State v. Robinson, No. 12726

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before PETERS; PER CURIAM
• Citation: 527 A.2d 694,204 Conn. 207
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Matthew ROBINSON.
• Docket Number: No. 12726
• Decision Date: 30 June 1987

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527 A.2d 694 204 Conn. 207 STATE of Connecticut
v.
Matthew ROBINSON. No. 12726. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued June 2, 1987.
Decided June 30, 1987.

David F. Egan, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Judith Rossi, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom was James G. Clark, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in its instructions,[204 Conn. 208] to the jury on circumstantial evidence. The defendant, Matthew Robinson, was charged by amended information with murder, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), ¹ assault in the first

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degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1), ² and assault in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(2). ³ Following trial, a jury found him guilty of murder and assault in the first degree. The defendant was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of forty-five years. He appeals to this court from the judgment of his conviction. We find no error.

The charges against the defendant arose from a shooting that occurred at a Norwalk nightclub early in the morning of February 20, 1984. Three people were injured, one fatally, as a result of the shooting. Two eyewitnesses, testifying for the prosecution, identified the defendant as the person who had fired the shots. Two other prosecution witnesses testified that [204 Conn. 209] they had seen the defendant outside the nightclub directly following the shooting. Another prosecution witness, a neighbor of the defendant, testified that the defendant had telephoned her about an hour after the shooting and told her that he had "just killed" one of the victims. The defendant presented no evidence on his behalf. On cross-examination and in his closing argument to the jury, however, he attempted to discredit the state's witnesses. In particular, he sought to expose flaws in the eyewitnesses' ability to observe the perpetrator of the shooting, and alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of various witnesses.

The defendant claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the state's burden of proof relative to circumstantial evidence. The trial court instructed the jury that it could draw inferences from circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) "the fact from which you are asked to draw the inference has itself been proven beyond a reasonable doubt"; and (2) "the inference asked to be drawn is not only logical and reasonable but is strong enough so that you can find that it is more probable than not that the fact to be inferred is true." (Emphasis added.) The defendant claims that this instruction diluted the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, denying him his constitutional right to a fair trial. We disagree.

The defendant's claim of error is governed, both procedurally and substantively, by our recent decisions in State v. Mullings, 202 Conn. 1, 12-14, 519 A.2d 58 (1987), and State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 755-58, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 597, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), both of which involved instructions on circumstantial evidence substantially identical to the one given in this case. In Whelan, as in this case, the defendant failed to take exception to the challenged portion of the court's charge. As in Whelan, however, we review the defendant's claim of error [204 Conn. 210] under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), because it "implicates the fundamental...