State v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 28 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14212,14212
• Citation: 613 A.2d 211,223 Conn. 127
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Angel L. RODRIGUEZ, Jr.

Page 211

613 A.2d 211

223 Conn. 127

STATE of Connecticut v. Angel L. RODRIGUEZ, Jr.

No. 14212.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 24, 1992.

Decided July 28, 1992.

Berdon, J., dissented in part and concurred in part and filed opinion.

Elizabeth M. Inkster, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, were G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, Beth Merkin, Asst. Public Defender, and Donald Dakers, Former Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Carolyn K. Longstreth, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Angel L. Rodriguez, Jr., appeals to this court ¹ from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of two counts of the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). ² The defendant claims that the trial court improperly- : (1) denied his motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to two separate search warrants; and (2) instructed the jury on a statutory alternative for conviction for which there was no supporting evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the afternoon of December 19, 1988, the defendant was shot in the leg by Hector Rivera on Elliot Street in New Haven. Prior to this incident, the defendant and Rivera had an ongoing feud concerning Rivera's wife. As a result of the shooting, an arrest warrant was issued for Rivera but no arrest was ever made.

On the afternoon of February 19, 1989, Rivera and his brother encountered the defendant near the corner of Steven Street and Elliot Street in New Haven. Rivera chased the defendant and challenged him to a fight. The defendant left the scene. Later that evening the defendant met with two acquaintances, Joseph Ristorucci and Jose Ayala, and told them that he was going to shoot Rivera. The defendant then showed Ristorucci a .44 caliber pistol that he was carrying.

At approximately 9:45 p.m., the defendant, who was driving a 1981 brown Datsun station wagon on Spring Street in West Haven, pulled alongside a vehicle occupied by Rivera and Gilberto Rodriguez, and fatally shot both occupants. At approximately 11 p.m., the defendant returned home and told his girlfriend that he had shot Rivera and the other occupant of the vehicle.

The state, in two separate informations, charged the defendant with murder, alleging that he, "with intent to cause the death of another, shot Hector Rivera and thereby caused his death," and "with intent to cause the death of another, shot Gilberto Rodriguez, and thereby caused his death." The defendant filed two motions to suppress certain evidence seized pursuant to two search warrants. ³ The trial court denied both motions. The defendant also excepted to the trial court's instruction to the jury that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the person causing the death of another must have done so with the intent to cause death either that of the victim or of a third person." The jury returned guilty verdicts on both informations and the court rendered one judgment on the informations. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from a Mazda automobile pursuant to a search warrant dated February 22, 1989. Specifically, the defendant contends that probable cause did not exist to issue the warrant because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not adequately set forth the police informants' bases of knowledge or reliability. We disagree.

The following facts are relevant to this claim. West Haven police presented to a judge of the Superior Court a warrant application to search an unregistered reddish-brown 1979 Mazda RX 7. After providing background information on the investigation of the murders, the affidavit stated that the affiants, who were police officers, "along with other members of the Homicide Investigation Unit, developed one Angel Rodriguez, Jr., as a suspect. Information developed by the unit revealed that Mr. Rodriguez, Jr., is involved in the narcotics trade in the same geographical area as that used by Hector Rivera. That said unit was able to develop information regarding the rivalry between Rodriguez and Rivera and that on Dec. 19, 1988, one Hector Rivera did shoot Angel Rodriguez, Jr., in his left leg, in an apparent dispute. This was confirmed by New Haven Police Department investigation, which resulted in the acquisition of an arrest warrant for Rivera." Additionally, the affidavit stated that "several informants, who have given information to police officers in the past involving narcotic[s] related cases, which have [led] to arrests and convictions in a State Court of Law, related to the undersigned that Mr. Rodriguez has made overt physical threats toward Mr. Rivera for retribution for the aforementioned assault." The affidavit then related that informants had stated that the defendant had been seen in possession of a large caliber revolver within four hours prior to the murders, and that forensic evidence showed that the victims had been shot with large caliber bullets.

The affidavit further stated that the defendant had admitted that he owned an unregistered 1979 Mazda RX 7 that was parked in front of his residence. The affidavit stated that on the floor in front of the Mazda front passenger seat, in plain view of the officers, was a jacketed .44 caliber round of ammunition.

A

Before we determine whether probable cause existed to issue the warrant, we first address the state's claim that the defendant was not entitled to challenge the search of the Mazda. ⁴ The state, contending that the defendant did not own the Mazda, maintains that he consequently had no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in its contents, and thus could not challenge its search. ⁵

To receive fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded area. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-517, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 330, 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). "Absent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 355, 503 A.2d 566 (1986). The determination of whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched requires a two part factual inquiry: first, whether the defendant has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy; and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. State v. Mooney, supra, 218 Conn. at 94, 588 A.2d 145.

In the present case, the record establishes that the defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the Mazda. The warrant affidavit stated that the defendant had claimed ownership of the Mazda, that the vehicle was parked in front of his residence when the police came to interview him, that the defendant knew the vehicle was not currently operable, and that he had joked that he would pay the police officers $100 to repair the vehicle. Thus, the defendant exhibited a significant degree of possession of and control over the automobile. Under these circumstances, the defendant exhibited the necessary subjective expectation of privacy.

Whether the defendant "possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the automobile requires a factual inquiry into all the relevant circumstances surrounding its [search]." State v. Pittman, 209 Conn. 596, 601, 553 A.2d 155 (1989). This court has held repeatedly that the owner of an automobile may challenge a police search of its contents. State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161, 178-79, 448 A.2d 837 (1982); State v. Darwin, 161 Conn. 413, 419-20, 288 A.2d 422 (1971). Even individuals who do not legally own an automobile may be entitled to challenge its search. See State v. Darwin, supra, 420, 288 A.2d 422 (husband may challenge search of wife's car); see also United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418 (7th Cir.1990) ("[i]f an individual has the owner's permission to use [the automobile], society surely recognizes this [expectation of privacy] as reasonable"); compare State v. Pittman, supra, 209 Conn. at 601-602, 553 A.2d 155 (husband not entitled to challenge search of car of murdered wife because he had surrendered possession, keys and access to vehicle).

In the present case, the warrant affidavit stated that the defendant had told the police that he owned the unregistered Mazda. The officers relied on that statement to support their application for a warrant. Furthermore, the state has not established that the defendant did not own the Mazda. As previously noted, the vehicle was parked in front of the defendant's residence, and the defendant's statements regarding its condition and need for repair provided additional indicia of ownership. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the defendant was not the owner of the vehicle. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the defendant's ownership of the Mazda rendered his expectation of privacy therein reasonable. United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.1990) (defendant not required to show documentary proof of ownership or lawful custody of the vehicle); United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 446 n. 2 (10th Cir.1990) (same).

B

We next consider the validity of the search warrant. In the present case, the necessary inquiry is whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had shot the victims and that evidence of the crime would be found in the place to be searched. The determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant under article first, § 7 of our state constitution, ⁶ and under the fourth...