State v. Robinson
Decision Date | 18 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-2620.,SC01-2620. |
Citation | 873 So.2d 1205 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Leon ROBINSON, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellant.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.
We review a decision of a district court of appeal declaring invalid the Florida Sexual Predators Act as applied to a defendant whose crime admittedly did not include a sexual component. See Robinson v. State, 804 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. See also State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla.1995) ( ); Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So.2d 419, 421-23 (Fla.1992) (same). For the reasons explained below, we hold that the Act, which requires certain defendants to register as sexual predators and limits their employment opportunities, is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose crime indisputably did not contain a sexual element. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court, but on different grounds.
When the vehicle in which Appellee, Leon Robinson, and a companion were riding ran out of gas, they began to walk. Shortly thereafter, Robinson's companion saw an opportunity to steal a car, and he did so—even though he saw a baby in the back seat. When Robinson entered the car moments later, he noticed the baby. Shortly after stealing the car, Robinson left the child, still sitting in her car seat, in front of a doctor's office. Robinson was convicted of carjacking and kidnapping. He received two life sentences, which are not at issue here.
On the State's motion, the trial court held a hearing under section 775.21, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) (the Florida Sexual Predators Act (Act)) to determine whether Robinson should be designated a "sexual predator." Although the State conceded "that Robinson, in committing the crimes, had not engaged in any sexual act upon or in the presence of the child," 804 So.2d at 452, the circuit court nevertheless concluded that the "sexual predator" designation was mandatory because Robinson had been convicted of kidnapping a minor of whom he was not the parent. See § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Robinson argued that in light of the elements of the crime of kidnapping, the nature of the crime, and the conceded facts of the case, he did not qualify as a sexual predator and thus his automatic designation was unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that Robinson's designation as a sexual predator was mandatory, but held the statute unconstitutional as applied to his circumstances. 804 So.2d at 452. The district court found that the statute was overinclusive as applied to Robinson and did not pass the rational relationship test:
While the statute may have been based on the premise that providing the community with relevant information about certain types of offenders was a reasonable way to help them protect themselves and their children, we hold that the language used goes beyond that purpose when applied in this case. Designating a person such as Robinson as a sexual predator when there is no sexual element to his crime would lead to an absurd result. The legislature could have achieved the same remedial goals, for example, by patterning section 775.21 after the federal standard and, thus, specifically targeting those defendants who commit crimes against children regardless of any sexual element. By instead pigeonholing defendants such as Robinson into the same category as sexual predators, it has effectively subjected them to an unwarranted stigma. This is not only unjust, it is legally unsound. Accordingly, we reverse the designation.
Id. at 453 (footnote omitted). The court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied. Although the court did not indicate the constitutional ground for its decision, it appeared to base its analysis on the Equal Protection Clause because it noted that "kidnappers such as Robinson are not a part of a suspect or quasi-suspect class." Id. at 453 (citing F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). The State now appeals in this Court.
The State first contends that Robinson lacked standing to challenge the trial court's order. We reject this argument. The district court had jurisdiction to review the order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(C), which grants appellate jurisdiction over criminal court orders "entered after final judgment or finding of guilt." See also art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. ( ). The designation of an offender as a sexual predator is based on the offender's conviction for one of the crimes specified in the Act. § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The order designating a defendant a sexual predator is thus entered after final judgment or a finding of guilt. See Thomas v. State, 716 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
( ); Downs v. State, 700 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (same). Because Robinson was designated a sexual offender under the Act and subjected to its requirements, he had standing to challenge the trial court's order.
We now consider the constitutionality of the Act. Robinson does not argue that the Act is facially unconstitutional. Rather, he argues that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him. Specifically, he disputes his automatic designation as a sexual predator despite the admitted lack of any sexual component to his crime and the lack of a sexual motivation. The district court agreed, holding that the statute was overinclusive "as it covers offenses that do not involve nor require sexual contact." 804 So.2d at 452-53.
Although not entirely clear, the district court seemed to employ an equal protection analysis. See804 So.2d at 453 ( ). Robinson's argument in this Court is also based on the Equal Protection Clause. We believe, however, that the issue is more properly analyzed as one concerning due process.1 As we explained in Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93 (Fla.2002), Id. at 110-11; see also 16B Am. Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 789 (1998) ( ).2 It is the Due Process Clause that protects the individual against the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of governmental power. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); see also State v. Walker, 444 So.2d 1137, 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA)
(, aff'd, )461 So.2d 108, 108 (Fla.1984) ("adopt[ing] the opinion of Judge Grimes"). Robinson does not contest the classification of some individuals as sexual predators; he simply argues that he does not belong within the classification. His argument therefore raises a due process claim.3
We first review the Act under which Robinson was designated a sexual predator. The Florida statute, entitled the Florida Sexual Predators Act, is similar to many "Megan's Laws" enacted in virtually every state.4 The statute contains a statement of its findings and intent. They include the following:
§ 775.21(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). These findings clearly express the Act's purpose of protecting the public, and especially children, from predatory sexual activity.
In light of these findings, the Legislature created categories of crimes and required that those who commit these enumerated ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
D.M.T. v. T.M.H.
...from arbitrary and unreasonable governmental interference with a person's right to life, liberty, and property.” State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205, 1212 (Fla.2004); seeU.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process o......
-
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto
...procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest” a conviction for a sex offense (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205, 1216 n. 8 (Fla.2004) (“Unlike the defendant in Doe, Robinson was not convicted of a crime involving a sexual element or intent. Therefore, ......
-
Sult v. State
...notice of the consequences of their actions). The conduct the statute regulates is not an "innocent activity" in the sense that Black and Robinson use the phrase. As demonstrated above, the statute does not address persons who wear law enforcement insignia in connection with pro- or anti-la......
-
State v. Smith, 2008AP1011-CR.
...else." Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 239 (1994); see also State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2004) (holding that as applied to the facts of the case where the State conceded that the crime contained no sexual element and the cir......
-
SEX OFFENDERS AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION.
...2007) (same); ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (striking down the decision); State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2004) (68) See GA. CODF. ANN. [section] 42-1-12(e) (1) (2020) (requiring registration as a sex offender by any individual convicted "of......
-
Tipping the ole tipsy coachman over in his grave: an inequity of appellate review.
...(1947); Globe Liquor Co. v. Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 573-574 (1948) (citing Cone). (69) Infra note 38, 41, 52, 53. (70) State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1219 (Fla. 2004) (Wells, J., dissenting); Smith v. State, 866 So. 2d 51, 68 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting......