State v. Robinson
Decision Date | 28 September 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 11350,11350 |
Citation | 662 A.2d 1295,38 Conn.App. 598 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Shawn ROBINSON. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Deborah L. DeHart, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, were William H. Narwold, Hartford and Lynn A. Addington, Stamford, for appellant (defendant).
Nancy L. Gillespie, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and David J. Strollo, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and LANDAU, JJ.
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of the crime of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60. He claims that he was denied a right to a fair trial by the trial court's words and conduct, and that the state's use of two peremptory challenges violated his right to equal protection under the law as explicated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We conclude that the defendant was given a fair trial but remand this matter for a hearing as to the exercise of one of the peremptory challenges.
The defendant claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court improperly (1) made reference to the fact that security in the courtroom was a result of the war in the Middle East, (2) laughed at him, and (3) allowed him to be shackled during the course of the trial. The defendant asserts that the trial court's comments and the high level of security in the courtroom, when taken as a whole, prejudiced him and denied him the right to a fair trial. If the defendant were to prevail on this claim, he would be entitled to a new trial; State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 564-65, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985); and we would not need to reach the defendant's claim that the use of peremptory challenges violated his right to equal protection.
The defendant argues that the trial court made improper reference to the war in the Middle East in that part of its charge concerning the heightened security in the courtroom. The defendant claims that he was prejudiced by this comment because the jury was aware of the fact that he was a Muslim.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court stated,
The defendant objected to the trial court's reference to the war. Thereafter, the trial court called the jury back and stated,
The trial court's comments did not prejudice the defendant. First, we cannot assume that the jury knew the defendant's religious affiliation. The defendant has not provided a reference to any part of the transcript to show that the jury knew of the defendant's religion. The defendant references his own comment to the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, that the jury knew he was a Muslim, and his own comment during a hearing on a postverdict motion. 1
Further, even if the jury was aware of the defendant's religion, the trial court's statements indicate that it referenced the security precautions taken because of the war in the Middle East simply as an example of society's general security consciousness. It is unlikely that any juror would understand the court's general comment to be related to the religious affiliation of the defendant.
Next, the defendant claims that he was prejudiced because the trial court allegedly laughed at him. The defendant discusses this issue in only one sentence of his brief and his only reference to the transcript is from the hearing on a postverdict motion where the trial court stated, "I do remember one occasion when everybody in this room laughed and I'm sorry to say that I joined in." 2 It is impossible from this statement to know the reason for the laughter, and to assess the merits of the defendant's claim.
The defendant next asserts that the high level of security in the courtroom throughout the trial served to create a prejudicial atmosphere, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. Prior to voir dire, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether the defendant should be restrained during trial. The first witness to testify was a sheriff who recalled an incident that occurred while the defendant was in a holding cell at the courthouse, wearing handcuffs and leg irons, with a gag in his mouth. The defendant had smashed his head through a window, picked up a piece of broken glass and threatened sheriffs with the glass.
The trial court also admitted into evidence the transcript of summary contempt proceedings from a previous mistrial of this case where the trial court had described incidents that occurred during that trial. The court stated that the The state then brought to the attention of the court other alleged incidents of violent behavior by the defendant, including the fact that, in this case, the defendant was accused of assaulting two correction officers while incarcerated at the John R. Manson youth institution.
The trial court then decided that the defendant should remain shackled with his hands loosely cuffed to his belly irons, but without close handcuffs. During the trial, the court modified its original ruling by ordering that the defendant's writing hand be free and, then, ordering that both hands be free. The court had a barrier constructed to conceal the physical restraints from the jurors. Correction officers in charge of the defendant sat or stood near him in the courtroom.
The defendant claims that his right to a fair trial was violated by these security measures. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 505, 594 A.2d 906 (1991).
(Citations omitted.) State v. Woolcock, 201 Conn. 605, 615, 518 A.2d 1377 (1986).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the security measures and causing the defendant to be restrained. The defendant had exhibited a history of violent behavior. This violent behavior had been directed toward sheriffs and the court and had occurred in the courthouse. Further, the trial court attempted to conceal the restraints from the sight of the jury and adjusted the restraints after personally observing the defendant in the courtroom.
Finally, the defendant asserts that the cumulative effect of the trial court's comments and the heightened security deprived him of a fair trial. Our previous conclusions concerning the court's comments and security measures lead us to reject this claim. " 'We decline to create a new constitutional claim in which the totality of alleged constitutional error is greater than the sum of its parts.' " State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 747, 631...
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State v. Robinson
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