State v. Robshaw

• Docket Number: Pen-24-432
• Decision Date: 17 June 2025
• Citation: State v. Robshaw, 2025 ME 50, Pen-24-432 (Me. Jun 17, 2025)
• Parties: STATE OF MAINE v. AARON A. ROBSHAW
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

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2025 ME 50

STATE OF MAINE v. AARON A. ROBSHAW

No. Pen-24-432

Supreme Court of Maine

June 17, 2025

Argued: May 6, 2025

James M. Mason, Esq.(orally), Handelman &Mason LLC, Brunswick for appellantAaron A. Robshaw

R Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appelleeState of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

MEAD J.

[¶1]Aaron A. Robshaw appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered by the trial court(Penobscot County, Mallonee, J.) following a jury trial, for gross sexual assault (Class A), unlawful sexual contact (Class A), and unlawful sexual contact (Class B).17-A M.R.S. §§ 253(1)(C),255-A(1)(E-1), (F-1)(2025).Robshaw, with leave of the Sentence Review Panel, also appeals from his sentence.Robshaw contends that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony concerning child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, misapplied the law in conducting Robshaw's sentencing analysis, and abused its discretion in imposing a period of supervised release.We affirm the judgment, his sentence, and his period of supervised release.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record establishes the following facts.SeeState v. Cote,2015 ME 78, ¶ 2, 118 A.3d 805.

[¶3] Robshaw was indicted on five counts each of gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact against the victim in 2018 and 2019, when the victim was ten and eleven years old.In 2019, the victim first told her mother about an incident with Robshaw.Four years later, the victim revealed the full extent of the sexual abuse committed by Robshaw to her mother and then reported it to investigators.

[¶4]The court held a two-day trial in August 2024.The victim testified that she would spend time with her mother's best friend, Kerry Labelle, and Labelle's romantic partner, Aaron Robshaw, in Robshaw's trailer while her mother worked.The victim, Labelle, and Robshaw would typically watch TV on a bed in the back bedroom of the trailer.Labelle would sometimes step out of the room to smoke a cigarette or cook food, leaving the victim alone with Robshaw.On multiple occasions, when Labelle was out of the room, Robshaw engaged in physical contact with the victim that constituted sexual acts or unlawful sexual contact as defined by statute and that was specifically alleged in the indictment.17-A M.R.S. §§ 251(1)(C), (D),253(1)(C),255-A(1)(E-1), (F-1)(2025).

[¶5] During the trial, the State called a forensic interviewer from the Cumberland County Children's Advocacy Center to testify, in general and not in terms specific to the case, regarding the topic of child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse.The testimony was meant to explain the extent to which and the reasons why children delay in disclosing incidents of sexual abuse for years and may not disclose the full extent of the abuse all at once.The court allowed the forensic interviewer to testify as an expert over Robshaw's objection that the expert's testimony would impermissibly bolster the victim's credibility and was not necessary for the jury to understand the evidence.

[¶6] After the State rested its case, the court granted Robshaw's motion for judgment of acquittal as to count 2, one of the counts of gross sexual assault.At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all of the remaining counts.In September 2024, the court held a sentencing hearing at which the court entered judgment and sentenced Robshaw to twenty years' imprisonment followed by twenty years of supervised release.Robshaw timely appealed and filed an application to allow an appeal of his sentence.SeeM.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20;15 M.R.S. §§ 2115,2151 (2025).The Sentence Review Panel granted Robshaw leave to appeal from his sentence.

II.DISCUSSION

A.Expert Testimony about Delayed Disclosure

[¶7] Robshaw argues that the court abused its discretion in admitting an expert witness's testimony concerning child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse because it impermissibly bolstered the victim's credibility and was not necessary in order for the jury to understand the evidence.

[¶8]Maine Rule of Evidence 702 allows "[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education [to] testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if such testimony will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.""Whether proffered evidence requires expert explanation is a question left to the discretion of the trial court."State v. Wyman, 2015 ME 1, ¶ 26, 107 A.3d 641.

[¶9]We have permitted courts to allow qualified experts to testify about delayed disclosure in child sexual abuse cases because such testimony can provide a useful explanation of counterintuitive and inconsistent behavior in children.SeeState v. Preston,581 A.2d 404, 407(Me.1990);State v. Black,537 A.2d 1154, 1156(Me.1988);State v. Smith, 2024 ME 56, ¶¶ 28-29, 320 A.3d 405.To avoid improper bolstering of a victim's credibility, we have recognized that courts can require experts to limit the scope of their testimony by speaking generally about a topic rather than applying their analysis to the victim.SeeState v. Paquin, 2020 ME 53, ¶ 18, 230 A.3d 17(holding that no unfair prejudice or abuse of discretion resulted when a court limited an expert's testimony "to the subject of delayed disclosure in general-as opposed to an opinion as to why the victim in [that] case may have made a late disclosure"), abrogated on other grounds byState v. Armstrong, 2020 ME 97, ¶¶ 8-11, 237 A.3d 185;Preston,581 A.2d 404, 407(Me.1990)(holding that expert testimony that "merely described the phenomena" of delayed disclosures was admissible "to rebut an express or implied defense assertion that such counter-intuitive behavior makes it improbable that either a crime was committed or that this defendant committed the crime, even though it may also have had the effect of bolstering the victim's credibility"(alterations and quotation marks omitted)).

[¶10] Here, the victim ultimately revealed the full extent of the sexual abuse committed by Robshaw four years after the abuse occurred.Because a jury might wonder why a victim would take so long in coming forward, the forensic interviewer's testimony, based upon her knowledge and experience, likely helped the jury to understand the evidence by providing context regarding a potentially counterintuitive behavior in children.

[¶11] Like the expert in Paquin, the forensic interviewer limited the scope of her testimony to a general explanation of delayed disclosure.2020 ME 53, ¶ 18, 230 A.3d 17.The forensic interviewer avoided offering an opinion concerning the victim's disclosure in this case or commenting on whether delayed disclosures were likely to be true.Together, these limitations avoided crossing a line into impermissible bolstering of the victim's credibility.Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the forensic interviewer's testimony.

B.Sentencing Analysis

[¶12] Robshaw argues that the court misapplied the law during its sentencing analysis, resulting in an improperly harsh sentence.We review "the determination of the basic sentence (1) de novo for misapplication of legal principles and (2) for an abuse of the court's sentencing power."State v. Bentley, 2021 ME 39, ¶ 10, 254 A.3d 1171(citations and quotation marks omitted).

[¶13] When sentencing a person convicted of a felony in Maine, the sentencing court is required to perform the analysis prescribed in State v. Hewey,622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55(Me.1993) and codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(2025).State v. Ringuette,2022 ME 61, ¶ 9, 288 A.3d 393.The Hewey analysis consists of three steps:

(1)the court determines a basic term of imprisonment by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the individual; (2)the court determines the maximum term of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the case; and (3)the court determines what portion, if any, of the maximum term of imprisonment should be suspended and, if a suspension order is to be entered, determine[s] the appropriate period of probation or administrative release to accompany that suspension.

Id.(ellipsis and quotation marks omitted).

[¶14] In cases of gross sexual assault involving a victim who has not yet attained twelve years of age, the Legislature has mandated a basic term of imprisonment of at least twenty years in step one of the Hewey analysis.17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4-E)(2018);17-A M.R.S. § 253-A(2)(2025).^[1] In State v. Parker,2017 ME 28, ¶ 34, 156 A.3d 118, we affirmed a trial court's sentencing analysis in which it, in sentencing the defendant under the same statute, set the basic term of imprisonment at twenty years in the first step and then imposed a twenty-year sentence after evaluating the aggravating and mitigating factors in the second step.

[¶15] Here, the trial court, in conducting its analysis, recognized that the first step was prescribed by the Legislature and set the basic term of imprisonment at the minimum of twenty years.The court then analyzed a variety of aggravating and mitigating factors in step two of the analysis, finding little in terms of mitigating factors and several aggravating factors, including Robshaw's harmful subjective impact on the victim and his criminal record, which included a sex offense in 2004 and multiple failures to comply with requirements for sex offender registration.The court then sentenced Robshaw ...