State v. Rodriguez

• Citation: 45 P.3d 541,146 Wash.2d 260,146 Wn.2d 260
• Decision Date: 02 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 70666-2.,70666-2.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Marcelino J. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner.

45 P.3d 541

146 Wn.2d 260

146 Wash.2d 260

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Marcelino J. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner.

No. 70666-2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued September 25, 2001.

Decided May 2, 2002.

William Edelblute, Spokane, for Petitioner.

James L. Nagle, Walla Walla County Prosecutor, for Respondent.

MADSEN, J.

Marcelino Rodriguez seeks reversal of a Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction on two counts of delivery of cocaine. Rodriguez contends that the appearance of a state witness in prison garb, shackles and handcuffs, while testifying to a criminal association with the defendant, was unfairly prejudicial and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the judge was not required to conduct a security hearing before the appearance of a state witness in prison garb and shackles. We hold that the prohibition against physical restraints in the court room applies to all inmate witnesses. We affirm the conviction, however, because the defendant did not object to the witness's appearance and has failed to demonstrate that only a new trial could have cured the prejudice caused by that appearance.

FACTS

Marcelino Rodriguez was convicted of two counts of delivery of cocaine in May, 1999. The convictions arose out of two controlled buys arranged by the police through a paid informant, Arturo Suarez. On two separate occasions during the spring of 1999, Suarez contacted Rodriguez in order to purchase cocaine. Suarez told Rodriguez each time that he wanted to buy an "eight-ball," or four grams of cocaine. On each occasion the police then gave Suarez prerecorded money with which to make the drug buy. Following each meeting with Rodriguez, Suarez returned and gave the officers two grams of cocaine he said he had purchased from Rodriguez. The amount on each occasion was two grams less than the four grams expected when purchasing an eight-ball.

According to Arnulfo Ojeda, a State witness, Rodriguez contacted him prior to each meeting with Suarez to purchase cocaine for the planned transaction. At the scene of the second meeting, officers observed Rodriguez enter a vehicle to make what officers believed was a drug buy. Officers followed the car in which they had seen Rodriguez and later determined that it was driven by Ojeda. Police obtained a search warrant for Ojeda's residence and during the search the officers found two of the prerecorded $20 bills that Suarez had given to Rodriguez during the second drug buy.

When the state called Ojeda as a witness, officers brought him into the courtroom wearing a black and white striped prison suit, handcuffs, and his ankles were bound by shackles. Ojeda testified that he had been charged with delivering cocaine to Rodriguez. He also testified that he had pleaded guilty to delivering the cocaine later purchased by Suarez as part of a plea agreement in which the prosecutor agreed to recommend deportation rather than incarceration.

Immediately following Ojeda's testimony, Rodriguez moved for a mistrial arguing that the witness's appearance in prison garb and shackles while testifying to a criminal association with the defendant was unfairly prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion reasoning that prohibitions on shackling prisoners do not apply to State's witnesses. Rodriguez appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge was not required to conduct a security hearing and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Rodriguez's motion for a new trial.

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case is whether the trial judge erred when he denied Mr. Rodriguez's motion for a new trial following the testimony of a State's witness who appeared in court while shackled and dressed in jail garb. Before we can answer that question, however, we must decide whether the prohibitions against physical restraints in the courtroom apply equally to all inmate witnesses. It is a well settled rule that absent some compelling reason for physical restraint, defendants may appear in court free of prison garb and shackles. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)

; State v. Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d 383, 635 P.2d 694 (1981); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967 (1999); State v. Elmore, 139 Wash.2d 250, 985 P.2d 289 (1999),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 837,121 S.Ct. 98,148 L.Ed.2d 57 (2000); State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wash.2d 863, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1157, 119 S.Ct. 1065, 143 L.Ed.2d 69 (1999); State v. Breedlove, 79 Wash.App. 101, 900 P.2d 586 (1995). This rule has also been extended to defense inmate witnesses by every court to consider the issue. See Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 399,

635 P.2d 694; Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.1985); State v. Simmons, 26 Wash.App. 917, 614 P.2d 1316 (1980); U.S. v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484 (7th Cir.1997); Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Amaro, 816 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.1987); Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632 (7th Cir.1982); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1972).

This court and the Court of Appeals have addressed the issue of witness restraints generally in two cases, Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d 383, 635 P.2d 694 and Simmons, 26 Wash. App. 917, 614 P.2d 1316. In Hartzog, this court held that a blanket security order applying generally to all inmate witnesses constitutes an abuse of discretion. The court began by recognizing that, historically, restraints are an extreme measure to be used only when necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom, or to prevent disorder. Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 398, 635 P.2d 694. Then the court stated that "[w]hile a shackled witness may not directly affect the presumption of innocence, it seems plain that there may be some inherent prejudice to defendant, as the jury may doubt the witness' credibility." Id. at 399, 635 P.2d 694 (citing Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 105 n. 5). Balanced against the defendant's right to a fair trial, the Hartzog court noted, is the broad discretion afforded the trial court judge to provide for order and security in the courtroom. Id. at 401, 635 P.2d 694. Accordingly, this court adopted standards set forth by the Court of Appeals in Hartzog for trial courts to consider when faced with physical restraint decisions:

"[A]ge and physical attributes; his past record; ... threats to harm others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others; ... the nature and physical security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies."

Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 400, 635 P.2d 694 (quoting State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368, 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976)). Notably, the court did not distinguish between the restraint of defense and prosecution witnesses but ruled that a trial court must engage in a case by case analysis to determine if shackling of an inmate witness is necessary. Hartzog, Wash.2d at 400, 635 P.2d 694. The holding was neither explicitly limited to defense witnesses nor explicitly included witnesses for the State. Rather, the court focused on the need for the trial court to exercise its discretion in determining the necessity and the extent of security measures to protect the process. Id. at 400, 635 P.2d 694.

Similar to Hartzog, the trial court in Simmons issued a blanket order that all inmate witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense would be shackled at Simmons' trial. Following this court's decision in Hartzog, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and held that "until a record is made, those inmate witnesses called by either the State or the defense cannot be physically restrained." ¹ Simmons, 26 Wash.App. at 921, 614 P.2d 1316.

The State argues that our analysis in Hartzog does not support a prohibition against physical restraint of all witnesses in the courtroom and that Simmons was wrongly decided. We disagree.

Courts that have extended the restraint rule to witnesses have done so for two reasons. First, as this court held in Hartzog, a jury may suspect the credibility of a witness who appears in court wearing shackles, thereby prejudicing the defendant. Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 399, 635 P.2d 694. See also Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632

(7th cir.1982) (citing United States v. Garcia, 625 F.2d 162 (7th Cir.1980)); and Kennedy, 487 F.2d 101. Because this impacts a defendant's right to a fair trial, a witness may not appear in physical restraints except in compelling circumstances. Hartzog, Wash.2d at 400, 635 P.2d 694; Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.1985); and United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.1972). See also Simmons, 26 Wash.App. at 921,

614 P.2d 1316 (physical restraints may be used only as a last resort); United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.1972); Harrell, 672 F.2d at 635-36 (both require a showing of extreme need to justify the use of physical restraints at trial); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 794 (7th Cir.1985) (physical restraint is permissible to prevent grave danger of witness attacking people in courtroom or attempting to escape); Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 105 n. 5 (physical restraint may be necessary when there is evident danger of escape or harm by witness in courtroom). The judge must conduct a hearing weighing the reasons for physical restraint on the record and determine that the prejudice to the defendant is outweighed by the necessity for physical restraint. See Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d 383,

635 P.2d 694; Roustio, 455 F.2d at 371; Fountain, 768 F.2d at 794; Simmons, 26 Wash.App. at 921,

614 P.2d 1316.

Although potential harm to a defense witness's credibility has been accepted as a reason for extending the rule against physical restraint to defense witnesses, that rule has its...