State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 21 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3830.,3830.
• Citation: 360 S.C. 187,600 S.E.2d 100
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Quinzell ROBINSON, Appellant.

360 S.C. 187

600 S.E.2d 100

The STATE, Respondent, v. Quinzell ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. 3830.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted June 8, 2004.

Decided June 21, 2004.

Rehearing Denied August 18, 2004.

Assistant Appellate Defender Aileen P. Clare, of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Cecil Kelley Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.

KITTREDGE, J.

Quinzell Robinson was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment. He appeals, arguing a violation of his Constitutional protection from double jeopardy and reversible error in the admission of evidence concerning his flight from police custody. We affirm.

FACTS

On March 28, 2001, Robinson and Kevin Atkins were riding in a blue van. Robinson and Atkins stopped at Connor's Superette convenience store in Sumter County and made a small purchase. Following their exit, the store clerk saw a blue van leave the parking lot. A short time later, Atkins again entered the store, this time with female companion Bridgette Epps. Atkins, wielding a handgun, pinned the store clerk behind the service counter and ordered her to open the register. Once open, both Atkins and Epps began grabbing money from the register. As customers approached the store, Atkins and Epps fled the store. A few seconds following the robbery, the clerk again noticed the blue van exiting the parking lot. The clerk activated a silent alarm signal from the store and called the police.

While patrolling the area of the robbery, officers spotted a blue van and pulled it over. Robinson, the driver, and Atkins, the only passenger at this time, were arrested.¹ At some point during the armed robbery investigation, Robinson was informed that he was also a suspect in an unsolved murder. Robinson, who had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement concerning the armed robbery, led police to the area where the gun used in the robbery was discarded. The police found the weapon with Robinson's assistance. While returning to the police station, a handcuffed Robinson successfully fled from the police vehicle while it was slowing for a traffic light. He was apprehended and arrested five days later at a nearby residence wearing a wig, a dress, lipstick, and high-heeled shoes and hiding under several mattresses. Robinson, Atkins, and Epps were indicted for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and conspiracy.

In the first trial against Robinson, following approximately two days of testimony, jury deliberations began on the third day at 9:54 a.m. The trial judge recharged the jury in response to the jury's requests, and witness testimony was replayed. At 4:03 p.m., the jury sent a note to the judge stating it had not come to a unanimous decision on the first and second charge (armed robbery and conspiracy), but had agreed on a verdict as to the third charge (possession of a firearm). Over Robinson's objection, the judge charged the jury pursuant to Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).

At 5:32 p.m., the jury sent the judge another note indicating that it remained deadlocked on the two undecided charges and inquiring into court policies regarding the jurors' personal responsibilities, such as picking up their children. The judge responded by allowing any juror who needed to make alternative personal arrangements access to a telephone. The judge also explained that law enforcement officers would aid any juror who needed assistance with transportation or otherwise. As to the jury's deadlock status, the judge expressed his desire that the deliberations continue until a verdict was reached, but requested the jury determine if more time would be beneficial in pursuit of a unanimous verdict.

Six minutes after giving this direction, the judge received a final note from the jury, which stated:

We feel that further deliberation would not make a difference. We do appreciate your patience, but we can't reach a decision on the 1st and 2nd charges.

The judge summoned the jury into the courtroom where a verdict of not guilty was published as to the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Over Robinson's objection, the judge then declared a mistrial in regard to the two undecided charges.

Over Robinson's renewed objection and motion to dismiss, Robinson was retried on the two remaining charges. The jury found Robinson not guilty of conspiracy, but guilty of armed robbery. He appeals from his armed robbery conviction and sentence.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the trial court err in denying Robinson's motion to dismiss based on the Double Jeopardy Clause?

II. Did the trial court err in allowing evidence of Robinson's flight from law enforcement?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State v. Cutter, 261 S.C. 140, 147, 199 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1973). We are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 452, 527 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2000). Concerning the admission of evidence, the trial judge's determination will be sustained absent error and resulting prejudice. State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 353, 543 S.E.2d 586, 591 (Ct.App.2001).

DISCUSSION

I. Mistrial

Robinson argues the declaration of mistrial in his initial trial was in error, thereby precluding the subsequent trial. Specifically, Robinson argues the retrial violated the United States and South Carolina Constitutions' Double Jeopardy Clauses. We disagree.

The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions are in accord. The federal constitution provides that "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. Const. amend. V. The South Carolina counterpart similarly provides that "[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty...." S.C. Const. art. I, § 12. See State v. Easler, 327 S.C. 121, 132, 489 S.E.2d 617, 623 (1997)

("Article I, section 12 of the S.C. Constitution is essentially identical to the Fifth Amendment and, on its face, confers no greater rights than the federal constitution."); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (holding the United States Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Pursuant to this clause, a defendant, such as Robinson, is protected from multiple prosecutions for the same offense after an improvidently granted mistrial.²

State v. Kirby, 269 S.C. 25, 27-28, 236 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1977); State v. Baum, 355 S.C. 209, 214, 584 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Ct.App.2003). If, in a criminal trial, a mistrial is declared "without an absolute necessity for it, the [mistrial] is equivalent to an acquittal, and may be pleaded as a bar to a subsequent indictment." State v. Bilton, 156 S.C. 324, 342, 153 S.E. 269, 276 (1930) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must, therefore, determine the propriety of the trial court's initial declaration of mistrial.

We find the trial court properly declared a mistrial. It is universally recognized that a genuine inability of the jury to reach a unanimous verdict constitutes a manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 402 (2003). "[A] mistrial declared by the judge following the jury's declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict... remains the prototypical example [of] ... `manifest necessity.'" Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). The trial judge, however, has a duty to urge the jury to reach a verdict, provided he does not coerce them. State v. Williams, 344 S.C. 260, 263-64, 543 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ct.App.2001). The typical judicial mechanism for encouraging an indecisive jury is the Allen charge, in which jurors are instructed on, among other things, their duties to approach the evidence with an open mind and consider the opinions of their fellow jurors.³ If a jury, following additional deliberations in the wake of an Allen charge, remains deadlocked, section 14-7-1330 of the South Carolina Code of Laws is triggered. The statute reads, in pertinent part, "[b]ut if [the jury] returns a second time without having agreed upon a verdict, it shall not be sent out again without its own consent unless it shall ask from the court some further explanation of the law." S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1330 (1976). At the second indication of deadlock, courts typically inquire as to whether more deliberations would be beneficial to the jury, and the issue of consent is determined from the jury's response. See Buff v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp., 342 S.C. 416, 422, 537 S.E.2d 279, 282 (2000)

("[W]hen a jury has twice indicated it is deadlocked, the trial judge should diplomatically discuss with the jury whether further deliberations could be beneficial. The jury's consent to resume or to discontinue deliberations is determined, either expressly or impliedly, by its response to the trial judge's comments.")

In the case before us, deliberations for a two-day criminal trial lasted an entire day. Upon receiving notification of deadlock, the judge administered an Allen charge. When the judge received further notice of deadlock, he diplomatically inquired whether more time would help facilitate unanimity. The jury responded with the unequivocal answer that additional time to deliberate would not break the deadlock. Not only was the declaration of mistrial at this juncture proper, it was mandated by law. Had the trial court ordered further deliberations, any subsequent verdict would have likely been...