State v. Roe, 29199.

Citation140 Idaho 176,90 P.3d 926
Decision Date02 March 2004
Docket NumberNo. 29199.,29199.
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kyle Thomas ROE, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Idaho

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise; Ryan Peck and Charity Shreve, Legal Aid Clinic, Moscow, for respondent. Ryan Peck and Charity Shreve, Legal Interns, argued.

PERRY, J.

The state appeals from the district court's order granting Kyle Thomas Roe's motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In July 2002, an officer stopped a vehicle based on a violation of Idaho's seatbelt law. Subsequently, Roe, a passenger in that vehicle, was charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). Prior to trial, Roe filed a motion to suppress. The district court held a hearing on the motion at which the parties stipulated to the facts as set forth in the police report. In the report, the officer indicated that he observed a vehicle in which the front passenger was not wearing a seatbelt. The officer reached that conclusion because he noticed the silver latch locking mechanism suspended above the passenger's right shoulder. Based on this observation, the officer stopped the vehicle. Two additional officers soon arrived on the scene to assist. After stopping the vehicle, the first officer explained the reason for the stop and identified the driver by his drivers' license. A second officer verbally identified a rear passenger and, after conducting a check of his records, learned that the rear passenger had three outstanding arrest warrants. The second officer directed the rear passenger to exit the vehicle and placed the passenger into custody. The police report explains further:

Prior to a search of the rear compartment area incident to arrest, I had the rear passengers exit the vehicle on the passenger side of the car.... The second person to exit the vehicle was Kyle T. Roe who was sitting directly behind the driver's seat. As Roe exited the car, he was carrying a pair of blue jean shorts. I told Roe to leave the shorts in the vehicle. Roe placed the shorts onto the ground just below the rear passenger side door. I then had the front occupants exit the vehicle. For my safety, I had the five occupants sit down on the sidewalk next to the car approximately 10-12 feet away.... I searched the blue jean shorts which Roe was carrying.... Inside the front right pocket, I located a clear zip lock plastic baggie containing five small bundles of a green vegetable matter. Each bundle was wrapped in clear plastic and all had similar shapes and sizes. I also found in the same pocket green vegetable matter wrapped in clear plastic. From my training and experience, all of the substances appeared to be marijuana. I placed Roe into custody without incident and advised him he was under arrest for possession of marijuana under three ounces. As I did this, Roe stated, "It's actually 2.5 grams." I secured Roe into the back of my patrol car. I seized all of the evidence and secured it into my patrol car. After a records check of Roe by central, they advised Roe had a confirmed warrant. I released the rest of the occupants.

Roe moved to suppress the evidence found during the search and his statements made after his arrest. In support of his motion to suppress, Roe argued that the evidence stemmed from an illegal traffic stop. Roe asserted that the police had no grounds to search his shorts incident to a search of the car because, he argues, they improperly ordered him to leave his shorts in the car as he exited. In granting the motion to suppress, the district court ruled that stopping a motorist for a seatbelt violation pursuant to I.C. § 49-673 did not constitute a valid traffic stop and that the police had no grounds to search Roe's shorts incident to a search of the vehicle.

The state appeals from the district court's order granting Roe's motion to suppress. On appeal, the state argues that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence because the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on a violation of Idaho's seatbelt law. The state also argues that the district court erred because the search of the car and Roe's shorts was valid incident to arrest based upon the arrest of a passenger or, in the alternative, the outstanding warrant for Roe's arrest.

II. ANALYSIS

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

A. Valid Traffic Stop

The state argues that an apparent violation of I.C. § 49-673 provides reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop and, thus, the district court erred in granting Roe's motion to suppress evidence on this ground. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct.App.1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286.

At the time of the stop, I.C. § 49-673(1) read, in pertinent part:

Each occupant of the front seat of a motor vehicle which has a gross vehicle weight of no more than eight thousand (8,000) pounds, and which was manufactured with safety belts in compliance with federal motor vehicle safety standard no. 208, shall have a safety belt properly fastened about his body at all times when the vehicle is in motion.

Subsection (3) of I.C. § 49-673 describes the punishment imposed for the failure to comply with subsection one. At the time of the stop subsection (3) read:

If a person is convicted of a violation of any traffic law, other than a violation of the provisions of section 49-1229 or 49-1230, Idaho Code, relating to proof of liability insurance, it shall be an additional infraction for any person to violate the provisions of this section, for which a fine of five dollars ($5.00) shall be imposed.

In his motion to suppress, Roe argued, and the district court agreed, that a violation of I.C. § 49-673(1) alone is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle because the statute requires a violation of another traffic law before the seatbelt law becomes a citable traffic offense. This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 485, 959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct.App.1998). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. It is "incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001). Here, the statute's language was plain and unambiguous. Idaho Code Section 49-673(1), as it read at the time, made the failure to wear a seatbelt a violation of a traffic law. Punishment, however, in the form of a fine was not allowed unless a conviction on another traffic law violation was obtained. The legislature did not,...

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