State v. Rodriguez/Buck
Decision Date | 24 September 2009 |
Docket Number | CA A131050,CA A131973,(CC 04102314,CC C051244CR,SC S055720),SC S055721. |
Citation | 347 Or. 46,217 P.3d 659 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Veronica RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner on Review. State of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Darryl Anthony BUCK, Petitioner on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Kevin H. Kono and Timothy R. Volpert, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, filed a brief and reply brief on behalf of amici curiae Boys & Girls Club of Portland and Oregon Education Association.
These two criminal cases, which we consolidated for argument and disposition, require us to interpret and apply the requirement in Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution that "all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense."1
Veronica Rodriguez touched a 13-year-old boy when, standing behind him in a room with 30 to 50 other people, she brought the back of his head into contact with her clothed breasts for about one minute. Darryl Buck touched a 13-year-old girl when the girl, who was sitting next to him while she was fishing, leaned back to cast her fishing line, bringing her clothed buttocks into contact with the back of his hand and Buck failed to move his hand; that happened one or two more times. When they stood up, Buck brushed dirt off the back of the girl's shorts with two swipes of his hand. Each of those touchings was unlawful because a jury in Rodriguez's case and a judge in Buck's case found that they had been for a sexual purpose a fact that brought the physical contact within the definition of first-degree sexual abuse. ORS 163.427(1)(a)(A). Rodriguez and Buck were both convicted of that crime.
First-degree sexual abuse carries a mandatory sentence of six years and three months (75 months) in prison, under Ballot Measure 11 (1994). In each of these cases, however, the trial judge determined that the mandatory sentence was not "proportioned to the offense" committed by the defendant and therefore was unconstitutional under Article I, section 16. The trial courts imposed shorter sentences—16 months in the case of Rodriguez and 17 months in the case of Buck.2 The state appealed the trial courts' sentencing rulings, and Rodriguez and Buck cross-appealed their convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but agreed with the state that the trial courts should have imposed mandatory 75-month sentences. State v. Rodriguez, 217 Or.App. 351, 174 P.3d 1100 (2007); State v. Buck, 217 Or.App. 363, 174 P.3d 1106 (2007).
Defendants filed petitions for review, which we allowed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendants' convictions. However, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals as to sentencing and affirm the sentences imposed by the trial courts. We conclude that the imposition of the mandatory 75-month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse, as applied to the facts of Rodriguez's and Buck's offenses, would violate the constitutional requirement that the penalty be proportioned to the offense.
We first describe the conduct that led to the convictions at issue here and the proceedings below. We then consider defendants' challenges to their convictions, before turning to defendants' arguments that imposition of Measure 11 sentences in their cases would violate the proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16. We take the facts from the decisions of the Court of Appeals and from the record.
Rodriguez was an employee at the Hillsboro Boys & Girls Club, where she worked with at-risk youth. One of the at-risk youths with whom she worked was a boy who was 12 years old when Rodriguez began working at the club. Rodriguez developed a close relationship with the boy and his family, spending time at his home, helping him with his homework, and giving him rides to the club and to school. She and the boy spent time together outside the club—often alone—in her car, at her apartment, or at his home— all in violation of club rules. Rodriguez told the boy not to tell anyone that they had been alone at her apartment. Rodriguez and the boy often hugged each other and put their arms around each other. The boy sat on her lap in her office and occasionally kissed her on the cheek. Rodriguez sent email messages to the boy in which she called him "babyface" and said, "I love you" and "love you lots." The boy sent Rodriguez similar messages. Rodriguez took the boy with her on several trips, including overnight trips to visit a former club member and to visit her family. Their conduct had raised concerns among staff members and became the subject of rumors among other children at the club.
The conduct that gave rise to this case occurred on February 14, 2005. Another staff member saw Rodriguez and the boy in the game room at the club, along with 30 to 50 other youths and at least one other staff member. The victim, 13 years old at the time, was sitting in a chair. Rodriguez was "standing behind him, caressing his face and pulling his head back; the back of his head was pressed against her breasts." 217 Or. App. at 354, 174 P.3d 1100. The staff member pointed that out to another staff member, who "saw [Rodriguez] run her hands along the victim's face and through his hair while the back of his head was against her breasts." Id. The contact lasted approximately one minute.
The staff member reported the incident to a supervisor, and the police were called. Rodriguez was eventually charged with first-degree sexual abuse based on that conduct, and a jury found her guilty.
Buck, 217 Or.App. at 366, 174 P.3d 1106. The Court of Appeals described the other contact:
Buck was charged with first-degree sexual abuse. He waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court, which found him guilty.
Because of the passage of Measure 11 in 1994, the penalty for first-degree sexual abuse is a mandatory sentence of six years and three months (75 months) in prison. ORS 137.700(2)(a)(P).3 Under that statute, the trial court has no discretion to impose a lesser sentence based on the specific facts of the case, harm to the victim, or characteristics of the defendant. A trial court, however, like this court, has an obligation to consider a claim that a particular sentence is unconstitutional. Here, the two experienced trial judges who heard the cases each ruled that a 75-month sentence for the conduct for which the defendant before them was convicted would violate Article I, section 16.
In Rodriguez, Judge Campbell applied the "shock the moral sense" test that this court first set out in Sustar v County Court for Marion Co., 101 Or. 657, 201 P. 445 (1921)— the same test that has been followed by this court in subsequent cases and that we follow again today. She explained some of the reasons that she considered the 75-month sentence unconstitutional:
Judge Campbell imposed the sentence that Rodriguez would have received under the Oregon...
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...is only to determine whether those penalties exceed constitutional limits. Id. at 671-72, 175 P.3d 438. Later, in State v. Rodriguez/Buck , 347 Or. 46, 58, 217 P.3d 659 (2009), the court reiterated that point, stating that the legislature plays "the central role" in establishing penalties f......
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...opening brief on review that the trial court erred in its application of the framework that this court set out in State v. Rodriguez/ Buck , 347 Or. 46, 58, 217 P.3d 659 (2009) —specifically, in determining the gravity of his offense—by failing to consider the availability of rehabilitative......
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...review of the legality of government action often requires consideration of a range of factors. See, e.g. , State v. Rodriguez/Buck , 347 Or. 46, 58, 217 P.3d 659 (2009) (when determining whether a sentence is so disproportionately severe that it "shocks the moral sense" of a reasonable per......
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..." State v. Fudge , 297 Or. App. 750, 756, 443 P.3d 1176, rev. den. , 365 Or. 819, 453 P.3d 1289 (2019) (quoting State v. Rodriguez/Buck , 347 Or. 46, 58, 217 P.3d 659 (2009) ). Defendant raises arguments about each of the three Rodriguez/Buck factors. Under the first factor, we consider the......
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Chapter §1.4 INTERPRETATION
...Still, interpretation of Article I, section 16, became more complicated in 2009, when the court decided State v. Rodriguez, 347 Or 46, 217 P3d 659 (2009). In that case, the court acknowledged the decision in Wheeler, but then proceeded to set out the same federal Eighth Amendment test to de......
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Chapter §16.2 NATURE OF THE ISSUE
...quotation marks omitted)). The nature of the challenge—facial or as-applied—can affect the outcome. Compare State v. Rodriquez, 347 Or 46, 217 P3d 659 (2009) (mandatory sentences given to certain criminal defendants under Ballot Measure 11 (1994) violate Article I, section 16, of the Oregon......
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Chapter § 1.4
...Still, interpretation of Article I, section 16, became more complicated in 2009, when the court decided State v. Rodriguez, 347 Or 46, 217 P3d 659 (2009). In that case, the court acknowledged the decision in Wheeler, but then proceeded to set out the same federal Eighth Amendment test to de......
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Chapter § 16.2
...only a facial challenge"). The nature of the challenge—facial or as-applied—can affect the outcome. Compare State v. Rodriquez, 347 Or 46, 217 P3d 659 (2009) (mandatory sentences as applied to certain criminal defendants under Ballot Measure 11 (1994) violate Article I, section 16, of the O......