State v. Roby
| Decision Date | 16 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-0175,15-0175 |
| Citation | 897 N.W.2d 127 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Ryan Lee ROBY, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John Audlehelm of Audlehelm Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In this appeal, we must decide if article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution categorically prohibits any minimum term of incarceration without the possibility of parole when imposed on an individual who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. If it does not, we must also decide whether the district court erred in resentencing Christopher Roby to a minimum term of incarceration following a hearing in which the court was to consider certain mitigating factors attributable to his youth at the time of the offense. In December of 2004, a jury found Roby guilty of two counts of sexual abuse for his conduct when he was sixteen and seventeen years of age. The court initially sentenced him, as required by statute, to twenty-five years with a mandatory minimum of seventeen and one-half years for sexual abuse in the second degree and a concurrent term of ten years for sexual abuse in the third degree. Following our decision in State v. Lyle , 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014), in which we held all statutorily imposed mandatory minimums constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution, the district court held a resentencing hearing to determine whether the minimum term of incarceration should be imposed. It found it should and issued an order detailing its reasoning. Roby appealed, arguing any minimum term of incarceration without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional and, in the alternative, that the district court failed to properly apply the factors we identified in Lyle . The court of appeals disagreed with Roby on both matters and affirmed the sentence. We granted further review. On further review, we find the Iowa Constitution does not prohibit a district court from sentencing a juvenile offender to a minimum term of incarceration without the possibility of parole, but we remand for resentencing.
Christopher Roby was convicted following a jury trial of the crimes of sexual abuse in the second and third degrees on December 2, 2004. He was sixteen and seventeen when he committed the crimes. The conviction resulted from Roby's inappropriate sexual conduct with S.M., who was ages eleven through thirteen during the relevant times.
A. The Offenses. The first incident, for which Roby was not prosecuted, but the jury did hear evidence on, was apparently in the spring of 1998. Roby was staying at S.M.'s house. S.M.'s parents were downstairs, while S.M. and her siblings, along with Roby, were upstairs. This was not unusual. Roby was S.M.'s brother's best friend since kindergarten and would often stay overnight. He was considered a member of the family and would even accompany them on vacations and to church. S.M., then ten years old, fell asleep in her parents' bedroom while watching television. She awoke to Roby, then fifteen, forcing his hand under her pants and underwear. She immediately left the room, went downstairs, and told her parents what had occurred. S.M.'s parents were furious and confronted Roby, who left the house with S.M.'s brother, and the two walked to a gas station before Roby went home to his own parents. S.M.'s parents did not contact the police or Roby's parents at that time.
After about six to eight weeks, S.M.'s parents allowed Roby back into the home. They insisted Roby not be left alone with S.M. Over time, however, this precaution eased. Years passed with Roby frequently coming and going and staying over, just as he was before the initial incident. In March of 2002, Roby, now eighteen, left for the Navy. In September of 2002, he returned on leave. That was when S.M., now fourteen, confided in her brother's girlfriend that Roby had been abusing her ever since being let back into the house. S.M. stated the abuse would occur nearly every time Roby had stayed over during the preceding three years and that it occurred again with Roby back on leave. Either Roby would touch S.M.'s genitals and breasts or he would force S.M. to masturbate him. This contact with S.M. was always nonconsensual and was severely impacting her mental health. S.M.'s parents learned of the abuse, and S.M.'s mother confronted Roby. Roby denied any contact occurred. S.M.'s mother then went to the police.
The police arrested Roby. There is some indication Roby initially thought the police were investigating him for stealing a video game or maybe thought admitting that crime would deflect them from investigating the abuse. During an interrogation, Roby confessed to the contact. However, the court ultimately suppressed the interrogation because Roby only confessed after the investigator implied he must submit to a polygraph for use in court, promised him leniency, and threatened greater punishment if he continued to deny the allegations.
After the interrogation, Roby was charged and released on bond to return to the Navy. He served for two years until being discharged to answer for this case. The prosecutor had initially charged Roby with one count of sexual abuse in the third degree for the alleged conduct while Roby was eighteen and S.M. was under fourteen. After a breakdown in plea negotiations, the prosecutor charged Roby with four counts, delineated by Roby and S.M.'s birthdays: (Count I) sexual abuse in the second degree for conduct occurring when S.M. was under twelve and Roby was fifteen or sixteen, (Count II) sexual abuse in the third degree for conduct occurring when S.M. was under fourteen and Roby was under eighteen, (Count III) sexual abuse in the third degree for conduct occurring when S.M. was under fourteen and Roby was eighteen, and (Count IV) sexual abuse in the third degree for conduct occurring when S.M. was fourteen and Roby was eighteen. After Roby moved to dismiss Count I for alleging conduct while Roby was fifteen and therefore under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the prosecutor amended Count I a second time and confined it to the time after Roby turned sixteen. Thus, while the jury heard evidence regarding the initial incident when S.M. told her parents Roby was touching her while she was sleeping, he was not charged for this event. Instead, he was charged based on S.M.'s statements of continuing abuse from that point.
At trial, the State presented testimony from S.M., her parents, and her brother. Roby did not testify. He also did not present witnesses. The jury found Roby guilty of Counts I and II. They found him guilty of sexual abuse occurring when Roby was sixteen and S.M. was eleven, and when Roby was seventeen and S.M. was twelve or thirteen years old. The jury found Roby not guilty of Counts III and IV, abuse occurring after he turned eighteen.
B. Initial Sentencing. A presentence investigation (PSI) report was prepared, and the court held a sentencing hearing with testimony from Roby and his parents. Though the record is limited on Roby's life before prison, at least some history appears from trial testimony, this hearing, and the PSI. The record shows Roby was born two months premature on December 20, 1983. His mother indicated his biological father abducted, abused, and neglected him for four years when he was very young. Roby's father eventually returned him to his mother in Waterloo, who later married a man who adopted Roby. Roby's mother was a homemaker and his adoptive father worked for a farm implement company as a designer. Roby is the middle child of three. He maintained a good relationship with his family, despite the absence of his biological father, but generally felt his childhood was "rough." He was diagnosed with attention-deficit disorder
. He completed the tenth grade at Expo Alternative Learning Center in Waterloo and reported getting along well with his teachers, although he was suspended once for fighting. Roby joined the Navy to, in his words, straighten out his life. The PSI reported Roby frequently consumed alcohol while in the Navy and used marijuana. At sentencing, Roby denied any alcohol or drug use. Roby had no juvenile record before this case.
Roby also testified. He maintained his innocence and stated, "There's just so many inconsistencies in her story, and I mean, I just—I don't see how one person can—can take another person's life like this."
The court sentenced Roby, stating, "The court is sympathetic to the feelings of the family, however, as they point out, this is the only disposition available to the court under the law[ ] as it presently stands." The court was statutorily required to, and did, impose the maximum sentence of twenty-five years on Count I with a mandatory minimum of seventeen and one-half years before eligibility for parole. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of ten years for Count II. This was in January of 2005. Roby had recently turned twenty-one while in jail awaiting sentencing.
C. Resentencing. In 2014, following this court's holdings...
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