State v. Rodriguez
| Citation | 996 A.2d 145 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-321-C.A.,2008-321-C.A. |
| Parties | STATEv.Jose A. RODRIGUEZ. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
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Jane M. McSoley, Department of Attorney General, for Plaintiff.
Marie T. Roebuck, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.
The defendant, Jose A. Rodriguez (Rodriguez or defendant), appeals from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for possession of heroin with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of a knife while committing a crime of violence. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on March 3, 2010, pursuant to an order directing both parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues raised by this appeal should be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
On July 13, 2006, Michael Sama (Sama), intending to buy heroin, called his supplier, Rodriguez. In the briefest of conversations, Sama asked defendant to meet him. The two arranged a meeting in a Cadillac in the parking lot of the West River Stop & Shop located on Branch Avenue. Providence Police Officer Richard Piccirillo (Officer Piccirillo) testified that he routinely patrolled that parking lot because it was a well-known drug-trafficking location. On this evening, he observed the two men in the Cadillac seemingly exchange money. Further investigation revealed that the vehicle was unregistered.
Officer Piccirillo approached the vehicle and, amid the several discarded needles and syringe caps that littered the front passenger area, observed the occupants engaged in furtive movements, a time-honored investigative tip-off. Officer Piccirillo first ordered Sama out of the vehicle, who complied. He then ordered defendant out of the vehicle, who did not comply. Rodriguez became belligerent and then retrieved a bag of heroin from his sock and ingested it. Officer Piccirillo tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent defendant from swallowing the contraband, and as recompense for his efforts Rodriguez slashed at him with a knife. Officer Piccirillo attempted to subdue Rodriguez and, during the ensuing fracas, defendant hurled a bag of marijuana in Sama's direction and invited Sama to join him in consuming the merchandise. Sama demurred. It took several more officers and a can of pepper spray to subdue and arrest defendant. During a strip-search in connection with the arrest, the police discovered on defendant's person several bags containing what later was determined to be cocaine and heroin.
The defendant was charged with: (1) possession of heroin with intent to deliver; (2) possession of cocaine with intent to deliver; (3) possession of a knife with a blade in excess of three inches while committing a crime of violence; (4) assault with a dangerous weapon; (5) assaulting a police officer while engaged in his duties; and (6) possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The state presented as witnesses Officer Piccirillo, Officer Richard Esposito, who assisted Officer Piccirillo, Detective Andre Perez, who sent the narcotics to the state toxicology laboratory, and Sama, who struck an immunity deal with the prosecution. Sama largely corroborated Officer Piccirillo's testimony, although he denied exchanging money or narcotics with Rodriguez in the Cadillac. Significantly, Sama disclosed that he had purchased both heroin and cocaine from Rodriguez on two prior occasions. The defendant objected to this testimony, and the trial justice issued the following cautionary instruction:
The defendant did not object to this instruction.
After the state presented its evidence, Rodriguez moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.1 The trial justice entered a judgment of acquittal for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, but denied the motion with respect to the remaining counts. On February 4, 2008, a jury found Rodriguez guilty of possession of heroin with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of a knife with a blade in excess of three inches while committing a crime of violence, to wit: possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, but found him not guilty of assaulting a police officer while engaged in his duties. On February 11, 2008, Rodriguez's motion for a new trial was denied. A judgment of conviction was entered on March 31, 2008, from which Rodriguez timely appeals.2
The defendant advances three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts charging him with possession of cocaine and heroin with intent to deliver, as well as possession of a knife while committing a crime of violence. Second, defendant renews his argument that Sama should not have been permitted to disclose their previous drug transactions. Finally, Rodriguez argues his motion for a new trial erroneously was denied.
“Whenever this Court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we apply the same standard as that applied by the trial justice; namely, we ‘must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, * * * giving full credibility to the state's witnesses, and draw therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt.’ ” State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148, 1159 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Caba, 887 A.2d 370, 372 (R.I.2005)). “This Court must evaluate just the evidence ‘that the prosecution claims is capable of supporting proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 616 (R.I.2009) (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1159). “This Court must uphold the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal if the record shows sufficient evidence to merit a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Reyes, 984 A.2d at 616.
Our review of a trial justice's decision on a motion for a new trial similarly is deferential. “Provided that the trial justice has ‘articulated an adequate rationale for denying a motion,’ * * * a trial justice's ruling on a new trial motion is entitled to great weight.” State v. Bergevine, 942 A.2d 974, 981 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 1199 (R.I.2006)). “Accordingly, ‘[a] trial justice's ruling on a new-trial motion will not be overturned unless the trial justice was clearly wrong or unless he or she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence that related to a critical issue in the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1046 (R.I.2004)).
The defendant advances two arguments why his motion for judgment of acquittal erroneously was denied. The defendant first argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's convictions. Although it is undisputed that police officers found cocaine and heroin on his person, Rodriguez contends that there is no evidence he intended to distribute it. He further argues that failure to prove that he possessed either heroin or cocaine with an intent to deliver would necessarily require acquittal on the charge of possession of a knife while committing a crime of violence.3
The defendant's insufficiency of the evidence argument in favor of acquittal focuses mainly on the cocaine charge.4 He directs this Court to Sama's testimony that although he set out to buy heroin from defendant, Sama did not state that was looking to buy cocaine. This distinction, however, relies on a crucial misunderstanding of the intent element of the charge. It is not Sama's intent that is germane; rather, the only relevant inquiry is what did Rodriguez intend when he made his way to the Stop & Shop to meet his customer, to whom he previously had delivered both cocaine and heroin. Intent, of course, can be established by inference. 5
Although a relatively small amount of cocaine was found on Rodriguez, the state presented evidence that the cocaine was individually packaged and that Sama and defendant had an existing buyer-seller relationship that included the delivery of cocaine. Furthermore, the brief telephone call, followed by a rendezvous at a well known drug-trafficking location, provided a more than adequate basis for a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant arrived at the Stop & Shop intending to sell narcotics; both heroin and individually packaged cocaine. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial justice properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal on the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Moreover, our decision upholding the judgment of conviction for this count conclusively dispatches defendant's related argument that acquittal for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver would require acquittal on the charge of possession of a knife with a blade exceeding three inches in length while committing a crime of violence. 6
The defendant next argues that the trial justice erred when he allowed Sama to testify that he had purchased narcotics from defendant on two previous occasions. He avers that this testimony is prohibited by Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. “This Court has stated that ‘[t]he admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere with the trial justice's decision unless a clear abuse of discretion is...
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