State v. Rodriguez, 80-K-2190

Decision Date06 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-K-2190,80-K-2190
Citation396 So.2d 1312
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. Elena M. RODRIGUEZ.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Craig J. Cimo, Gretna, for defendant-relator.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, James Maxwell, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiffs-respondents.

COLE, Associate Justice ad hoc *.

Elena Rodriguez was arrested on April 14, 1980 and charged by bills of information on May 7, 1980 with possession of cocaine and marijuana in violation of La.R.S. 40:967. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which was heard by the trial court on August 15 and 18, 1980 and denied. This Court granted the defense application for supervisory writs to review that judgment below.

FACTS

On April 14, 1980, at approximately 9:15 p. m., Officer Herbert Doyle of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office received a telephone call from a confidential informant who told him a grey Mercury automobile with a particular license plate number would be in "Fat City" that night carrying two males and one female who were in possession of one ounce of cocaine. The conversation between Officer Doyle and the informant was brief and Officer Doyle could not recall when he testified four months later any additional information being furnished. Officer Doyle had received reliable information from the informant in the past which resulted in one or two arrests and convictions. Believing the informant to possess personal knowledge upon which the information was based, 1 Officer Doyle immediately proceeded to search for the vehicle. He was accompanied by Officer Dexter Accardo who drove a separate police unit. A third officer remained behind to obtain a search warrant if the police activity revealed one was needed and could be utilized.

The officers, in their two unmarked police cars, patrolled the parking areas and streets of Fat City. They soon located a vehicle fitting the exact description furnished by the informant. The vehicle was stopped just before it entered Interstate 10, presumably before it could leave the jurisdiction of Jefferson Parish officers and enter into Orleans Parish. 2 The occupants were requested to get out of their vehicle and as they did so, one arresting officer observed marijuana in two plastic bags on the floor of the car. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was observed throwing down a white envelope. This was retrieved, tested and found to be cocaine. 3

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

By this assignment defense counsel contends the trial court erred in curtailing his cross-examination of the arresting officers concerning the reliability of the confidential informant. Following testimony that the informant had previously supplied narcotics related information which resulted in one or two arrests and convictions, defense counsel sought the name of those arrested or convicted as a result of the alleged previous contacts. The trial court would not permit counsel to elicit the names reasoning such specific information about the informant might disclose his identity and thereby endanger his life.

When the arresting officer has testified in open court as to why he had reason to believe the informant, it will not be assumed the officer has committed perjury. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1063, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). Officer Doyle's testimony that the informant had provided accurate information in the past satisfies the need to establish reliability, at least in the absence of defense suggestion that he intentionally misrepresented his informant's past performance.

In State v. Babbitt, 363 So.2d 690 (La.1978), we held:

"The informer privilege is the privilege of withholding the identity of an informant who supplies information to law enforcement officials concerning crime. It is founded upon public policy and seeks to advance the public interest in effective law enforcement. (Citation omitted.) This court has consistently held that a confidential informant's identity will be divulged only under exceptional circumstances. (Citations omitted.) The general rule is that the burden is upon the defendant to demonstrate exceptional circumstances and much discretion is vested in the trial judge on the question of whether the circumstances warrant disclosure. (Citations omitted.)"

Also, in State v. Babbitt, supra, we held:

"It is well established that the credibility of the affiant's informant or the correctness of the information furnished by the informant may not be attacked on a motion to suppress. (Citations omitted.)"

The hearing on the motion to suppress in this case was held on two separate days. On the first occasion, defense counsel named two persons and asked if either was the informant. The trial court sustained the state's objection to this attempt to identify the informant. During the second day's proceedings defense counsel pursued the names of those persons previously arrested or convicted upon information furnished by the informant. The trial judge felt this line of questioning tied in with the previous interrogation and would aid in identifying the informant himself. We agree. The specifics of prior experience with the informant would certainly tend to disclose his identity. What is directly prohibited will not be allowed through indirect means. See, State v. Babbitt, supra; State v. Diliberto, 362 So.2d 566 (La.1978); State v. Keys, 328 So.2d 154 (La.1976); State v. Thorson, 302 So.2d 578 (La.1974).

Aside from questions concerning the identity of the informant or the identity of persons previously arrested or convicted upon information supplied by the informant, defense counsel was allowed to interrogate the arresting officers as regards the credibility of the informant and the correctness of the information furnished. Considering this was permitted on a motion to suppress, defendant cannot seriously argue prejudice. State v. Babbitt, supra.

This assignment is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

By this assignment defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the information supplied by the informant was sufficient reasonable cause to justify an intrusion upon her liberty.

The evidence sought to be suppressed was seized pursuant to the stop of defendant's vehicle. The state stipulated the arresting officers did not obtain a warrant. The officers admitted they did not observe the occupants of the vehicle commit any crime prior to stopping the vehicle, but rather, the stop of the vehicle was based upon their checking out the tip and finding everything to be as represented. Essentially, the informant gave Officer Doyle seven items of information. They were: (1) the make of the automobile i. e., a Mercury, (2) the color of the automobile, i. e., grey, (3) the number of the license plate on the automobile, (4) the occupants of the automobile, i. e., two males and one female, (5) the location of the automobile, i. e., in "Fat City," (6) the time when the automobile would be in "Fat City," and, (7) possession by the occupants of one ounce of cocaine. It is undisputed the six supporting items of information were verified by the officers prior to the stop.

Initially, no arrest was made of the defendant nor was a search of the vehicle conducted. The evidence establishes after the vehicle was stopped, the marijuana was immediately discovered. This happened while the occupants were getting out of the vehicle. As of that time, the officers had no opportunity to demand of the occupants their names, addresses and an explanation of their actions. Upon finding the marijuana, the defendant was advised she was under arrest and, at about the same time, she attempted to throw away the envelope containing the cocaine.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 states, in pertinent part:

"A. A law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or a misdemeanor and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions."

Reasonable cause for an article 215.1 investigatory stop is something less than probable cause; nevertheless, the officers must have articulable...

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