State v. Rogahn, No. 20150297.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
• Writing for the Court: VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
• Citation: 879 N.W.2d 454
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Rodney Michael ROGAHN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 20150297.
• Decision Date: 26 May 2016

879 N.W.2d 454

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Rodney Michael ROGAHN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20150297.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 26, 2016.

879 N.W.2d 456

Joshua J. Traiser, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Tyler J. Morrow, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.

¶ 1] Rodney Rogahn appealed from a criminal judgment after he conditionally pled guilty to various drug crimes, reserving

[879 N.W.2d 457

the right to appeal an order denying his motion to suppress certain evidence and his request for a Franks hearing. We affirm.

I

¶ 2] The following information comes from the affidavit of probable cause offered in support of a warrant to search Rogahn's residence. On October 23, 2013, a confidential informant (“CI”) working with the Ward County Narcotics Task Force met with and purchased a substance from Trisha Engstrom. The substance was identified as likely being marijuana. Engstrom left this meeting and went to a residence identified as belonging to Rogahn, where Engstrom was seen entering the residence.

[¶ 3] The CI again met with Engstrom on October 29, 2013, with the CI again purchasing what an officer identified as marijuana. During this meeting, the CI inquired about purchasing a larger quantity of marijuana. Engstrom replied she would contact her “source” for pricing information. Engstrom further stated she could arrange another meeting for this purchase during the evening of October 29, 2013. After this second meeting, Engstrom parked her vehicle in front of her residence, which was across the street from Rogahn's residence. Officers observed Engstrom immediately walk to Rogahn's residence. Within approximately five minutes of leaving the second meeting, the CI received a message from Engstrom with the requested pricing information. During the time the CI arranged a third meeting with Engstrom, the officers did not see Engstrom leave Rogahn's residence.

[¶ 4] Prior to the third meeting, officers applied for a daytime search warrant for Rogahn's residence. The application included the affidavit of probable cause outlined above. After finding probable cause existed, the magistrate issued the daytime search warrant at 8:27 p.m. Officers arrested Engstrom at the third meeting, after which they executed the search warrant of Rogahn's residence at 9:54 p.m. The search lasted until 11:25 p.m. As a result of the search, Rogahn was charged with various drug related crimes.

[¶ 5] Rogahn moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search, arguing no probable cause existed and the officers executed the warrant at an unreasonable time. Rogahn further requested a Franks hearing, arguing the attesting officer made false statements in the affidavit of probable cause and the false statements were necessary for a finding of probable cause. The district court denied Rogahn's motion, concluding probable cause existed and the officers executed the warrant at a reasonable time. The court also denied a Franks hearing, concluding any false statements by the attesting officer were not made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly with regard to the truth and the allegedly false statements were not necessary for a finding of probable cause.

II

[¶ 6] Rogahn argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress certain evidence because the affidavit of probable cause did not support a finding of probable cause. He also argues the court erred by denying his motion to suppress because executing the daytime search warrant at 9:54 p.m. was unreasonable. A district court's decision to deny a motion to suppress will not be reversed on appeal if there is sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the district court's findings, and if its decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Johnson, 2011 ND 48, ¶ 9, 795 N.W.2d 367.

[879 N.W.2d 458

A

[¶ 7] Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, a search warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause. Johnson, at ¶ 10. “Probable cause to search exists if the facts and circumstances relied on by the magistrate would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the contraband or evidence sought probably will be found in the place to be searched.” State v. Ballweg, 2003 ND 153, ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d 490 (quoting State v. Thieling, 2000 ND 106, ¶ 7, 611 N.W.2d 861 ) (internal quotations omitted). In determining whether probable cause exists, courts “may not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit or application for issuance of the warrant.” State v. Schmalz, 2008 ND 27, ¶ 13, 744 N.W.2d 734. “The determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is a question of law” fully reviewable on appeal. Johnson, at ¶ 9 (quoting Schmalz, at ¶ 12). In marginal cases, we will defer to the magistrate's determination as to the existence of probable cause. Id. at ¶ 10.

[¶ 8] After reviewing the affidavit of probable cause, we conclude probable cause supported the issuance of the search warrant. After the CI's October 23, 2013 meeting with Engstrom, Engstrom went to and entered Rogahn's residence. Engstrom's pattern of behavior on October 29, 2013, further connected Rogahn's residence to drug activity. Following this meeting, Engstrom parked her vehicle and immediately proceeded towards Rogahn's residence rather than going to her own residence, mirroring what she had done on October 23, 2013. Within minutes of leaving the meeting, Engstrom contacted the CI with the pricing information and arranged for a larger purchase later that...