State v. Rodgers

• Decision Date: 21 February 1917
• Citation: 90 N.J.Law 60,99 A. 931
• Parties: STATE v. RODGERS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

99 A. 931

90 N.J.Law 60

STATE

v. RODGERS.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 21, 1917.

Certiorari to Review Conviction before Recorder of Paterson.

Peter J. Rodgers was convicted of being a disorderly person under Laws 1913, c. 67 (P. L. 103), and he brings certiorari. Reversed.

Argued November term, 1916, before SWAYZE, MINTURN, and KALISCH, JJ.

William A. Sumner, of Paterson, for prosecutor. Josiah Stryker, of Trenton, for the State.

SWAYZE, J. This case should not be entitled Rodgers v. Recorder of Paterson. The writ is directed to the recorder as custodian of the record only. The case should be entitled (rule 15) as it was before the recorder, "State of New Jersey v. Peter J. Rodgers."

Peter J. Rodgers was convicted by the recorder of being a disorderly person under chapter 67 of the laws of 1913 (P. L. 103). The act provides that any person who operates an automobile, motor, or any other vehicle over any public street or highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquors shall upon conviction be punished by an imprisonment of not less than 30 days and not more than 6 months. The act is one of an increasing class of acts whereby the Legislature seeks to punish offenses by summary proceedings, evidently with a design of avoiding trial by jury. That this can be accomplished in a certain class of cases is settled. Howe v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N. J. Law, 145; Riley v. Trenton, 51 N. J. Law, 498, 18 Atl. 116, 5 L. R. A. 352. That it cannot be accomplished in another class of cases is also settled. State v. Anderson, 40 N. J. Law, 224; Atlantic City v. Rollins, 76 N. J. Law, 254, 69 Atl. 964. The recognized line of distinction is between offenses indictable at common law and offenses created by statute. In the present case the statute is applicable to cases of both classes. One who operates an automobile or motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is almost sure to be guilty of a public nuisance, although it is conceivable that the vehicle might be of so low a power and weight and operated at so slow a speed that it could not be properly found to be a nuisance. On the other hand, one who operates (to use the word of the statute) an ox cart while under the influence of intoxicating liquors would be within the words of the statute, but could hardly be called guilty of a public nuisance. Since the statute applies to offenses that may not be a crime at common law, as well as offenses that may be, we must look to the facts of the case to determine whether the present proceeding is an attempt to convict Rodgers of a crime without an indictment by a grand jury as required by the Constitution or whether it is an attempt to convict him merely of disorderly conduct which may properly be done by summary proceedings before a magistrate. This question is not to be determined by the mere language of the statute. The Legislature cannot, for instance, deprive a man...