State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 02 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 74599,74599
• Citation: 835 S.W.2d 303
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Marlon ROBINSON, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 303

835 S.W.2d 303

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Marlon ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. 74599.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

June 2, 1992.

Melinda K. Pendergraph, Columbia, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Millie Aulbur, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

BENTON, Judge.

Jury-convicted, appellant Marlon Robinson ("defendant") was sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms for forcible sodomy and forcible rape, and to a concurrent one-year imprisonment for stealing. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, transferred the case to this Court to examine the inherent authority of the trial court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine the complainant to aid the court in determining the complainant's competency to testify. After reviewing diverse cases within Missouri and across America, this Court holds that the trial court lacks such authority, and so affirms the circuit court.

On December 1, 1987, at 6:55 p.m., two police officers were radio-dispatched to the 4100 block of Page Avenue in the City of St. Louis, in response to a report of a woman screaming. Shining a spotlight down alleys and into garages, the officers spotted the defendant on top of the complainant, apparently engaged in sexual intercourse. On the ground near the complainant's head was a metal tire tool weighing 4 or 5 pounds. The police officers testified they literally pulled defendant from the complainant. Though complainant immediately went to Regional Hospital, no laboratory examination occurred due to "no functioning microscope." The medical record at Regional Hospital showed no cuts or bruises. One police officer remembered a "trickle of blood" on complainant's head.

Other critical facts are almost completely disputed. The complainant--a 41-year-old mother of two--testified she was awaiting a cab when "a fellow snatched me off the street." The complainant hollered, "Help, cab driver." The complainant testified the male hit her in the back and on the side, held her arms "real tight," and led her into a garage. Inside the garage, the male slapped her face and demanded oral sex. The male then stated "Lay down before I kill you, bitch," and ordered her to "pull all your clothes off." In an attempt to get the male to leave her alone, complainant volunteered that she had money, offered him $50 in change, and kissed him on the jaw. The male responded "Bitch, lay down on the ground before I kill you and have me," and "Take your clothes off before I kill you." Then the police arrived. The complainant described the male's clothing, but did not positively identify the defendant. The complainant admitted hearing voices of animals at the time of the incident. The complainant claimed to have taken all her clothes off, contrary to the police officers' testimony.

Defendant testified the third, final day of trial--the only witness that day which concluded with the jury verdict. Defendant--a 30-year-old father of two--flatly denied forcibly raping, forcibly sodomizing, or stealing from the complainant. Defendant stated he had just been to the bank and withdrawn $25 in change. Drinking but not drunk, defendant claimed to be looking for a liquor store when he saw complainant walk toward him, mumbling. According to defendant, he asked her the location of a liquor store, and she told him "right around the corner." The two walked together, and the complainant reached toward his trousers. Complainant asked if defendant would buy her a drink. According to defendant, he asked what he was going to get out of it; complainant responded "some sex," or words to that effect. According to defendant, the complainant grabbed his hand, led him down an alley into a garage and undressed herself. Defendant unzipped his pants and had sexual intercourse. Defendant denied ever hitting complainant, denied that anyone ever yelled or screamed, claimed he was zipping up his pants when the police arrived, and first denied but then admitted a previous misdemeanor conviction for assault third degree.

In view of these polar accounts, the defense strategy was clear. Complainant's medical records from three hospitals were described, in detail, by three medical records custodians, documenting her history of mental illness, schizophrenia, excessive alcohol intake, hearing voices, and other behavioral problems, for which she received Prolixin injections. Pursuant to a medical release signed by complainant, a treating physician testified as to complainant's psychiatric state some six months after the incident at issue, concluding that complainant was suffering from some type of mental illness consistent with schizophrenia. More specifically, the physician testified that, in May 1988, he treated her regarding an alleged rape, for which he found no supporting physical evidence. The supervisor of the sex crimes unit for the St. Louis City police testified for the defense that from June 1982 through May 1988, the complainant had filed "between six and seven" complaints of alleged rapes, of which only the present one resulted in charges. The supervisor labeled the complainant a "chronic victim" or "chronic reporter."

In this factual setting, defendant requested, before and during trial, that complainant be evaluated by a psychiatrist to determine her competency to testify. The circuit judge overruled such requests and objections, and defendant alleges error in his Point I. Defendant's Points II and III question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions of forcible rape, forcible sodomy and felony stealing.

I.

As to Point I, the districts of the court of appeals disagree. The eastern district holds that, in the absence of a statute or rule granting authority to order psychiatric examination of a witness, trial judges lack authority to order such examinations. State v. Clark, 711 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo.App.1986); see also State v. Sinner, 772 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Mo.App.1989); State v. Wallace, 745 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Mo.App.1987); State v. Moesch, 738 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo.App.1987). The western district holds that a trial court can order such an examination upon a proven compelling need. State v. Johnson, 714 S.W.2d 752, 758 n. 6, 759 (Mo.App.1986); see also State v. Weiler, 801 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo.App.1990).

In addition to following the rule in a majority of other states, the western district cites to a line of cases of this Court holding that a defendant does not have an automatic right to compel physical or psychiatric examinations of a witness. See State v. Cox, 352 S.W.2d 665, 672-73 (Mo.1961); State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Mo.1957); State v. Wilson, 361 Mo. 78, 233 S.W.2d 686, 688 (1950). As none of this Court's cases found trial error in the denial of a motion for an examination, any implication that a trial court could, under some unspecified circumstance, order an examination is dicta. Assuming for the sake of argument that the facts of the present case are sufficiently compelling to justify a psychiatric examination, this Court now squarely faces whether a trial judge has the authority to order such an examination.

Both parties cite numerous other jurisdictions to detail the arguments for and against recognizing an inherent judicial authority to order psychiatric examination. While not universally accepted, a handful of arguments disclose the real issues.

Three basic reasons are cited to support the authority of trial courts to order psychiatric examinations of witnesses in limited circumstances. First, in compelling cases, these examinations are necessary for a "just and orderly disposition of the criminal cause." See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1130 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1973); Dinkins v. State, 244 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1971); Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn.1977). Second, in some circumstances, the defendant's right to a fair trial is allegedly infringed by denying an examination. See, e.g., Benn, 476 F.2d at 1130 n. 12; State v. Diamond, 553 So.2d 1185, 1190 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); Dinkins, 244 So.2d at 150; State v. Buckley, 325 N.W.2d 169, 171 (N.D.1982). Third, intelligent adjudication of a substantial challenge to witness competence requires expert testimony. See Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901, 905-06 (1970).

Likewise, three significant reasons are offered against trial judge discretion to order examinations. First, the invasion of privacy and potential for harassment created by such a discretionary power discourages victims from reporting and testifying--especially in cases of sexual offenses. See, e.g., Benn, 476 F.2d at 1131; United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 343 (D.D.C.1966); Pickens v. State, 675 P.2d 665, 669 (Alaska Ct.App.1984); State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Ct.App.1980); People v. Passenger, 175 A.D.2d 944, 572 N.Y.S.2d 972, 972-73 (1991); State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612, 627 (1978); Buckley, 325 N.W.2d at 171; Forbes, 559 S.W.2d at 322. Second, an order that a witness submit to an examination is not directly enforceable. See, e.g., Dildy, 39 F.R.D. at 342; State v. Gabrielson, 464 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1990). Third, as there is no common law right to discovery in criminal cases, the authority for such examinations must come from a statute or rule. See, e.g., Dildy, 39 F.R.D. at 342; Gabrielson, 464 N.W.2d at 438; State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 685 P.2d 918, 924 (1984); State ex rel. Holmes v. Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex.Ct.App.1989).

All these reasons are substantial, presenting conflicting claims of rights, which are difficult to balance. Such balancing of competing public policies is best left to the General Assembly. ¹ The constitutional aura of some of these arguments and this Court's general authority over all courts compels addressing the issue on the merits.

This difficult question does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it arises in the context of many other procedures designed to...