treacherous" in marital dissolution actions); State v. Roberts , 183 Or. App. 520, 524, 52 P.3d 1123 (2002) (recognizing that "fact-matching is not helpful" in the civil commitment context). The application of the "best intere......
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State v. T. W. (In re T. W.)
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