State v. Robertson, 45406

• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: SANDERS; HAMITER; HAMLIN
• Citation: 128 So.2d 646,241 La. 249
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Benton ROBERTSON.
• Docket Number: No. 45406,45406
• Decision Date: 20 March 1961

Page 646

128 So.2d 646 241 La. 249 STATE of Louisiana
v.
Benton ROBERTSON. No. 45406. Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 20, 1961.
Rehearing Denied April 24, 1961.

[241 La. 251]

Page 647

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. Atty., Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Daniel W. LeBlanc, Ossie B. Brown, Baton Rouge, for appellee.

SANDERS, Justice.

The defendant was a deputy sheriff assigned to supervise the East Baton Rouge Parish jail. During the trial of criminal cases, the jurors were served their meals at the jail. By bill of indictment the defendant was charged with jury tampering under LSA-R.S. 14:129 in that he 'attempted to influence petit jurors in respect to their verdict' by making certain statements in their presence.

A motion to quash the indictment was filed by the defendant based on the averment that the statutory provision was so vague and indefinite as to render it unconstitutional. The district judge sustained the motion and held that the statute was 'too vague to sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature of the offense or the acts which constitute the offense * * *.' The State of Louisiana has appealed to this Court.

[241 La. 252] LSA-R.S. 14:129 provides:

'Jury tampering is any influencing of, or Attempt to influence, any petit juror in respect to his verdict in any cause pending, or about to be brought before him, otherwise than in the regular course of proceedings upon the trial of such cause.

'Whoever commits the crime of jury tampering shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.' (Italics ours.)

The defendant contends that the failure of the statute to determine or define the 'influence' which it seeks to prohibit renders it fatally defective. Contrariwise, the State asserts that the statutory language is clear and explicit. Posed for decision is the constitutional question of whether or not the statute sets up a reasonably clear standard of criminality.

Basic to a resolution of this issue is Article I, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA, which provides:

'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him * * *'

It is well established that the constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute which fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence [241 La. 253] fair notice that his conduct is criminal. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815; State v., Penniman, 224 La. 95, 68 So.2d

Page 648

770; City of Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So.2d 308; State v. Murtes, 232 La. 486, 94 So.2d 446. Cf. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322; Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989. See also IX La. Law Review 247, 414; X La. Law Review 198; XXI La. Law Review 264; XXII Tulane Law Review 653; 62 Harvard Law Review 77.

The test was succinctly stated by this Court in State v. Murtes, supra (232 La. 486, 94 So.2d 448):

'Hence, it is sufficient to say that a criminal statute, in order to be valid and enforceable, must define the offense so specifically and accurately that any reader having ordinary intelligence will know when or where his conduct is on the one side or the other of the borderline between that which is and that which is not denounced as an offense against the law * * *.'

Under this test a statute is valid in the absence of detailed specification if the general phraseology used in defining the crime has a fixed, definite, or commonly understood meaning and application. State ex rel. Mioton v. Baker, 112 La. 801, 36 [241 La. 254] So. 703, 'without just cause'; State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643, 'lewd dancing'; Town of Ponchatoula v. Bates, 173 La. 824, 138 So. 851, 852, 'disturb the peace'; State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So.2d 909, 910, 'any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child * * * with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person'; State v. Route, 221 La. 50, 58 So.2d 556, 'or other structure'; State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392, 393, 'sexually indecent print.'

However, if the definition of the crime is couched only in general language which is ambiguous, vague, or indefinite to such an extent that the line between criminal and noncriminal conduct is obscure, the statute is repugnant to the state constitution. State v. Gaster, 45 La.Ann. 636, 12 So. 739, 'misdemeanor in office'; State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758, 'immoral purpose'; State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329, 330, 'perform any immoral act'; State v. Kraft, supra, (214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 816), 'indecent print, picture'; City of Shreveport v. Brewer, supra, 'without a satisfactory explanation'; State v. Murtes, supra, 'in any way interested'; State v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So.2d 403, 416, 'Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency'; State v. Vaicor, 239 La. 357, 118 So.2d 438, 441, 'under circumstances which indicate that [241 La. 255] said possession is for the purpose of illegally taking commercial fish.'

In making a determination of constitutionality, we have heretofore given expression to the view that a statute should be construed according to the fair import of its words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context. LSA-R.S. 14:3; State v. Truby, supra.

Originally, the word Influence was an astrological term. It was...