State v. Roe

Citation6 S.W.3d 411
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)
Decision Date26 October 1999
Parties(Mo.App. E.D. 1999) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard Roe, Defendant/Appellant. Case Number: ED59480 & ED61197 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date:

Appeal From: Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Hon. Edward M. Peek

Counsel for Appellant: Douglas R. Hoff and Susan K. Roach

Counsel for Respondent: John M. Morris, III, Krista Boston and Hugh L. Marshall

Opinion Summary: Richard Roe, Defendant, appeals the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction of first-degree murder and armed criminal action.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Division Three holds: 1) the trial court committed plain error in submitting an instruction that allowed the jury to convict Defendant of first-degree murder without necessarily finding that he had the intent to kill the victim; 2) on remand, the State may elect whether to retry the Defendant on all issues embraced by the charges of first-degree murder and armed criminal action or accept the lesser convictions of second-degree murder and armed criminal action.

Opinion Author: Lawrence E. Mooney, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Teitelman, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part; Ahrens, J., concurs in the opinion of Judge Mooney.

Opinion:

Richard Roe ("Defendant") appeals the judgment and sentence entered upon his convictions for first-degree murder and armed criminal action. In his sole point on appeal, Defendant contends the trial court plainly erred in submitting a verdict-directing instruction that allowed the jury to convict him of first-degree murder without finding the requisite intent to kill. We reverse and remand with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts, which we have largely borrowed from our opinion in Roe v. State, 845 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992), are as follows:

On September 10, 1989, Defendant and John Hamil discovered that they had been cheated in a drug deal. After surreptitiously obtaining a gun from Defendant's girlfriend, Kristahle Adams, Hamil and Defendant and several others returned to the scene of the drug deal to rough up the man who had swindled them.

Afterward, the group went to a local bar. While at the bar, one member of the group called Imo's and ordered a pizza, specifically requesting that it be delivered by a man named James Donovan. The group believed Donovan had put sugar in Defendant's gas tank. When another delivery man appeared, the group ducked out of the bar and went to another bar where they resumed drinking.

The group eventually left that bar to go to the Imo's where Donovan worked. They parked their car in front of Donovan's car, which was parked near the building's rear door. When Donovan emerged from the door to deliver some pizzas, Hamil approached him and asked if he had "messed with" the car. Donovan told Hamil to get away from him and pushed Hamil to the ground. Hamil looked up when he heard a shot and saw Defendant shoving something into his waistband. Defendant and Hamil got in the car and drove away. As they were leaving the scene, Hamil asked Defendant what had happened, and Defendant stated that he had shot Donovan.

Later that night, Defendant also told Adams that he had shot Donovan. Some time later, Defendant repeated his confession to the police. The jury viewed a videotape of Defendant's confession at trial. Defendant's theory at trial was that Hamil had shot Donovan, and that Defendant had confessed to the murder to protect himself, Adams and his mother from Hamil's alleged threats of harm.

Based on this evidence, a jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. The court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and twenty-five years' imprisonment. Following a timely appeal, this court, in Roe v. State, supra, affirmed Defendant's convictions and the denial of post-conviction relief.

Several years after our affirmance in Roe v. State, Defendant filed a federal habeas corpus action in which he alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the trial court plainly erred by giving an improper first-degree murder instruction. In that action, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held Defendant was entitled to belatedly raise this issue on direct appeal or, in the alternative, to a new trial. Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1998). We then recalled our original mandate in the case to allow Defendant to bring this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Again, Defendant's sole claim of error on appeal is that the trial court plainly erred in giving a verdict director that allowed the jury to convict Defendant of first-degree murder without necessarily finding Defendant intended to kill Mr. Donovan. The instruction in question stated:

As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that on September 10, 1989, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant caused the death of James Donovan by shooting him, and

Second, that defendant knew or was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the death of James Donovan or that it was the defendant's purpose to cause serious physical injury to James Donovan, and

Third, that defendant did so after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief,

then you will find the defendant guilty under Count I of murder in the first-degree.

However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first-degree.

If you find the defendant guilty under Count I of murder in the first-degree, you will return a verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first-degree.

(Emphasis added.)

This instruction is obviously defective and fails to comply with the Missouri Approved Instructions - Criminal. A verdict director must require the jury to find every fact necessary to constitute the essential elements of the offense charged. State v. Ward, 745 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Mo. banc 1988). To be convicted of first-degree murder, a defendant must (1) knowingly (2) cause the death of another person (3) after deliberation upon the matter. State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 923 (Mo. banc 1992). Thus, first-degree murder in Missouri requires proof of the essential element of intent to kill. See MAI-CR3d 313.02 and MAI-CR3d 313.04; Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d at 418. A defendant cannot be found guilty of first-degree murder for merely having the intent to cause serious physical injury. Id. As the State concedes, the instruction in this case allowed the jury to convict Defendant of first-degree murder if they found he had either the requisite intent for first-degree murder or the requisite intent for second-degree murder. The instruction therefore did not necessarily require a finding of intent to kill and as such, was tantamount to an instruction that omitted that necessary element of the offense.

However, Defendant admits that this claim of error, now raised some ten years after the murder, has not been properly preserved for our review as his trial counsel failed to either object to the instruction at trial or to raise the issue in a motion for new trial.1 Thus, we review the claim for plain error only.

Failure to comply with the Missouri Approved Instructions - Criminal and the applicable Notes on Use is presumed prejudicial. State v. Brokus, 858 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo.App. E.D. 1993). However, instructional error seldom constitutes plain error, which requires a defendant to show more than mere prejudice. Id. To prevail on a claim of plain error, a defendant must prove that the error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id.; Rule 30.20. Although there is no precise formula for determining the existence of plain error, our Supreme Court has offered some guidance on the issue. "In the context of instructional error, plain error results when the trial court has so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that it is apparent to the appellate court that the instructional error affected the jury's verdict." State v. Doolittle, 896 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo. banc 1995), citing State v. Nolan, 872 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Mo. banc 1994). In determining whether the misdirection likely affected the jury's verdict, an appellate court will be more inclined to reverse in cases where the erroneous instruction "did not merely allow a wrong word or some other ambiguity to exist, [but] excused the State from its burden of proof on [a] contested element of the crime." State v. Doolittle, 896 S.W.2d at 30. Additionally, this court has previously held that where a verdict director effectively omits an essential element of the offense, such an instruction rises to the level of plain error if the evidence in the case fails to establish the existence of the omitted element "beyond serious dispute." State v. Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 303.

First, the State argues that the error here does not rise to the level of plain error, because the defense's theory at trial was that Defendant was not involved in the murder, not that he lacked the intent to kill, and thus the intent element was essentially uncontested.

In support of this argument, the State cites several cases where the courts have found no plain error under similar circumstances and urges the same result here. State v. Walton, 703 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985); State v. Root, 820 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991); and State v. Busch, 920 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). However, in each of these cases, the appellate court found that the evidence adduced at trial established the existence of the omitted element "beyond any serious dispute." The instant case is thus distinguishable from Walton, Root and...

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