State v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 07 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 75808,75808 |
| Citation | 261 Kan. 865,934 P.2d 38 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jerry Lee ROBINSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. An appellate court's review of a question of law is unlimited.
2. A statute is presumed constitutional and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. A statute must clearly violate the constitution before it may be struck down.
3. The void-for-vagueness analysis is based upon a due process requirement that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite unless its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.
4. In determining constitutionality of a criminal statute, in addition to the inquiry whether the proscribed conduct is adequately defined, the court recognizes that a second inquiry is appropriate. That inquiry is whether the statute adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
5. Depraved heart second-degree murder requires a conscious disregard of the risk, sufficient under the circumstances, to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life. Recklessness that can be assimilated to purpose or knowledge is treated as depraved heart second-degree murder, and less extreme recklessness is punished as manslaughter. Conviction of depraved heart second-degree murder requires proof that the defendant acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. This language describes a kind of culpability that differs in degree but not in kind from the ordinary recklessness required for manslaughter.
6. Extreme indifference to the value of one specific human life is enough to satisfy the elements of depraved heart murder. Although indifference to the value of human life in general is often present in crimes prosecuted as depraved heart murder, general indifference is not a requirement of depraved heart murder.
7. An instruction on an included offense is not proper if from the evidence the jury could not reasonably convict of the lesser offense.
8. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends, under Miranda, on whether the person's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.
9. If a defendant invokes the right to remain silent, the interrogation must stop immediately and the right must be scrupulously honored. This does not mean an interrogation resumed at a later time is invalidated if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to be silent at this later time and the defendant's right to be silent was scrupulously honored while it was invoked.
10. A confession is not inadmissible merely because the person making it is a juvenile; however, a juvenile's confession requires courts to use the greatest care in assessing the validity of the confession. Consideration is given to the totality of the circumstances, and great reliance is placed upon the finder of fact.
11. Although the prosecution is given wide latitude in language and in manner of closing argument, the prosecutor must abide by the evidence and refrain from speech designed to inflame or prejudice the jury.
12. Improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney in summation to the jury will not provide a basis for reversal where the jury has been instructed to disregard the remarks, unless the remarks were so prejudicial as to be incurable.
B. Kay Huff, Special Appellant Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was with her on the brief, for appellant.
Bryan M. Hastert, Deputy County Attorney, argued the cause, and Brett W. Berry, Assistant County Attorney, and Alex R. Stavrou, Legal Intern, were on the brief, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal by the defendant, Jerry Lee Robinson, from a jury conviction for depraved heart second-degree murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3402(b). Robinson was 14 years of age when he killed Clyde Richard Crowley by striking him in the head with a golf club.
Robinson contends the depraved heart second-degree murder statute is unconstitutionally vague; that the evidence is insufficient to prove depraved heart murder; that he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction; that his confession was inadmissible, and that the prosecution improperly argued in closing argument that Robinson was a member of a gang.
The victim, Richard Crowley, was clearly the initial aggressor in this case. On the day of his death, Crowley went to the Ottawa Police Department because he felt the police were not responding to two separate incidents in which his sons had been threatened by Jeremy Hendrickson and his friends. Crowley was upset and told the police that if they did not take care of the problem, then he would.
From the police department, Crowley drove to Forest Park, where he inquired as to whether Jeremy Hendrickson was at the park. Upon receiving a negative response, Crowley went home. Crowley later returned to Forest Park where he spotted Jeremy Hendrickson, Eddie Carter, Tony Surber, and Robinson. Crowley did not know the four boys, but Hendrickson identified himself. Crowley approached Hendrickson, yelling at him to leave his sons alone. Crowley spit in Hendrickson's face. Then Surber made a comment and Crowley yelled at Surber, "I am [Richard Crowley] and you don't know who you're fucking with." Crowley hit Surber twice in the face. At this point, Surber took a knife from Robinson, which Robinson had been using to clean his nails. Surber held up the knife and Crowley stated, "Oh, you want to play games." Crowley returned to his truck and obtained a metal baseball bat. Crowley began to chase the boys with the bat, swinging at them when he got close. While running away from Crowley, the boys spotted golf clubs hanging out of a window of a car in the park and each boy grabbed a club. The boys began chasing Crowley and eventually surrounded him. The boys taunted Crowley by calling him names and swinging their clubs at him, although they did not actually hit him. At this point, Crowley had not hit anyone with the bat and was not swinging it. He was using the bat defensively, trying to avoid being struck with the golf clubs. The boys testified that they engaged in this "fencing" in order to hold Crowley at bay until the police arrived.
Patricia Taylor and her husband, William Taylor, were driving through the park at the time of the altercation. Patricia saw Crowley with a baseball bat trying to hit a group of boys. She saw the boys run and grab golf clubs from a parked car. The boys then "jousted" or "fenced" with Crowley. Crowley asked the Taylors to "give me a hand," but the Taylors said they would get the police. The Taylors left the park to call the police. William Taylor testified the boys did not look like they were intending to harm Crowley when Taylor saw them.
Later, while the boys and Crowley were still "fencing," Victoria Bond drove her car through Forest Park. Scott Renyer, a passenger in the car, saw the altercation and heard someone from the boys' group yell, "I'll teach you to hit my brother again, mother fucker!" Crowley then broke free from the boys, running towards Bond's moving vehicle. According to Renyer, Crowley "hollered" for help. Bond and Renyer had five children in the back seat of the car. They were worried about the children so they did not stop to help Crowley. One eyewitness, Nick Griffin, then 16 years old, testified that when Crowley ran towards Bond's car, the boys chased him, grabbed him, and prevented him from getting into Bond's moving vehicle.
After Crowley hollered at Renyer, Renyer testified that he saw one of the boys, Surber, hit Crowley in the back with a golf club. Crowley then chased Surber, with the other three boys chasing Crowley. Surber tripped, fell to the ground, and Crowley hit Surber twice with the bat. Griffin, a witness for the The police arrived and removed the baseball bat from Crowley's hands before transporting him to the hospital, with the golf club still impaled in his head. Crowley died shortly thereafter in the emergency room of Ransom Hospital due to the blow to his head. The autopsy revealed that the club directly struck Crowley's head and was not deflected by his arm. The autopsy also showed numerous defensive wounds on Crowley's hands, but did not show any bruising on his back or ribs.
State, testified that Hendrickson ran up to Crowley and struck Crowley twice in the back or in the ribs with a golf club. After Hendrickson hit him, Crowley turned away from Surber to see who was hitting him. With this opportunity, Surber rolled away from Crowley and began to get off the ground. At this time, Robinson fatally struck Crowley in the head with his golf club. Robinson testified that he was not trying to hit Crowley in the head, but was trying to hit Crowley in the arms in order to make him stop hitting Surber with the bat. Robinson testified that he could not remember if his eyes were [261 Kan. 869] open or shut when he hit Crowley. After Robinson struck Crowley in the head, he let go of the club because it was stuck in Crowley's head. Crowley fell to the ground, and Robinson ran home.
A few hours after the altercation, Robinson, along with his mother and his mother's boyfriend, returned to the park where the police were investigating the scene. Robinson asked to talk to a police officer, and he told the officer his version of what occurred.
Upon completing its investigation of the altercation, the State charged Robinson with depraved heart second-degree murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3402(b). The jury was instructed on depraved heart second-degree murder and on the lesser included offense of involuntary...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Orr
...723, 727, 608 P.2d 1006 (1980); State v. Cross, 223 Kan. 803, 806, 576 P.2d 698 (1978). In our most recent case of State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 934 P.2d 38 (1997), we applied Young and the totality of circumstances test in determining admissibility of a juvenile's confession. See also F......
-
State v. Jackson
...21-3107(2)(c), so the trial court was required to give that instruction if there was evidence to support it. See State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 883, 934 P.2d 38 (1997). Jackson does not dispute that Williams died in Kansas after being run over by Combs and Clanton. Rather, he argues that ......
-
State v. Donesay, 77558
...14 years of age or older, the court exercises "the 'greatest care' in assessing the validity of the confession." State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 888, 934 P.2d 38 (1997) (quoting State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541, 553, 552 P.2d 905 [1976] ). In Young, the court concluded that an accused juvenile......
-
State v. Reed
...of depraved mind murder, fall within the Legislature's definition of depraved mind murder in Section 30-2-1(A). See State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 934 P.2d 38, 49 (1997) ("[T]he classic example of depraved heart murder [is] when a defendant unintentionally kills a friend through the game ......
-
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Trial: Lessons Learned from State v. Pabst and Other Recent Cases
..."stays within the bounds of admissible evidence," they are given "considerable latitude" in discussing the evidence); State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 892, 934 P.2d 38 (1997) (prosecutor is given "wide latitude" in closing argument although they must avoid speech "designed to inflame or pre......
-
Appellate Decisions
...amended definition of "recklessly" in the 2010 recodification of Kansas Criminal Code does not alter the rationale in State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865 (1997), that a difference between unintentional second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter is one of degree and not one of kind. Final......
-
§ 31.10 Criminal Homicide: Model Penal Code
...with B as an example of "extreme indifference" murder. American Law Institute, Comment to § 210.2, at 22; accord State v. Robinson, 934 P.2d 38, 49 (Kan. 1997) (applying an MPC-type homicide provision, held: "one specific human life is enough" to qualify, citing the ALI Commentary). On the ......
-
§ 31.10 CRIMINAL HOMICIDE: MODEL PENAL CODE
...with B as an example of "extreme indifference" murder. American Law Institute, Comment to § 210.2, at 22; accord, State v. Robinson, 934 P.2d 38, 49 (Kan. 1997) (applying an MPC-type homtcide provision, held: "one specific human life is enough" to qualify, citing the ALI Commentary). On the......