State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 17 March 1954
• Docket Number: No. 33560,33560
• Citation: State v. Robinson, 161 Ohio St. 213, 118 N.E.2d 517, 53 O.O. 96 (Ohio 1954)
• Parties: , 53 O.O. 96 STATE v. ROBINSON.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 213

161 Ohio St. 213

118 N.E.2d 517, 53 O.O. 96

STATE v. ROBINSON.

No. 33560.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 17, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. If there is no evidence to eatablish beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of an accused of murder in the second degree, the Court of Appeals, on review, may modify a conviction of such offense by reducing where the evidence warrants, to one of manslaughter in the first degree.

2. Under Section 13459-1, General Code, Section 2953.02 Revised Code, 'a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals in conviction of a felony * * * may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.'

3. Where the Court of Appeals modifies a conviction of murder in the second degree to one of manslaughter in the first degree, such modification is not a reversal on the weight of the evidence, and the state in appealing from such modification may elect to appeal either from the judgment of modification or from the final order of the Court of Appeals imposing sentence.

4. Whoever, purposely and maliciously kills another is guilty of murder in the second degree.

5. In such case, an intent to kell may be presumed where the natural and probable consequence of a wrongful act is to produce death, and such intent may be deduced from all the surrounding circumstances, including the instrument used to produce death, its tendency to destroy life if designed for that purpose, and the manner of inflicting a fatal wound.

6. Where the fact of killing is proved, malice is to be presumed, and all the circumstances of justification, excuse, or extenuation must be made out by the accused, unless they appear from the evidence adduced against him.

7. One who inflicts a mortal wound in a sudden affray or in heat of blood or passion, without time for reflection or for passions to cool, is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.

8. What constitutes a reasonable time for reflection or for passions to cool is a question for the trier of facts and is not a matter of law, unless on the evidence adduced minds of reasonable men could not differ as to what constitutes such a reasonable time.

The accused, appellee herein, hereinafter designated as the accused, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Mahoning County at the May 1952 term on a charge of murder in the first degree.

Following a plea of not guilty, the accused waived a trial by jury and elected to be tried by three judges of the Court of Common Pleas. On October 21, 1952, the accused was found guilty of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In due course he took an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Mahoning county, which court, in an entry dated April 13, 1953, found that 'the evidence is insufficient to warrant conviction of murder in second degree but sufficient only to warrant conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, degree of crime reduced to manslaughter in first degree.' In its entry of April 13, 1953, the Court of Appeals ordered 'that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas be and the same is hereby reversed and held for naught.'

The Court of Appeals ordered the accused to appear before it on April 14, 1953, and on April 22, 1953, it placed him on probation for a period of five years.

This cause is now before this court following the allowance of a motion by the state for leave to appeal.

William A. Ambrose, Pros. Atty., Youngstown, for appellant.

D. F. Rendinell and Harry T. Rapport, Youngstown, for appellee.

LAMNECK, Judge.

The accused contends that the order of the Court of Appeals, dated April 13, 1953, does not constitute a judgment or final order from which an appeal may be taken.

Section 13459-4, General Code, Section 2953.05, Revised Code, provides that an appeal may be filed as a matter of right 'within thirty days after sentence and judgment.'

This section fixes the time within which an appeal may be taken and was intended to apply primarily to appeals from trial courts. In its application to an appeal from a final judgment of a trial court, an appeal cannot be taken until after sentence. In Cochrane v. State, 30 Ohio St. 61, the court held that an error proceeding could not be prosecuted from the trial court until after a final determination of the case therein.

In the instant appeal we have a different situation. There was a 'sentence and final judgment' in the trial court. On appeal to the Court of Appeals this sentence and judgment was 'reversed and held for naught.' It is this reversal that the state has asked this court to review.

Section 13459-1, General Code, Section 2953.02, Revised Code, provides in part in so far as it relates to this case that 'a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals in conviction of a felony * * * may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Under this section this court has jurisdiction in a felony case to review a 'judgment' of the Court of Appeals as distinguished from a 'final order.'

Is the entry of the Court of Appeals, dated April 13, 1953, a judgment from which an appeal may be taken?

1 Freeman on Judgments (5 Ed.), 3, Section 2, defines the word, 'judgment,' as follows: 'The conclusion of law in a particular case announced by the court; the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it.'

The appeal to the Court of Appeals in the instant cause was on questions of law and that court fully announced its conclusion of the law involved, in its entry of April 13, 1953, when it 'reversed and held for naught' the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and entered a 'judgment of conviction of manslaughter in first degree.'

The state, in prosecuting an appeal, may elect to appeal either from that 'judgment' or from the 'final order,' of sentence, if a sentence is imposed, for the reason that Section 13459-1, General Code, provides that a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals in a felony case may be reviewed by this court.

Under Sections 13449-1 and 13459-6, General Code, Sections 2945.79 and 2953.07, Revised Code, the Court of Appeals, where the evidence shows the accused to be not guilty of the degree of crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser crime included therein, may modify the conviction, without ordering a new trial, and pass sentence on such modified conviction. See State v. Porello, 138 Ohio St. 239, 34 N.E.2d 198.

The Court of Appeals may do this, however, only as provided in subdivision 4 of Section 13449-1, General Code, Section 2945.79, Revised Code, if 'the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence'. If the evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding and judgment of the Common Pleas Court as to murder in the second degree but is sufficient as to manslaughter in the first degree, then the Court of Appeals may modify the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. Under State v. Porello, supra, such modification is not a reversal on the weight of the evidence.

However, if there is sufficient evidence in the record to warrant the finding and judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Appeals may not substitute its judgment as to what the evidence shows for that of a jury or a three-judge court, where a jury trial has been waived, as a basis for modification.

Section 13459-1, General Code, provides in part that the Supreme Court on review 'shall not be required to determine as to the weight of the evidence.' Since the action of the Court of Appeals was a modification of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and not a reversal on the weight of the evidence, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether the Court of Appeals was warranted in substituting its judgment as to the facts shown by the evidence for that of the three-judge court sitting in lieu of a jury.

There is testimony in the record, although contradicted in some details, to support the following:

On June 7, 1952, between 10:30 p. m. and 11:30 p. m., a number of persons were in the 'Spaghetti House' located at 33 Adams...